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James Hutton (1726-1797) is most famous for his Theory of the Earth in
which he demonstrated the vast time scale of the geological process and has become
known as "the founder ofmodern geology." Much therefore has been written about
Hutton's work on geology, but he was in fact a polymath who published on a variety
of subjects in natural philosophy and philosophy which have been largely neglected.
Indeed, his longest publication the three-volume metaphysical work An Investigation
ofthe Principles ofKnowledge and of the Progress ofReason, from Sense to Science
and Philosophy (1794) has been virtually ignored. Yet without an examination of his
metaphysical inquiry it is difficult to comprehend his approach to science.
Embedded within his metaphysics was Hutton's theory of language which is the
main subject of this thesis.
Beginning with an introduction which biographically and historiographically
contextualizes Hutton, this thesis is then divided into three parts: Metaphysics,
Language, and Science. The first part contains an analysis ofHutton's metaphysics
and an explanation ofwhy it has been neglected. It also considers the influence of
Hutton's university professors—specifically Colin MacLaurin and John Stevenson—
on his metaphysics and theory of language. Additionally this part includes an
examination ofwhat has been written about Hutton's metaphysics most notably in
the contemporary periodicals The Analytical Review, The Critical Review, and The
English Review. The second part begins by illustrating the importance that Hutton
attached to his work on language as he presented it to an intellectually elite audience
as part of a linguistic debate at the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Using manuscript
evidence from the Society's records this part also illustrates the extent ofHutton's
activities in both the Physical Class and the Literary Class of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh. Additionally this part shows that Hutton's published theory of language,
which contained dissertations on speech and orthography, was a social, cultural and
pedagogical response to the period's preoccupation with standardization. But
Hutton's theory differed completely from the preoccupation with an elitist standard
that was prevalent at the time, as he thought that the fashionable pronunciation of the
Court and the polite metropolitan society of London were just as erroneous as any
regional dialect since they all failed to adhere to proper principles. In the third part it
is argued that Hutton's principles of orthography had implications for his and other's
science since if natural philosophy continued to be written on an erroneous
etymological standard it would eventually fall into scientific ruin. The thesis
concludes that since Hutton's theory of language was ultimately part of his
metaphysics which he applied to his science, then in order to fully comprehend
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James Hutton was born in Edinburgh on 3 June 1726. He was the son of
William Hutton, a merchant who had held the office ofCity Treasurer, and Sarah
Balfour, the daughter of John Balfour another Edinburgh merchant. Hutton had three
sisters, Sarah, Jean and Isabella, as well as an older brother John who died as a child.
Hutton's father died in 1729 when James was only three-years-old but he left the
family financially sound. As a boy, Hutton was educated by his mother at home until
he attended the High School ofEdinburgh at age eleven. Then in November 1740,
fourteen-year-old Hutton began his studies as a student ofhumanity at the University
of Edinburgh. Three years later in 1743, when he was seventeen, Hutton entered a
brief and unsuccessful legal apprenticeship and by the following year he had returned
to the University of Edinburgh. There he studied medicine, but on turning twenty-
one Hutton abruptly moved to Paris in 1747, a move that could have been associated
with the birth of an illegitimate son which happened about this time. In Paris Hutton
studied chemistry and anatomy, then after two years in France he returned to Britain
via Holland where he was awarded his Doctor ofMedicine degree at Leyden in
September 1749 for a thesis entitled De Sanguine et CirculationeMicrocosmi (On
human blood and its circulation)} Hutton then spent several months in London from
late 1749 until the summer of 1750 when he returned to Scotland. On his return to
Scotland Hutton became successful in business along with John Davie, a former
student friend, by devising a synthesized process to manufacture sal ammoniac
(ammonium chloride). Used as a metallurgy flux and as smelling salts, sal
ammoniac had previously to be imported and this new process made Hutton
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financially independent. An interest in agriculture then took Hutton to Norfolk in
1752 to learn the latest methods of farming. It was also at this time that his interest
in geology began and while he made excursions throughout England "on foot" to
further his knowledge on agriculture, "it was in the course of them that to amuse
himself on the road, he first began to study mineralogy or geology."2 Hutton also
made a tour from the early spring until the middle of summer of 1754 "from
Rotterdam through Holland, Brabant, Flanders, and Picardy."3 By the end of the
summer of 1754 he had returned to Scotland and began to put his agricultural
improvement plans into action on farms which he had inherited at Slighhouses and
Nether Monynut in Berwickshire. Indeed, Hutton's farming achievements became
legendary as Adam Ferguson noted that "he hastened to Norfolk" where
he purchased a plough, hired a ploughman, and brought both on post-
chaise with him to Berwickshire. The neighbours were diverted with this
assortment of company and baggage, and no less with the attempt which
followed, to plough with a pair ofhorses without a driver. This joke,
however, has become serious, and is now the general practice from one
end of Scotland to the other.4
Although he made several geological excursions throughout England and Scotland,
and made several visits to Edinburgh, Hutton mostly remained on his farm from
1754 engaged in improving agricultural practices until 1767 when he returned to live
in his native Edinburgh. While Hutton's farms and sal ammoniac business continued
to boost his income, his other business interests included an active role on the
committee of one of the greatest engineering projects of the time: the Forth and
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Clyde Canal.5 So being independently wealthy held the advantage of not having to
spend time in employment that would have diverted him from his studies, as well as
not being beholden to patronage that could have influenced his findings. Therefore,
once he had moved back to Edinburgh in 1767, as his first biographer John Playfair
wrote, Hutton was able to give "his undivided attention from that time to scientific
pursuits."6
On his return to Edinburgh Hutton became a member of the Philosophical
Society in 1768 and "he read several papers" to that society during the period from
1771 until 1783.7 The Philosophical Society then turned into the Royal Society of
Edinburgh in 1783 and Hutton became a founding member of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh. This was a relatively formal gathering as records of the meetings were
kept and papers were published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh; and it was in this environment that Hutton tested his work in front of an
intellectually exclusive audience before publishing the full-length versions through
the prestigious publishing houses of Andrew Strahan and Thomas Cadell of London,
Thomas Cadell Junior and William Davies of London, and William Creech of
Edinburgh. Indeed, prior to the release of the first volume of the Transactions of the
Royal Society ofEdinburgh in 1788 Hutton had only published a pamphlet on coal
taxation in 17778, and although he had amassed an enormous amount ofmanuscript
by the mid-1780s John Playfair believed that it was in fact only Hutton's enthusiastic
5 'A list of the committee, &c. for managing the affairs of the company of the Forth and Clyde
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support for the Royal Society of Edinburgh which prompted him in 1785 to read the
Theory ofthe Earth at the Physical Class as he
was in no haste to publish his theory [of the earth]; for he was one of
those who are much more delighted with the contemplation of truth, than
with the praise ofhaving discovered it. It might therefore have been a
long time before he had given any thing on this subject to the public, had
not his zeal for supporting a recent institution which he thought of
importance to the progress of science in his own country induced him to
come forward, and to communicate to the Royal Society [of Edinburgh] a
concise account ofhis theory of the earth.9
And although Hutton had circulated his theory as an Abstract concerning the System
ofthe Earth, its Duration, and Stability around his circle of friends in 1785, it was
the publication of this Theory of the Earth in the first volume of Transactions ofthe
Royal Society ofEdinburgh in 1788 that subsequently led to criticism which
prompted Hutton to publish his theory in full in 1795.
Hutton's Theory of the Earth was epoch-making as he rejected the Biblical
chronology that the earth was six-thousand years old and the relative catastrophic
position that fossils found on mountain tops were the result ofNoah's flood. Instead,
Hutton advanced that the earth experiences a cycle of erosion, deposition,
consolidation and uplift. Immense underground heat produces consolidation and
uplift and the entire system occurs continually over a period beyond the capabilities
of human observation or as described in Hutton's most famous dictum we can "find
no vestige of a beginning,—no prospect of an end."10 However, aware of the
extremely controversial implications ofhis theory Hutton attempted to avoid being in
conflict with Mosaic chronology as he wrote an (unpublished) preface intended to
preempt criticism. EntitledMemorialjustifying the present Theory ofthe Earth from
9
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the suspicion of impiety he sent it to William Robertson who rewrote it but Hutton
decided against using it as indeed Robertson had suggested.11 Nevertheless, once the
Theory ofthe Earth had been published in the Transactions ofthe Royal Society of
Edinburgh it was immediatelymet with criticism by John Williams in a 'Refutation
ofDr Hutton's Theory of the Earth' as part of the Preface of his NaturalHistory of
the Mineral Kingdom (1789) since,
The wild and unnatural notion of the eternity of the world leads first to
scepticism, and at last to downright infidelity and atheism. If once we
entertain a firm persuasion that the world is eternal, and can go on of
itself in the reproduction and progressive vicissitude of things, we may
then suppose that there is no use for the interposition of a governing
power; and because we do not see the Supreme Being with our bodily
eyes, we depose the almighty Creator and Governor of the universe from
his office, and instead of divine providence, we commit the care of all
things to blind chance. Like a mob, who think they can do well enough
without legal restraints, depose and slay their Magistrates. But this is
rebellion against lawful authority, which must soon end in anarchy,
confusion, and misery, and so does our intellectual rebellion. How
degrading is infidelity! how miserable must a thinking man be in distress,
who does not believe that there is at the head of the creation, a good,
intelligent, and powerful being, who cares for his welfare through all the
stages of existence!12
This accusation that likened Hutton's theory to mob-rule was written byWilliams in
September 1789 and his rhetoric suggests that he may have analogised the theory
with events in France as the storming of the Bastille had occurred just a few weeks
previously on 14 July. AfterWilliams' attack a series of letters published in the
Monthly Review in 1790 and 1791 by Jean Andre Deluc (who had earlier disagreed
with Hutton's work on meteorology) also attacked Hutton's Theory of the Earth.
However, it was the 1793 attack by Richard Kirwan in the Transaction ofthe Royal
11
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Irish Academy which prompted Hutton to publish his theory in full.13 Indeed,
Playfair noted that,
Before this period, though Dr Hutton had been often urged by his friends
to publish his entire work on the Theory ofthe Earth, he had continually
put off the publication, and there seemed to be some danger that it would
not take place in his own life time. The very day, however, afterMr
Kirwan's paper was put into his hands, he began the revisal of his
manuscript, and resolved immediately to send it to the press. The reason
he gave was, that Mr Kirwan had in so many instances completely
mistaken, both the facts, and the reasonings in his Theory, that he saw the
necessity of laying before the world a more ample explanation of them.
The work was accordingly published, in two volumes octavo, in 1795;
and contained, besides what was formerly given in the Edinburgh
Transactions, the proofs and readings much more in detail, and a much
fuller application of the principles to the explanation of appearances.
The two volumes, however, then published, do not complete the theory: a
third, necessary for that purpose, remained behind, and is still in
manuscript.14
Certainly, Volume III of his Theory ofthe Earth, with Proofs and Illustrations
remained in manuscript until a surviving fragment of it was published in 1899.
During the three years prior to the publication of Theory ofthe Earth, with
Proofs and Illustrations Volumes I & II in 1795, Hutton's other most voluminous
publications had appeared as Dissertations on Different Subjects in Natural
Philosophy (1792), An Investigation ofthe Principles ofKnowledge, and of the
Progress ofReason, from Sense to Science and Philosophy [hereafter Principles of
Knowledge] (1794), and A Dissertation upon the Philosophy ofLight, Heat, and Fire
(1794). But in the course ofpublishing his most voluminous works his health was
deteriorating as he had contracted a suppression ofurine and was subjected to a very
painful and dangerous operation by his friend Joseph Black. At times his health
13 Kirwan, Richard. 'Examination of the Supposed Igneous Origin of Stony Substances' in
Transactions ofthe Royal Irish Academy. 1793. Volume 5. 51-87.
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improved and he was "remarkably well"15 and "in excellent spirits,"16 and able to
resume working, however for his remaining years Hutton was confined to the house
that he had built at 3 St. John's Hill in Edinburgh. Indeed by April 1795 in a letter to
James Watt, Joseph Black wrote that, "Dr. Hutton has been close confined to the
house for this twelve months and is now without hope of relief from his confinement
17but he enjoys good Spirits and is constantly employed in writing and publishing."
Black noted in the summer of 1796 that "when free from pain" Hutton was "still in
possession ofhis usual vivacity and activity in thinking and conversation and
writing," although "there are days now and then when he is distressed with painfull
(sic) spasms of the bladder, occasioned by a Stone, and his sensibility is so acute that
pain is to him uncommonly distressing."18 But by the winter of 1796-7, Playfair
noted that Hutton "became gradually weaker, was extremely emaciated, and suffered
much pain" even although he "still retained the full activity and acuteness of
mind."19 Hutton died on 26 March 1797 and was buried in Greyfriars Kirkyard.
Although he had "lived with his sisters, three excellent women, who managed his
domestic affairs", it was only Isabella who "remained to lament his death."20
Nevertheless, Playfair informs us that on the day of his death and in spite of a great
deal of pain, Hutton was still employing "himself in writing, and particularly in
noting down his remarks on some attempts which were then making towards a new
15
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mineralogical nomenclature."21 A fortnight later John Robison wrote a letter to
James Watt in Birmingham and noted that Joseph Black
feels very strongly the loss of his amiable and worthy Friend and
Companion Dr. Hutton. Dr. Black has not had Spirits enough to be able
to see Dr. Hutton these several Months, till within a few days of his
decease—He left us without a struggle, in less than half a minute—after
speaking with the utmost clearness—He was busy with another large
volume and had engaged the Engraver to come and get his orders the day
after that in which he died.22
Evidently, the 'Engraver' did not come as the rest ofHutton's work remained in
manuscript until a fragment ofVolume III ofhis Theory of the Earth was published
in 1899 and The LostDrawings were published in 1978. His Elements ofAgriculture
has never been published. While Hutton's time had ran out his geology was to bring
93
about a 'paradigm shift' in thinking, that was to reverberate throughout the modern
sciences as the cyclical formation of landforms postulated in Huttonian
Uniformitarianism astonishingly changed the comprehension of the age of the Earth.
Hutton had therefore done for the Earth Sciences of
geology and geomorphology what Newton had already achieved for
astronomy, and what Darwin was destined to do for biology. Indeed,
Darwin, through Lyell, owed a debt to Hutton, because Darwin's theory
of evolution by means of natural selection is merely an application to the
organic world of that slow evolutionary process which Hutton had first
perceived in Nature.24
Whereas Hutton was involved in the formal environments of the
Philosophical Society and the Royal Society of Edinburgh during the last thirty years
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Oyster Club along with his friends Adam Smith and Joseph Black. Playfair's
impression of Smith, Black and Hutton was that,
As all three possessed great talents, enlarged views, and extensive
information, without any of the stateliness and formality which men of
letters think it sometimes necessary to affect; as they were all three easily
amused; were equally prepared to speak and to listen; and as the sincerity
of their friendship had never been darkened by the least shade of envy; it
would be hard to find an example, where every thing favourable to good
society was more perfectly united, and every thing adverse more entirely
excluded.25
This lack of formality at the Oyster Club however meant that we are left with little
detail as to what went on at meetings. But it is known that other members of the
Oyster Club included leading members of the Edinburgh literati such as the architect
Robert Adam, Hugh Blair, John Clerk of Eldin, William Cullen, Adam Ferguson, Sir
James Hall, John Hope, Henry MacKenzie, John Playfair, William Robertson, and
Dugald Stewart. It was an informal intellectual environment which was thought to
be characteristic of the country as,
In London, in Paris, and other large cities of Europe, though they contain
many literary men, that access to them is difficult; and, even after that is
obtained, the conversation is, for some time, shy and constrained. In
Edinburgh, the access to men of parts is not only easy, but their
conversation and the communication of their knowledge are at once
imparted to intelligent strangers with the utmost liberality. The
philosophers of Scotland have no nostrums. They tell what they know,
and deliver their sentiments without disguise or reserve.26
And it was an informal environment that suited Hutton well and one in which he
evidently flourished. Indeed, he was a most welcome guest at many of the private
gatherings of such members of the literati as Monboddo, Smith, Ferguson and many
25
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others, and Playfair noted that a "brighter tint of gaiety and chearfulness (sic) spread
itself over every countenance when" he "entered the room."27 Certainly,
He had, indeed, that genuine simplicity, originating in the absence of all
selfishness and vanity, by which a man loses sight ofhimself altogether,
and neither conceals what is, nor affects what is not.. .His great
liveliness, added to this aptness to lose sight of himself, would sometimes
lead him into little excentricities (sic), that formed an amusing contrast
with the graver habits of a philosophic life.. ..His conversation was
extremely animated and forcible, and, whether serious or gay, full of
ingenious and original observation. Great information, and an excellent
memory, supplied an inexhaustible fund of illustration, always happily
introduced, and in which, when the subject admitted of it, the witty and
the ludicrous never failed to occupy a considerable place.—But it is
impossible by words to convey any idea of the effect ofhis conversation,
and of the impression made by so much philosophy, gaiety and humour,
accompanied by a manner at once so animated and so simple. Things are
made known only by comparison, and that which is unique admits of no
28
description.
Hutton's circle of illustrious friends included Joseph Black, James Russell, Sir
George Clerk and James Lind, as well as several others.29 But while Hutton thought
that it was only the intelligentsia who could fully understand his work, he never lost
his common touch. A description ofHutton as being "an aristocrat of the mind"30
was clearly a misleading metaphor, as indeed Playfair wrote how during an
agricultural excursion the peasants in Norfolk would not have kept a distance from
him as "It was always true ofDr. Hutton, that to an ordinary man he appeared to be
•3 1
an ordinary man."
It seems likely that language was often a subject of discussion at these
informal gatherings since Adam Smith, Lord Monboddo, and many others had
written on the subject. The subject had been so popular during the eighteenth
27 Playfair, 'Biographical Account', 98.
28 Ibid., 94.
29 Ibid., 46.
30 Porter, Roy. TheMaking ofGeology: Earth Science in Britain, 1660-1815. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977. 156.
31 Playfair, 'Biographical Account', 43-44.
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century and there were inquiries into the relationship between language and society
as well as language and mind which encompassed thoughts on the order of the parts
of speech as well as a vigorous debate into the origin of language that took a number
of forms including conjectural natural histories of language. However, Hutton's
method of explaining how language was formed was written as part of his illustration
of the progress ofmind from sense to science and then to philosophy in which he
noted that,
The philosophy of science surely cannot be complete, until the natural
progress of the human mind, in forming language, be studied in its
principles. For, language is truly a record, in which the operations of a
mind, proceeding to communicate its thoughts, may be legible; therefore,
in seeing the elements of language, we shall trace the original thoughts of
men; and, it is by examining what has passed in the mind, that the nature
of our knowledge be understood.32
And Hutton's theory of language as part of a larger work on metaphysics was
comprised of his thoughts upon speech as well as his most original contribution to
the eighteenth century discussion of language which was his thinking about
orthography. Hutton presented the orthographic part ofhis work on language to the
Royal Society ofEdinburgh on June 19, July 17 and November 20, of 1786 in a
paper entitled Dissertation on Written Language as a Sign ofSpeech. The full
version was published as part of his Principles ofKnowledge in 1794. The
discussion of language occupied 246 of its 2,173 quarto pages and was in two parts:
the first an examination of the principles of speech, the second a discussion of the
principles of orthography.
The section on spoken language contributed to the debate on the relationship
of language to mind and included a response to the philosophes Charles de Brasses
32
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and Antoine Court de Gebelin who were attempting to revive the anachronistic belief
that there was a natural connection between words and ideas. Indeed, Hutton
attacked this theory of natural language since he held that language is unquestionably
artificial. However, Hutton did believe that there are a fixed number of vocal sounds
possible within human physiology and by identifying these 'elements' and having the
orthography follow them then this would result in spoken language becoming more
stable and written language more accurate.
The section on written language contributed to the debate on etymology and
pronunciation and included a critique of contemporary etymological practises.
Hutton, on the other hand constructed a universal alphabet by identifying the
'elements' of language, and it was by adhering to what in effect was a phonetic
alphabet that Hutton thought science should progress. So by using rules instead of
memory he pointed out how society and educational methods would benefit, but
ultimately it was the accuracy and preservation of science that Hutton wished his
audience to be concerned about. Indeed, Hutton clearly attached enormous
importance to his work on language and this was evident in how he presented it to
his audience: first by reading it at the Royal Society of Edinburgh, second by having
part of it published in the Transactions ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh, and third
by having it published as part ofhis metaphysics by Andrew Strahan, and Thomas
Cadell. Therefore, Hutton clearly thought that if his theory of language was to make
an impression upon the Scots and English literati or those who had the power to
enact an improvement, he had to present it in the most eminent way.
The ingenuity ofHutton's work on language was recognised by John Playfair
as he noted that Hutton had "read several very ingenious papers on Written
18
Language, in the Royal Society of Edinburgh" before dedicating part of his
metaphysics to his "Theory of Language."33 But while Playfair read his 'Biographical
account ofthe late Dr James Hutton, F.R.S.Edin.' at the Royal Society ofEdinburgh on
10th January 1803 and subsequently published it in 1805 in Volume V ofthe Transactions
ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh34 at least four contemporary periodicals had
already reviewed Hutton's Principles ofKnowledge and his theory of language.
These reviews in The Analytical Review, The Critical Review, The English Review,
and The British Critic on the whole praised Hutton's metaphysics as well as his work
on language but were critical of his style ofwriting.
As Playfair himselfwrote regarding Hutton's writing style, the "great size of
the book [Principles ofKnowledge], and the obscurity which may justly be objected
to many parts of it, have probably prevented it from being received as it deserves,
even among those who are conversant with abstract speculation."35 This line of
criticism continued into the late nineteenth-century. James McCosh wrote in his The
Scottish Philosophy that James Hutton was an "author of an elaborate work in three
large quarto volumes" on metaphysics, which "is full of awkwardly constructed
sentences and of repetitions, and it is a weariness in the extreme to read it." McCosh
went on to write that in Principles ofKnowledge "we are made to feel at times that
these thoughts must be profound, if only we could understand them. He certainly
speculates on recondite subjects, but does not throw much light on them."36 Indeed,
the lack of clarity in Hutton's writing has been repeatedly commented on, as for
example in 1947 when the Royal Society of Edinburgh held a commemoration of the
33
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150th anniversary ofHutton's death, Professor S. I. Tomkeieffwrote that "Hutton
was notoriously obscure in his writings. It requires a great effort, even after repeated
reading, to grasp the meaning ofhis ideas."37 But the neglect ofHutton's
metaphysics has led to frequent misinterpretation ofHutton's intent within his other
works.
Considering the significance Hutton attached to the reciprocal arrangement of
physics and metaphysics and the importance of his first principles towards both
natural and moral philosophy; it is extraordinary that so many writers have failed to
grasp that Hutton was engaged in the pursuit of a general system and they have been
unable to notice how his metaphysics and his physics are intertwined. In his
scholarly book, James Hutton and the History ofGeology, Dennis Dean even went so
far as to complain that Playfair in his Biographical Account had given a "surprising
amount of space to Hutton's philosophizing on physics and metaphysics."38 But of
course Playfair had good reason to write extensively [in fact it only covered twelve
pages39] on Hutton's physics and metaphysics, indeed he went so far as to note that
in regards to Hutton's work on physics, the "ingenuity ofDr Hutton's reasonings
(sic) cannot be questioned, nor, I think, the justness ofmany ofhis conclusions."40
Certainly, it was through his investigation of the nature of the material world from
which Hutton was first led into an inquiry ofmetaphysical principles and
consequently a complete metaphysical system was established in his 1794 Principles
ofKnowledge, and it was upon his physical and metaphysical principles that Hutton
37 Tomkeieff, S.I. 'James Hutton and the Philosophy of Geology' in James Hutton—1726-1797,
Commemoration ofthe 150th Anniversary ofhis Death in Part IV ofVolume LXIII (1948-49) of the
Proceedings, Section B (Biology) of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd,
1950. 387-400. 387.
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based his geological theories in his Theory ofthe Earth. While there is no doubt that
Principles ofKnowledge is difficult to read, it has also received much undue
criticism since its publication in 1794. Extraordinarily, and what has been
completely ignored is that Hutton wrote that his writing would be difficult to read
and understand, indeed this point has never been acknowledged by his
contemporaries or subsequently. This point will be explained in Chapter One. So
although Hutton thought he had treated his investigation "diffusively"41; the criticism
ofHutton's writing has not taken into consideration what Hutton himselfwrote about
his composition, in fact John Playfair and Dugald Stewart ignored this and others
have followed.
The obscurity ofHutton's metaphysics has meant that Hutton has been
misunderstood as his Theory ofthe Earth has been constantly treated in isolation
from his other work without considering the impact that his metaphysics had on his
geology. Sir Edward Battersby Bailey, a twentieth-century biographer of Hutton,
openly admitted that he had not even bothered to read Hutton's metaphysics as he
wrote that, "By the time I struggled through Hutton's Dissertations [on Different
Subjects inNaturalPhilosophy] on Physics, 1792,1 found myself so exhausted that I
took his three volumes of Investigations [Principles ofKnowledge] into metaphysics,
1794, on trust from Playfair."42 But Playfair had condensed 2,173 quarto pages into
less than 4 quarto pages, and since it is difficult to comprehend Hutton's approach to
science without an examination of his metaphysics it is no wonder that there has
been so much misunderstanding about James Hutton. In spite of the fact that
Hutton's works can be read and understood as stand-alone writings, we have it on
41 PK III, 675.
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authority from Hutton that most of his published work, especially his physics and
metaphysics, was related as part of a comprehensive general system. And his
metaphysics which an understanding of is key to an understanding ofHutton's
overall general system including his geology has most often been ignored. Certainly,
even in what has been perhaps the most scholarly biography ofHutton, Dennis R.
Dean's James Hutton and the History ofGeology (1992), only one paragraph was
spent on Principles ofKnowledge, which was Hutton's largest work, and that was
paraphrased from Playfair's account.43 This treatment has been in spite of the fact
that Hutton noted that this was the foundation to his entire system; that without his
metaphysics his geology would have been like bricks without mortar.
James Hutton is known today as 'The Founder of Modern Geology' because
his Theory ofthe Earth changed the notion that the earth was thousands of years old
to the established thinking that it is billions of years old. Understandably much has
been written about Hutton's thoughts on geology but as a polymath there is much
more to his story including agriculture, chemistry, meteorology, physics and
metaphysics. However, the study of this non-geological work has not received the
attention it deserves in spite of the fact that it was published in greater volume than
his geology. Hutton's metaphysics was part of a general system that unified
knowledge and his theory of language was an important part of his metaphysics.
Therefore, his theory of language also played an important part in his wider general
system, and this should be considered when attempting to gain an understanding of
Hutton. Until now the history ofHutton's theory of language has not been told but
while this thesis shows how Hutton presented his work and the potential benefits that
43
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it could provide for society and education, it also attempts to show how ultimately
Hutton's method intended to contribute to the advancement of science.
It seems likely that Hutton's interest in the relationship between language and
science had its roots in the teaching of John Stevenson and Colin Maclaurin. Both
were Hutton's professors at the University of Edinburgh and while it has been shown
how Hutton's writing on Design resembled Maclaurin's44, as well as how an
illustration made in Stevenson's class led to a lifelong fascination with chemistry45,
this thesis looks at other ways in which these two professors influenced James
Hutton. Indeed, in Chapter One it will be shown how geometric reasoning was
prioritized in MacLaurin's class, and metaphysics and language in Stevenson's logic
and rhetoric class.
Throughout his life Hutton was accustomed to working in an interdisciplinary
intellectual environment and his activities in this regard are similar to those displayed
by MacLaurin. Certainly, just as Maclaurin facilitated the enlargement of the
Society for the Improvement ofMedical Knowledge to include philosophy and
literature that resulted in the formation of the Society for Improving Arts and
Sciences and particularly Natural Knowledge, or better known as the Philosophical
Society; Hutton was enthusiastic for the interdisciplinary approach of the Royal
Society of Edinburgh which allowed members of different interests to mix with the
organisation ofboth a Physical Class and a Literary Class. In addition to the papers
that he read at the Royal Society of Edinburgh, it is evident from the earliest Minute
44 The resemblance between MacLaurin and Hutton's writing on Design was pointed out in several
examples in Donald B. Mclntyre's 'James Hutton's Edinburgh: The Historical and Political
Background', Earth Sciences History 16 (1997), 100-157.; and it was also pointed out in Judith V.
Grabiner's 'Maclaurin and Newton: The Newtonian Style and the Authority ofMathematics' in
Science andMedicine in the Scottish Enlightenment edited by Charles W. J. Withers and Paul Wood.
East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press, 2002. 143-171.
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Books that Hutton was extensively active within both the Literary and the Physical
Class and that he held responsibilities as an Office Bearer on some of the
Committees of the Society. Furthermore, most accounts of the early years of the
Royal Society of Edinburgh have noted that while the Physical Class had a number
of debates in progress, the Literary Class was lacking in themes and the
interdisciplinary nature of the Society soon diminished as a result. But this thesis
offers an alternative view as by examining the Minute Books of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh it will be shown in Chapter Two how in fact there was a vigorous debate
about language taking place that Hutton entered by reading his Dissertation on
Written Language as a Sign ofSpeech.
Secondary literature on Hutton began with the contemporary reviews referred
to above and then the biography by his friend John Playfair. Playfair noted that
Hutton "was indefatigable in study, and was in the habit of using his pen continually
as an instrument of thought, he wrote a great deal, and has left behind him an
incredible quantity ofmanuscript, though imperfect, and never intended for the
press."46 But most ofHutton's manuscripts are lost and only a few letters have
survived, so Hutton's publications and Playfair's biography are the only other
primary sources available. And while Playfair's biography has been the fundamental
guide to Hutton's life and works, it is important to note that this sympathetic account
is not always reliable. Indeed, as a result of too much reliance on Playfair's eulogy
myths have developed about Hutton's character. A portrait by Sir Henry Raeburn is
apparently a most lifelike visual image ofHutton, but it typified a false notion from
Playfair's account that Hutton was a model of abstinence. This myth was further
46 Ibid., 93.
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reinforced in Robert Louis Stevenson's comment on Raeburn's portrait as "Hutton
the geologist, in quakerish raiment, and looking altogether trim and narrow, and as if
he cared more about fossils than young ladies."47 However, from a closer inspection
of some of the content of the surviving letters that Hutton wrote it is evident that he
was not always the chaste and sober bachelor that Playfair would have us believe.48
Certainly, Hutton fathered a son and this abrupt move to Paris in 1747 when he was
still a student was most probably to avoid a potential scandal in Edinburgh. In fact,
since the mother and child had moved to London it was only after Hutton died that
many ofhis friends became aware that he had a son. Therefore, while Playfair's
biography is a fundamental source of information about Hutton his eulogy cannot be
viewed as definitive.
Most subsequent secondary work about James Hutton has focused on his
geology and that is no surprise considering he was the first to notice that interpreting
the past history of the earth can only be done by examining the earth as it exists at
present while acknowledging that the earth's origins are beyond human investigation.
Indeed, his Theory of the Earth shifted the accepted wisdom on the age of the earth
and subsequently all branches of science have built upon his position. Sir Archibald
Geikie, who was one of the most eminent scientists in nineteenth-century Britain,
more than anyone, advanced the notion that Hutton was the father ofmodern
geology. Certainly, Geikie noted,
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Hutton started with the grand conception that the past history of our
globe must be explained by what can be seen to be happening now, or to
have happened only recently. The dominant idea in his philosophy is that
the present is the key to the past. We have grown so familiar with this
idea, it enters so intimately into all our conceptions in regard to
geological questions, that we do not readily realize the genius of the man
who first grasped it with unerring insight, and made it the chief corner¬
stone ofmodern geology.49
However, in The Earth in Decay: A History ofBritish Geomorphology, 1578-1878
(1969) Gordon L. Davies asserted that Geikie had mythologized Hutton as having
used completely modern methodology. In this book Davies made a number of
assertions regarding how Hutton's Theory ofthe Earth should be viewed in relation
to what was published before and after. While Davies gave Hutton considerable
praise, it was nevertheless his belief that Hutton "was not so much the precursor of
the late nineteenth-century school of fluvial geomorphology" but rather he was "the
scholar who blended the simple, uncritical fluvialism of the seventeenth century with
the teleology of the eighteenth century."50 As a result, Davies' assertions sparked a
lively discussion among geologists and historians of science as to whether Hutton's
geological theory preceded or succeeded the evidence that was required to back it up.
However, although Davies wrote that Hutton's Deism was "the basic premise from
which the entire Huttonian theory stems. Metaphysics led him to geology through a
simple chain of reasoning"51, as with most who have participated in this animated
debate he had not bothered to read Hutton's non-geological work that included his
metaphysics which was his longest work of all.
While some writers were aware of and had alluded to the significance ofHutton's
metaphysics and the fact that as with his geology it was merely a part of an entire system;
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it was not until Winslow H. Galbraith's unpublished PhD Thesis James Hutton: An
Analytical andHistorical Study (1974) that an attempt was made to examine Hutton's
work as a whole.52 This was long overdue as almost everyone to write about Hutton since
Playfair had focused on single elements ofHutton's general system and as a result had
distorted the thinking about Hutton; but since this thesis was not published, there still has
not been a work that has covered Hutton's entire system. Even ifGalbraith's thesis had
been published it was written from a theological and philosophical perspective with little
historical content and its main focus was to show how Hutton had blended science and
theology in his general system.53 And as Davies had already done, Galbraith criticised
Geikie and other modem writers who had portrayed Hutton as the "de-theologizer of
geology"; indeed, Galbraith noted that "no one can with an openmind read Hutton's
works without noticing the prominent role played by his theology. It is possible to ignore
Hutton's theology in attempting to reconstruct his view in some area, but it is not possible
to do justice to Hutton in such a procedure."54 In fact, for Galbraith Hutton's theology
was the "starting point and the goal of the entire conceptual system."55
In his book The Making ofGeology: Earth Science in Britain, 1660-1815
(1977) Roy Porter extended this position by arguing that Hutton was not geology's
"first truly empirical fieldworker"56 and affirmed that this impression ofHutton
merely existed as the result of "Geikie's championing."57 Indeed, Porter asserted
CO
that Hutton's geology was "deductive" , old-fashioned, and that some of "his most
important observations were made to confirm, not to decide, contentious points,
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indeed after he had actually written his Theory,"59 Therefore, Porter thought that
Hutton should be linked "to previous generations than to his immediate
successors."60 This position was maintained by Stephen Jay Gould in his Hen's
Teeth and Horse's Toes (1984) as he thought that Hutton's "observations no doubt
inspired, and instructed him; but we can show, also without doubt, that fieldwork
was not the source ofhis theory.. ..Fieldwork, at best, provided confirmation for a
theory developed elsewhere."61 Additionally, Gould in his Time's Arrow, Time's
Cycle (1987) wrote that "Hutton presents his theory as the a priori solution to a
problem in final causation, not as an induction from field evidence."62 The position
taken by Gordon L. Davies, Roy Porter and Stephen Jay Gould on Hutton's method
raised the ire of numerous geologists who held that Hutton had used purely inductive
methodology. So by the 1970s two entirely contrasting views on Hutton had developed;
the first that he was the first truly empirical geological fieldworker, and the second that his
geology was part of a general system constructed merely to illustrate design in the
universe.
However, two subsequent articles have quashed the argument that Hutton's
geological theory preceded his evidence. In his article "What was James Hutton's
methodology?" David J. Leveson meticulously demonstrated how "revisionist
accusations of a priorism [regarding Hutton's method] fail"63, and with respect to the
disputed proofs regarding granite and unconformities, "Hutton's reputation as an
59
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inductivist remains firm"64 Leveson concluded that "Most vitally, theory
construction appears to rest on a firm, pre-established empirical base" 5, and "his
procedure, judged by modern standards—standards defined by the actual practice of
scientists today—must be deemed acceptable and empirical."66 Strong evidence to
reinforce this position has been established in Donald B. Mclntyre's "The Royal
Society of Edinburgh, James Hutton, the Clerks ofPenicuik and the Igneous Origin
of Granite" in which it is shown how Hutton's evidence preceded his theory.67
Another perspective for the source ofHutton's geology was advanced in 1978 by
J. E. O'Rourke who argued that Hutton had gone a "step beyond" the empiricism of
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume and reached "a viewpoint similar to that of the great Prussian
philosopher Immanuel Kant"68 by "assigning a greater role to the operation of the mind in
creating knowledge."69 And so according to O'Rourke, Hutton had "apparently felt that
he could not expound a radically new philosophy in a geological treatise that was itself too
novel. So he dressed the theory in a teleology that was already out of fashion."70
O'Rourke thought that misunderstandings about whether Hutton's methodology was truly
modem or not had materialized because geologists such as Sir Archibald Geikie had
ignored Hutton's design argument, whereas historians of science such as Roy Porter had
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While geologists and historians of science have disagreed about Hutton's
aims and methodology, intellectual historians have tended to overlook or
misunderstand Hutton. During the last fifty years scholars have taken a keen interest
in the intellectual history of eighteenth-century Scotland, but missing from these
studies has been a thorough examination of James Hutton who alongside David
Hume and Adam Smith was a literatus of the first rank. Several interesting articles
by Jean Jones examining various aspects ofHutton's interests including his
involvement in the Forth and Clyde Canal, his agricultural career, his geological
collection, and his correspondence, have been helpful additions to understanding
Hutton. However, an understanding ofHutton in a wider sense is lacking and the
neglect of his metaphysics is the main reason behind this misunderstanding of
Hutton. Only two essays have concentrated on Hutton's metaphysics: the first by
Peter Jones concluded that,
The distinctive features ofHutton's philosophy, as he would have
admitted, are the comprehensive nature ofhis whole system, and the
rigour ofhis method....Hutton, who repeatedly described his position as
'idealist', saw himself as starting at the same point as Locke, but as
remaining more rigorously faithful to Lockean tenets than anyone else
had done; Berkeley, Hume, and to some extent Reid, had all contributed
essential improvements, but none had followed their insights consistently
or integrated them into a comprehensive system.72
And in the later of the two essays, as the introduction to the only facsimile edition of
Principles ofKnowledge, Jean and Peter Jones noted that Hutton thought of both his
moral and natural philosophy as being part of "a complete philosophical system, rare
in the English language, by one of the founders ofmodern science. That fact alone
justifies the reprinting of Investigations', more than two centuries after his death, a
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no
proper assessment ofHutton's achievements may now be attempted..However,
in the twelve years since this reprinting Hutton has continued to be overlooked and
given the significance of his Theory ofthe Earth in modern thought it is
extraordinary how little research has been undertaken regarding his non-geological
work especially his metaphysics.
Recent studies of the 'Scottish Enlightenment' continue to neglect Hutton.
Some have seen Hutton as primarily a natural philosopher. Others, notably students
of the Scottish attempts to construct a 'Science ofMan' have tended to ignore Hutton
altogether presumably because he paid more attention to the organisation of the mind
than to the organisation of society. Indeed, as Anand C. Chitnis put it,
Once Hutton is seen as amoral philosopher he can be related to other literati of
the Scottish Enlightenment. The social philosophers were concerned with the
natural order, but as manifested in society. Hutton was more of amental
philosopher, to use an old-fashioned term: while his fellow philosophers saw
happiness in an understanding of the natural order in society, Hutton saw it in
an understanding oforder in the mind, the attainment ofwisdom.74
Richard B. Sher, taking the approach of the cultural historian argues that socially and
intellectually the literati should be seen in an institutional context, and as an active
member ofEdinburgh's intellectual club life Hutton falls into that category. Overall,
studies concerning the 'Scottish Enlightenment' have tended to ignore Hutton other
than to mention how his Theory of the Earth changed the way in which the age of the
earth is viewed. But Hutton should be remembered as having been much more than
'The Founder of Modern Geology' as in fact he published more work about non-
geological topics than geological including his longest work: Principles of
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Knowledge. However, Hutton's Principles ofKnowledge has only received an
occasional mention and when it has been mentioned it has most often been
misunderstood.
This thesis focuses on Hutton's theory of language and it would be remiss if
it did not consider how Hutton has been regarded by linguists and historians of
linguistics. In Peter Jones' 'Outline' and his subsequent 'Introduction' with Jean
Jones it was mentioned that in Principles ofKnowledge Hutton was engaged in a
"long discussion of language."75 The only other published work to have made more
than a reference to Hutton's work on language was in a recent book by Jane Hodson
whose main interest is the relationship between English Language and English
Literature. Hodson noted that whereas some eighteenth century theorists were
emphasising that the purpose of language was to communicate ideas with as much
clarity as possible, in his Principles ofKnowledge Hutton had "taken this a step
further, arguing that as language is a direct mirror of the operations of the human
mind, so an examination of language will reveal the progress ofhuman thought."76
But while these writings briefly discussed what Hutton had written on speech; no
attention at all has been paid to Hutton's most original contribution to language
theory which was his theory of orthography that will be examined in Chapter Four.
The method that has been employed in this thesis is that of textual exegesis
since without a straightforward reading ofPrinciples ofKnowledge it is impossible
to comprehend Hutton's intentions or to contextualise them. Misunderstanding about
Hutton's geology began with his early critics accusing him of atheism and this was
followed by myth and counter-myth regarding his methodology. But the key to his
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theism and his method, indeed to comprehending Hutton, is through his metaphysical
text. However, even his associates ignored some basic but fundamental points that
Hutton made in his metaphysics regarding the subject, method, composition and
systematic approach of his work. Subsequently, the confusion surrounding
Principles ofKnowledge has affected what has been written about Hutton in context
as well as muddled what is thought about his geology. Employing the method of
textual exegesis in this thesis does not imply that Hutton's texts are free of any
underlying social, political, or cultural beliefs. It is just that before Hutton can be
contextualised or even an in-depth comparative analysis of other texts is undertaken,
it is vital to establish the straightforward content of this key text especially in relation
to his other works and the historiography surrounding them. Nevertheless, the
challenge in any exegesis is to avoid it turning into an eisegesis. So the aim of this
thesis has been to take at face value what Hutton published on metaphysics and
language. And it concludes that current interpretations ofHutton are inadequate in
light of the findings of this thesis.
The historiography regarding Hutton has been mainly focused upon whether
or not his Theory of the Earth displayed modern scientific methodology. However,
this thesis argues that the answer to that question is not made clear by examining the
Theory of the Earth in isolation—indeed, it can only be specifically answered by first
examining Hutton's Principles ofKnowledge since it was the epistemology revealed
in this text which Hutton applied to his other work including his geology and which
is the key to unlocking what was Hutton's methodology. The significance then of
Hutton's metaphysics was that it contains his scientific method, the reason that he
was a deist and took a systematic approach, as well as how he considered his self-
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image to be as a philosopher rather than as a geologist. Hutton applied both a priori
and a posteriori reasoning to his natural philosophy, but this thesis shows that his
metaphysics reveals that a posteriori always took precedence over a priori.
Although Hutton's systematic approach was based on strict empirical principles and
his scientific method was clearly that observation must precede theory, a balance was
required between the gathering ofparticulars and generalising since, for example in
the case ofhis geology, correct metaphysical principles were necessary to
comprehend a geological process too slow to be observed. So while disagreements
have persisted as to whether Hutton used an inductive or a deductive approach to his
Theory of the Earth, by examining his metaphysics it is shown in this thesis that he
used both but that induction took precedence over deduction. Also, it is only by
examining Hutton's metaphysics that it is possible to grasp that his deism was not
only arrived at through a posteriori reasoning from first principles, but that, for
Hutton, natural religion was equal to having the intellect of a philosopher. Lastly,
another significant aspect ofHutton's metaphysics is that it is only by reading
Principles ofKnowledge that it is possible to comprehend why he thought of himself
primarily as a philosopher rather than a geologist.
Hutton's theory of language played a significant role in his metaphysics as it
was used to illustrate how the mind is ordered as well as to show the importance of
utilising first principles. And while Hutton's theory of language was also a
pedagogical, social and cultural critique against the false rules of etymology; his
empirical remedy was made with the aim of generating a more literate and thus
enlightened society. Additionally, Hutton's fourth branch of science was logic, and
for Hutton logic is language. Therefore, this thesis argues that since language was
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the creature ofHutton's science it was vitally important to express thoughts as
accurately as possible in both speech and writing otherwise all of science was
capable of falling into ruin.
Hutton's Principles ofKnowledge was selected as the focus of this thesis due
to its neglect. Indeed, his theory of language and in particular his theory of
orthography was an unexplored but nevertheless original contribution to the
eighteenth-century debate on language. But Principles ofKnowledge was also the
focus of this thesis because of its associations with Hutton's other work as well as the
work ofhis contemporaries. The thesis is divided into three parts: metaphysics,
language and science. Part One deals with Hutton's metaphysics and its neglect.
Part Two considers Hutton's theory of language as given to the Royal Society of
Edinburgh, and in its later complete format. And Part Three considers the




In order to comprehend Hutton's approach to science including his geology it
is vital to examine his metaphysical inquiry. It was written at a time when science
and religion were still considered compatible and while Hutton's natural religion is
evident throughout his body ofwork including his geology, it is only evident in his
metaphysics how he concluded that the universe was designed and that this
conclusion could only be attained by philosophers. And an exploration ofHutton's
theory of language must begin with some understanding ofHutton's metaphysics
since it was within this inquiry that his theory of language was embedded. An
Investigation of the Principles ofKnowledge and of the Progress ofReason, from
Sense to Science and Philosophy (1794) was divided into three parts: Part I—Ofthe
Natural Progress in Knowledge, or, The Instinctive Faculties which lead to Science;
Part II—OfScience, or the Conscious Principles which lead to Wisdom', and Part
III—OfWisdom or Philosophy, as the Proper End ofScience andMeans of
Happiness. These three parts were in other words an examination of ideas, reason,
and morals. But the progress of the mind to what Hutton thought was its purpose
was long and complex and he acknowledged that it would be impossible to account
for every complexity within the train of thought as
the growth ofmind does not, perhaps, proceed by any precise number of
steps that we may be able to observe. There is a gradation, from a
beginning, which may be definite, although perhaps we do not define it
precisely, to an end, which seems to be indefinite, at least we cannot see
its utmost extent; and, there are also certain stages that may be
distinguished in this progress, although we may not be able accurately to
77




Nevertheless, Hutton set out in enormous detail the progression of the mind which
led from sense to science, which included his theory of language, and then on to
philosophy.
Most importantly the acquisition ofphilosophy was the privilege ofthe few and
Hutton thought that this state ofmind was parallel to the realisation that there was order
and design in the universe as he wrote that natural religion was "synonimous (sic) with
philosophy."78 While David Hume's A Treatise ofHuman Nature (1739,1740), Enquiry
concerningHuman Understanding (1748) and Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion
(1779) had undercut the deist position of the evidence ofGod's existence as seen in the
order ofnature, responses ranged from Lord Karnes innate deity to Thomas Reid's
common sense position. However, in contrast to Karnes and Reid, Hutton believed that
only those who had acquired progress in intellect to philosophy as well as having had a
grasp ofboth physical and metaphysical principles were able to comprehend the wisdom
and benevolence ofGod. And in many respects Hutton's metaphysics was an a
posteriori exercise undertaken in the same vein as Hume's Science ofMan, since it
was clear that natural philosophy and natural religion could not be successfully
investigated until proper metaphysical principles were established. It was in fact
from this Humean approach to investigating human knowledge that Hutton argued
that Hume's conclusion of scepticism was built upon false principles, and that his
own conclusion of deism was built on proper principles.
Although Hutton did not believe that God could be known since it is impossible to
attain equality with the omnipotent; he did believe that it could be inferred that a wise and
benevolent God had created natural, intellectual and moral systems for the happiness of
78 PK III, 650.
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humans. Principles ofKnowledge is a constructive exercise in which Hutton focuses for
the most part on his own philosophy. However, he realised that he would need to defend
his position and in opposition to Hume Hutton thought that dogmatism was not only to be
found in revealed religion but also in inordinate scepticism since,
Superstition makes people believe, upon authority and without proper
evidence, that which is not true. Scepticism, on the contrary, makes
people deny or disbelieve, upon a mistaken notion with regard to
evidence, that which is actually true. Philosophy makes people pursue a
middle course, in taking nothing for granted or on authority, but in
believing that for which there is found proper evidence.79
Instead Hutton believed that the proper way to obtain evidence was through the
operation of doubting as "no degree of doubt or inquiry, which is the opposite of
dogmatism, can be prejudicial to philosophy."80 And in response to what he believed
was Hume's excessive scepticism, Hutton argued not against Hume's conclusion but
instead chose to attack what he thought were Hume's erroneous principles. Indeed, he
reprimanded those who were unquestioning ofHume's first principles while being critical
ofHume's conclusion as
it does not appear that any body has detected a fallacy in Mr Hume's
reasoning, although many have solicitously sought for such a thing. If it
should be alledged (sic), by those who blame Mr Hume for having drawn
wrong conclusions, that, as a philosopher, he should have examined his
principles; this is true, but at the same time, it is not his conclusion that
they should in that case blame; and, unless they have corrected his
principles, they have no title to find fault, on this occasion, with
O 1
principles which they admit.
So a key part ofHutton's metaphysics was the correction ofhis predecessor's first
principles especially John Locke's since Hume's scepticism was founded upon what
Hutton thought were Locke's erroneous first principles.
79 PK II, 79-80.




Before examining Hutton's first principles and seeing how he positioned his
philosophy in relation to Locke and Hume, it is important to see how he presented
his Principles ofKnowledge. The first section of Part I—OfKnowledge in General,
and the Object of this Treatise, being Introductory to the Work—consisted of four
chapters in which Hutton set down much of the groundwork for his investigation. It
was essentially an introduction in which Hutton put forth his aims for the work as
well as giving an explanation of his peculiar terminology. But this introductory
section also contains the fundamental position ofHutton's scientific methodology
which was the procedure of 'remounting to principles.' Therefore, it is necessary to
begin this analysis ofHutton's metaphysics with a survey of these early chapters of
Principles ofKnowledge.
In Chapter I—Nature ofHuman Knowledge, and Purpose ofReflection—
Hutton noted that the purpose of his investigation was to find the principles upon
which we may judge science "without diffidence or error"82 as knowledge cannot be
83 ,.,iconsidered free of error "without returning back upon our steps." This theme
would return over and over again throughout Hutton's work as he continued to show
in detail the steps that he had covered and their pertinence to the introduction of
another stage in the progress ofmind. Indeed, the importance of establishing proper
first principles was evident in that Hutton believed that
however small or insignificant in itselfmay seem an error in first
principles, the consequences of such a deviation from the truth of reason,
or accuracy of observation, may, in a long deduction, serve to introduce
false notions in philosophy, and prove fatal to the establishment of
84
interesting truths, which otherwise might appear.
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But the critical point for Hutton in establishing truth was the need to constantly
return to first principles to test the validity of knowledge because
if false principles be employed in our philosophy, we must either be led
to judge erroneously, or to perceive some inconsistency in our science. It
is therefore of importance to examine well our principles. Now, the first
principles of our philosophy are no other than our natural knowledge,
when we see and feel, in order to perceive, and when, in consequence of
sensation and perception, we proceed to judge and form opinions. This is
the first ofhuman knowledge; and, it is upon these, as principles, that the
science ofmetaphysics must proceed.85
Therefore, Hutton was adamant that philosophy must begin from unquestionable
principles and he thought that the neglect of attention towards proper first principles
needed to be addressed as there was "little agreement in the opinions ofphilosophers,
both ancient and modern, with regard to those principles whereon our reasoning, in
or
relation to natural things, proceeds." This lack of consensus was a good enough
reason alone, Hutton thought, for the intelligentsia to continue an investigation into
the science ofmetaphysics.
It was also in Part I ofPrinciples ofKnowledge that Hutton set forth some of
his unusual definitions that he applied to common expressions—expressions which
he often used ambiguously. Although Hutton did not coin any new words, he did
define common expressions with his own definitions which he thought he was
applying more accurately than his predecessors. Indeed, Hutton stated in Chapter
II—Distinctions in Knowledge—that it was important to grasp the terminology he
was employing as the "terms knowledge, understanding, science, though in some
87 • 88
measure synonymous [ ], are also employed to express different things." Indeed,
85 PK I, xii-xiii.
86 PK I, 48.
87 With reference to synonymity Hutton wrote: "It may now be observed, that those distinctions,
which have been made with regard to the intellectual process, so far described, are not intended so
much with a view to fix the precise meaning and proper application of those terms, in relation to the
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although he used the term knowledge in its common use to describe the entire
intellectual process; Hutton also used knowledge to denote the "first step in the
intellectual process" consisting of sensation and perception and which was the
"primary information of the mind.. .a thing preserved in the memory;
OQ
and.. .afterwards revised in reflection." Understanding however was more than
"simple knowledge" as understanding "requires a judgement to be formed."90
Indeed, understanding was the "discernment of the mind" used in relation to the
"simple knowledge"91 of sensation as things were known first and then distinguished
in understanding. Furthermore, science was the "discernment of the mind.. .not upon
the simple knowledge of sensation and perception" but instead used "in relation to
the knowledge which has been attained by means of the understanding"92, or in other
Q-J
words, science "is knowledge attained by means of analysis." Hutton exemplified
this order of knowledge from understanding to science (or "abstracted reasoning"94)
as follows:
A and B, for example, maybe compared, and a judgement suppose
formed of their equality or inequality; the like may be done with regard
to B and C; here therefore are two judgements made, or several opinions
formed in our mind; and no number of repetition of those opinions are
here considered as producing science. The moment however that these
two opinions, the equalities ofA and B, and of B and C, are
contemplated together, in being as it were collated in the mind, and hence
a judgement formed with regard to the equality ofA and C, things which
had not been immediately compared, that instant science is begun. For
here, from data which are in the mind, that is to say, judgements or
opinions there already formed, (the mind being conscious of that
progress of the mind, as to establish this proposition, That there is truly a progress made in natural
order, which, therefore, is a proper subject for investigation, whatever terms shall be thought most
proper for the distinguishing of those several things." PK I, 30-31.
88 PK I, 16.
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42
operation), a judgement now is formed; and this judgement is new
knowledge; produced in the mind, without the operation or immediate
intervention of anything besides the faculties of the mind itself.95
Therefore, science "only follows understanding, as understanding only follows
knowledge."96 Furthermore, Hutton then used these definitions to summarise the
natural progress of the mind from knowledge to philosophy as containing the
following steps:
First, Knowing without understanding, which is knowledge simple and
absolute. Secondly, Understanding without reflection; which is
knowledge relative, and is commonly considered as knowledge. Thirdly,
Knowing by reflection, or knowing our knowledge; which is science, or
human understanding; and, lastly, knowing human understanding, or
understanding the ends and motives by which a rational being is
conducted. This is philosophy, or the perfection of the mind ofman,
which leads his knowledge towards the Author of his existence, or the
natural constitution of things, in knowing causes as well as effects, and in
foreseeing future events from the knowledge of that order which obtains
97
in nature.
So it was by taking these steps that man could see the order not only within his mind
but eventually within the universe and as a result he would be as certain as possible
of God's existence.
In Chapter III—A General Division ofScience, according to the Nature of its
different Subjects—Hutton argued that science is divided into five [98] branches:
physics, mathematics, morality, logic, and metaphysics; and that each branch rested
on principles. The science of physics requires observation of sensation as well as
reasoning to establish external or physical truth through perception. Mathematics, on
the other hand, requires reason and speculation with truths following conception.
Morality, the third division of science, is an internal judging of "good and evil, right
95 PK I, 22.
96 PK 1,21.
97 PK I, 30.
98 Elsewhere [PK I, ix-x.] he wrote that the sciences consisted of "mathematics, physics, morality, and
theology."
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and wrong, like and dislike, approbation and condemnation"; and it is "properly a
science" since it is founded in experience and requires "the conscious knowledge of
our will."99 The fourth branch of science was the scientific art of logic and for
Hutton logic is language. Indeed, he held that 'logic' had been improperly applied as
a term by others as
it may be made to appear, how unscientifically the term logic has been
applied to metaphysical reasoning. Reasoning simply, that is, judging, is
a natural operation of the mind; perhaps no mind exists that does not
judge, or it is no mind that does not reason in some degree. But
reasoning scientifically is more; it is reasoning artificially; and it is
proper to man. Whereas reasoning logically is still more than reasoning
scientifically; for, it is the expression of our scientific reasoning in
language appropriated to that purpose. Now, though both speech and
scientific reasoning belong peculiarly to man, yet these ought to be
distinguished; for, man may reason scientifically without reasoning
logically, that is without expressing in known signs that internal
operation ofhis mind. Whereas man cannot reason logically without
reasoning scientifically; for, language or that expression ofman's
thoughts is itself in science; and unless the subject ofman's thoughts be
scientifically treated, How is he to communicate to another that operation
of his mind which is purely internal?100
Hutton's definition for logic on the other hand was that it "is an artificial method of
communicating our knowledge, sentiments, and opinions to others by means of
audible signs; and also of recording them to ourselves, by means of visible signs."101
Metaphysics was the fifth branch of science since he thought that there must be an
inquiry into how our knowledge is acquired, and it is the "only means by which may
be conducted a philosophical research into the nature of things."102 But although
metaphysics was the last of his five sciences "in order of its natural attainment, it
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have already arrived at science and philosophy."103 other words, according to
Hutton, all knowledge is examined internally and without initially understanding the
first principles as well as the order of the human mind, it would be impossible to
determine whether philosophising on other sciences is reliable or not. And as far as
the improvement of logic was concerned, as will be shown in the following chapters
on language, Hutton wished to go back to first principles and axiomatically build a
perfect alphabet "like the elements of geometry."104
Chapter IV—ProposedMethod ofadvancing the study ofPhilosophy, by
remounting to Principles—is one of the most important chapters in the entire work as
it was in this chapter that Hutton set out his scientific method. Since the audience
that Hutton was addressing were philosophers, he essentially wished to impart the
importance of retracing the ordered mind back to first principles so that they had
proper means to test their philosophies. The method was reminiscent of geometry in
that the progression of reason must begin from principles which are self-evident, or
"unquestionable" as Hutton described them.105 Throughout Principles ofKnowledge
Hutton would occasionally remind his readers that his method was to return to
principles, and while he considered both natural and moral philosophic principles to
be equally certain, he also held that this certainty was limited. This, he thought, was
so because "in the case of physics, the external thing which acts in giving us
knowledge is never known, so, in morals, our information with regard to what
happens in other minds of our own kind is always mediate, and in some degree
precarious."106 But, in spite of this limitation Hutton held that the progress of
103 Ibid.
104 PK II, 661.
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knowledge in natural and moral philosophy is "neither precarious nor uncertain"
since although the acting of external things is never known; on the other hand with
the "laws of action or change, being steady and in perfect order" the subject of
natural history "may be investigated without error or dubiety."107 And in the case of
the limitation of investigating morals, Hutton held that whatever passes on the minds
of others in particular occasions may be precarious; but this "does not affect the
general" in acquiring knowledge in moral philosophy "first, from the study of our
own mind; and, secondly, in judging from the general appearances, which, being in
nature, cannot be supposed to give an information that is false."108 In other words
nature does not deceive, and therefore the truth is to be found in the general and not
in the particular.
In Section II—OfKnowledge, as a Thing in which there may be distinguished
different Kinds—Hutton argued that there are four principles of knowledge: the first
principle in the science ofmetaphysics occurs when a person knows that he knows in
reflection so that "the first operation of that mind must be to form this proposition, I
know,"109 Additionally, when our thinking powers are the subject of our thoughts, in
other words, "when I think that I am,,uo the mind also has consciousness which is a
"species of reflection."111 This reflecting operation which man possesses is one in
which "we have a consciousness of ourselves" 112and in which "our thoughts, our













thinking powers."113 The second principle of knowledge is will, for "when I have
willed, I know that I have willed."114 The third principle is action, as the "mind then
acts" after it has willed.115 Hutton concluded from the first three principles that there
was also a fourth principle, since mind is "a patient" as well as "an agent"116, and
there is
something besides our mind; and also, that this thing acts; although we
may not know what that thing is, nor what it does in order that we should
know. For it is only from our knowledge happening without our
intention, that we judge, in reason, something to have acted with that
intention; in like manner as a thing is known to have happened, in
consequence of our proper intention, and by the action of our will. Here
is, therefore, a fourth principle.117
While Hutton had established these four principles of knowledge, it was not so easy
to pinpoint every step in the progress of the mind.
Although Hutton recognised the impossibility of identifying and explaining
every stage in the progress of the mind, his attempt to show the numerous faculties
from first principles to philosophy was lengthy and complicated. The major stages in
the development ofmind, according to Hutton, of course began with sensation as it is
the "first step in mind"118 since "this information of the mind by sense, is absolutely
necessary to the existence of those things which are performed by its means."119
Hutton considered pleasure and pain as secondary 'sensations' which he thought
120
"may be called parasitical, as being engrafted upon sensations which are primary."
He thought that his theory "supposes sensation to be knowledge absolute and
original" and that "every other species of knowledge" is "founded on this, which is
113 PK I, 77.
114 PK I, 80.
115PKI, 81.
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first or primary."121 In Hutton's system the mind had "no power in itself to produce"
this absolute knowledge of sensation which followed the action of an external
cause.122 Furthermore, the external source from which the original knowledge was
received in sensation (and perception) as an effect could not be known—only
inferred. All knowledge (that is, the entire intellectual process) was regarded as
either sensation "when the mind is made to feel or suffer" passively, or conception
when the mind is active and made to know without sensation.123 Hutton was here
using 'conception' as a general term, in contrast to sensation, to indicate when the
mind is active and is not influenced by any external action. But 'conception' was
also used by Hutton in a particular way, as a faculty of the mind, which as a
"negative term" referred to all knowledge that was not "farther known or
understood." 124 Indeed, he thought that it was extremely difficult to distinguish all
of the various steps of human understanding in both sensation and conception
because of the difficulty of investigating the "close connection of the several
operations in which a mind is made to know."125 Distinguishing sensation from
conception due to their lack of connection is simple enough, however these
operations of the mind are also distinguished by "having interposed between them
the operation of perception."126 And by distinguishing perception from sensation in
the manner that he did, as will be shown later in this chapter, Hutton thought that he
had reformed philosophical first principles in a way that rescued natural religion
form the scepticism ofHume.
121 PK 1,328-329.
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The means that Hutton used to establish his first principles was initially, in
typical eighteenth century style, to distinguish between mankind and animals.
Hutton thought animals possessed the same sort of instincts and capacity for
perception as humans, and for Hutton this is "a truth that nothing but the grossest
ignorance, with regard to the nature of reason, and strongest prejudice of education,
could render in the least degree doubtful."127 However, animals did not possess the
human powers of reflection as Hutton pointed out that it is "only man that seems to
have this faculty, which may be termed reflected reason; and, this is the only means
for arriving at that rational intelligence which is termed science, and in which the
faculty of reason is again reflected, in proceeding from knowledge which is properly
understood."128 And so it was the power of reflection that Hutton pointed out was
what distinguishes the human mind from that of the animal and made it possible for
him to examine his own reasoning, and "that retrospective view, by which we may
contemplate the way wherein we had first blindly or instinctively proceeded to know,
is the proper means of advancing farther into this field of intellect; and here the
understanding of the mind is founded immediately upon reflection."129 However,
besides the obvious uses of the reflecting power, Hutton believed that it also held
significance for philosophers especially since it was indispensable for his method of
remounting to principles. Hutton illustrated this by stating that,
reflecting minds, advancing through an indefinite variety of thoughts, or
an indefinite succession of operations, when arrived at high degrees of
intelligence by association and comparison, learn also to abstract, in
thought, that which is found to be not necessarily conjoined in nature or
the actual state of things; and, by proceeding gradually in this operation,
127 PK I, 54-55.
128 PK 11,81.
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we at last come to the original knowledge, which had been at first excited
1 ^0
in our mind, or the first step of our intellect.
While his method was always to test thought by remounting to principles, the
original knowledge or first principles of sensation and perception upon which
Hutton's system was founded were distinct (indeed he did not use the term 'sense-
perception') and he believed were philosophically superior to those adhered to by his
predecessors.
One of the key factors in Hutton's intellectual system is that there is order in
mind and progress from the instinctive faculties when the mind is informed through
sensation by an external cause. The beginnings of science were to be found while
the mind was still in an instinctive condition as it was in "simple understanding" that
the "discerning faculty is exerted without, or with little of the abstracting power."131
Sir William Temple's Brazilian rational parrot [which will be discussed further in
Chapter 3] would be an example of a mind with simple understanding but without
the power of abstraction. But Hutton asserted that "there is a wide difference
between the imitation of a thing that is naturally understood in observation, and the
discovery of a thing which is far from being obvious."132 And he significantly [in
light ofwhat will be shown in the following chapters] turned to language and the
alphabet to illustrate this point by asking how easy is it "to learn and to employ an
alphabet, when once discovered?" while on the other hand "How difficult is it to
invent one?"133 So while Hutton thought that distinguishing and resembling or the
"first step of science"134 occurred as part of the instinctive faculties; it was, in
'30 PK I, 142-143.
oi PK I, 497-498.
132 PK I, 498.
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addition to the faculty of reflection, the power of abstraction which separated man
from animal, and with the combination of abstraction and reflection the mind could
discern upon prior distinguished knowledge through a "voluntary operation"135 thus
going beyond simple understanding to intellect or science. Thus,
The moment that a mind, which has learned instinctively to form
compound ideas, begins to discriminate in those ideas, and thus know the
principles on which the understanding of the mind is founded, may be
said to have made a step beyond the simple understanding of things.
This mind is then on the way to understand the nature of knowledge or
the proper constitution of a mind, which probably is the highest
attainment of a reasoning being. But, alas! How far is this first act from
the accomplishment of that proposed end? It is like taking a single step
to the East or West, as the first stage in a journey round the world.136
Therefore, although merely a 'single step' man's progress beyond the instinctive to
science begins once there is a "resolution or discrimination of ideas" from the
"composition or association of ideas"137, as it is "not in knowing, reasoning, or
speaking, but in thinking concerning those things which he has already known or
distinguished" that man attains science.138
In Part I ofPrinciples ofKnowledge Hutton had considered the instinctive
faculties, but in Part II—OfScience, or the Conscious Principles which lead to
Wisdom—he turned his attention to the "artificial or acquired faculties ofmind"
which was the investigation of human understanding, or science.139 Hutton's aim in
Part II was to "investigate the principles of scientific reasoning, when man, as a
conscious being, proceeds to know the nature of things, and to distinguish truth and
falsehood."140 In other words, after establishing principles in regards to simple and
135 PK 1,484.
136 PK 1,517.
137 PK I, 564.
138 PK I, 480.
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relative knowledge Hutton then formed principles in regards to knowledge that is
known by reflection, which is scientific knowledge. Hutton advanced that the first
principle of science is consciousness, or "acting in relation to the simple knowledge
of sensation and perception."141 Or even more simply, "in science the first principle
is this, I know,"142 Therefore, "the first conscious step in a mind being this, that I
am, the first step in science is, I know, which is as much as to say, I know that I
know; for, an animal knows, but he does not know that he knows."143 In other
words, Hutton thought that while an animal can perceive and discern it cannot know
that it is perceiving and discerning. But,
when man, before he thus reasons on his knowledge, shall think or say
within himself, I know, I feel, or I think, then he has made a step in
knowledge, greater than any that can be made in knowing and reasoning
simply, that is, instinctively concerning things. It is in this step, that man
knows himself; he then becomes, from a sensitive and discerning
animal, a scientific being; and thus enters upon a train of intellectual
action, in which he is considered as growing in a system, or proceeding
towards the perfection of his purpose.1 4
Having attained this state of conscious reflection, science was also for Hutton the
"perception of truth and error" 45 as it was in "knowing how we know that any thing
is either true or false"146 since "truth will appear to be the knowing ofknowledge in
reflection,"147 Here then was Hutton's second principle of science, "viz. that things
may be either true or false, that is to say, either real or only conceived. "148 So while
Hutton thought that science was the "knowledge of knowledge, when man thinks for
the purpose ofhis understanding", science was likewise "the perception of truth and
141
PKII, 7.
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error, in the conscious operation of a reflecting mind."149 And having therefore
"acquired those two first principles of science, the knowledge of ourselves and the
knowledge of truth, we may then reason in relation to every actual thing that shall be
known, and every thought or idea that occurs."150 But as Hutton's progress ofmind
had advanced in establishing principles from sense to science, he then advanced
further from science to philosophy. Indeed, Hutton's intellectual system progressed
from the animal who "simply knows", to science in which man reflects "that he
knows", and onwards to the philosopher who "knows how he knows."151
Certainly, Hutton thought that "No doubt is ever entertained in relation to
those truths that originate in our perceiving faculty"152 and so having perfect first
principles meant that if our scientific principles are also correct and "in the
disposition of those several principles, no misapplication is committed, the result of
this complicated operation, in a mind capable of reason, will be perfect, having all
the evidence of certainty ofwhich the nature of things admits."153 Therefore, Hutton
believed that he had properly recognized the progress ofmind as,
It has been shown, that there is a source of actual information, a source
which is distinctly different from the faculties of our mind; and that this
is not an inert system of extension and figure, but an active system that
we are first led to know, simply, in sensation, the passion of our mind;
and, secondly, by the changes in that information of sense, we are led, in
perception, to imagine extension and direction, and then to figure and
conceive things according to a certain order. This perceived order, then,
forms the system ofnature, or external things, to the knowledge of which
we are led by a real information, and in the contemplation of which we
must acknowledge the power and wisdom of our Author. But, besides
that system of power and wisdom which we are made to know or to
conceive, there is a system of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery,
with which we are more immediately concerned. It is in this moral
149 PK I, 477.
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system, that the benevolence of our Author is as clearly manifested, to
the philosopher, as is the power and wisdom of the Creator in the system
of the universe, which we are made in science to conceive.154
So it was only those who possessed sufficient intelligence—philosophers—who
could understand human nature as the effect of the wisdom and benevolence of a
Deity.
Hutton thought that a result of having acquired the state of philosophy was
the ability to see order and progress in the study of one's own mind. But it was also
at this stage of the progress ofmind that man "sees the laws of God, the constitution
ofhis being, or the order of his intellect."155 In Hutton's natural philosophy [already
published in 1792] he had noted that "in every law of nature there is system or
design"156, he was now stating [in his 1794 metaphysics] that the human constitution
is "no less the work ofGod"157 as the "intellectual system" also "appears to be
contrived in all that wisdom and benevolence which is found in nature." 58
Furthermore, at this stage of the intellectual system was to be found Hutton's moral
system which he thought had been designed so that philosophy was made
"subservient to happiness" and happiness was "benevolently ordained" as the "end,
or ultimate, in the intention of the being man."159 But while the moral system was
designed so that humans could achieve happiness it was not one in which God
interfered by punishing or rewarding human behaviour. Instead it was one in which
the system had been set so that the route to happiness was via wisdom and virtue and
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This philosopher had discovered, that the more good he did to others, the
more he increased his own happiness or intellectual pleasure; and he had
also found, that this species of pleasure was preferable to that which is
immediately derived from sense, when they are to be employed in
reflection. He therefore became benevolent upon principle, instead of
being benevolent instinctively.160
Within this moral system Hutton also touched on how he thought there were
principles benevolently designed for society and so Part III—OfWisdom or
Philosophy, as the Proper End ofScience andMeans ofPlappiness—as well as being
part ofHutton's intellectual system contained his moral and social systems which
along with the physical system were benevolently designed by God for the happiness
of humankind.
Throughout Principles ofKnowledge Hutton had provided countless
examples of design based upon the order of the intellectual system. Of course Hume
had argued that order in the universe is not proof that God exists so Hutton had to
come up with some other ways to challenge the Humean position. Hutton would
occasionally give examples ofwhere others had erred and then he would launch into
lengthy revisions, but on other occasions he would use a process of elimination in
order to identify truth. But it was also through connecting his systems into a general
system that gave Hutton what he thought were double proofs and thus certainty of
the existence of God. And the key connection was ofhis physical and metaphysical
systems through revised first principles which included his original theory of
perception. Hutton's aim in Principles ofKnowledge was to connect the material
and the intellectual in a general system illustrating how the systems were the
benevolent work of a Higher Power. Indeed,
160 PK 11,550-551.
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If the motions or actions ofmaterial things, proceeding upon established
laws of nature, and the actions or motives ofmen proceeding upon
intellectual and moral principles, shall be found properly connected, or
necessarily related, in a general system—a system evidently devised in
wisdom, and founded on benevolence, this will form a subject worthy of
the study ofmen; a subject important to the constitution of civil society;
and a subject most interesting to those who adore wisdom, and who take
pleasure in the happiness ofmankind. The work here offered to the
public, is an attempt to give such a view of the material and intellectual
systems,—as being the effect of a supreme design,—as proceeding from
one cause,—and as operating to one end.161
However, he pointed out that since the principles ofmetaphysics were still in dispute
and that no agreement had been reached as to whether matter was active or passive,
then since all science depended upon proper metaphysics a re-examination of first
principles was required. Certainly, to obtain a double proof of this he established his
first principles both physically and metaphysically. Indeed, it was Part III—Physical
Dissertations on the Powers ofMatter and Appearances ofBodies—ofDissertations
on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy (1792) which contained his work on
physics. And Hutton noted that it was from his study of physics that he was led into
an examination ofmetaphysics, but it is evident in both his 1792 publication as well
as Principles ofKnowledge in 1794, that his physics and metaphysics were the result
of a reciprocal investigation.
The volumes on physics and metaphysics are clearly connected and while
Hutton pointed out that he may have been better to have published his metaphysics
before his physics, it was nevertheless his physics which appeared in 1792 followed
by his metaphysics two years later in 1794. In his 1792 Dissertations on Different
Subjects in Natural Philosophy, Hutton noted that it was in these dissertations that he
wished to "found the physical system of this world, upon principles very different
161 PK I, xxxv.
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from those which have been generally adopted in natural philosophy."162 Although
he apologized for treating the subject ofphysics metaphysically, it was by examining
the first principles of our knowledge that he founded his physics as it
is the science ofmetaphysics, which alone is capable ofjudging with
regard to the principles that are employed in the other sciences; because
it goes to examine how we come to know those truths on which, in
reasoning scientifically, we proceed to increase our knowledge.
Every person reasons metaphysically who reasons in relation to his
knowledge; but few have carried this science so far, as to make it the
proper judge of those first principles which are employed in the other
sciences; because this requires to have accurately investigated the
different sciences, or all the sources of our knowledge, and to have
analysed our compound animal or vulgar ideas, so as to arrive at what is
absolute in knowledge, and cannot be farther analysed or distinguished in
our scientific progress. It is only so far as we thus proceed to examine
our first principles, that we shall arrive at science which is perfect, or
without error.
The importance to natural philosophy of the subjects here in question,
and the necessity of having recourse to the only science competent for
the examination of first principles, will plead my excuse for here
introducing so much metaphysical argument in a work where nothing but
physical subjects are concerned.163
But it was reasoning in this metaphysical way on matter which not only became
pivotal for his general system but also distinguished Hutton from his predecessors.
The existing paradigm regarding the theory ofmatter was based on the
Newtonian concept that the universe consisted of particles which were "solid, massy,
hard, impenetrable and movable."164 Indeed, Newton had written in the Principia
that,
The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia of the
whole, result from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and
inertia of the parts; and hence we conclude the least particles of all bodies
162
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to be also extended, and hard and impenetrable, and movable, and
endowed with their proper inertia.165
Moreover, Newton later expanded upon his idea ofmatter in his 31st Query (of Book
III—Part I) of the Opticks, in which he wrote that,
it seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form'd Matter in
solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable Particles, of such Sizes and
Figures, and with such other Properties, and in such Proportion to Space,
as most conduced to the End for which he form'd them; and that these
primitive Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any porous
Bodies compounded of them; even so very hard, as never to wear or
break in pieces; no ordinary Power being able to divide what God
himself made one in the first Creation.166
However, in spite of being a Newtonian in many respects167, Hutton criticised
Newton's nature ofmatter as he stated that,
The commonly received philosophy supposes, that bodies are composed
of atoms which are absolutely inert, or ofparticles ofmatter (as they are
called), which are infinitely hard, and perfectly incompressible. Here we
find two palpable errors, disgraceful to science, and baneful with regard
to natural philosophy. First, there is metaphysical or philosophic error, in
pretending to remount to principles of physical body, and then assuming,
as those principles, nothing but bodies themselves under the pedantic
designation of atoms or corpuscles, having definite volume and figure, as
if names were to alter things in other respects the same. Secondly, there
is a physical error, in supposing with the vulgar, and the most ignorant in
physical observations, that hard bodies are not perfectly compressible,
that is, always diminished in their volume when power is applied for that
165 Newton, Isaac. Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles ofNatural Philosophy and his System
of the World Translated into English by Andrew Motte in 1729... ed. F. Cajori. Berkeley & Los
Angles: University of California Press, 1934, as cited in The Arch ofKnowledge: An Introductory
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purpose; for, if hard bodies be compressible, as they truly are, we would
have no right to attribute incompressibility to their particles, or to the
principles of their constitution.168
Therefore, Hutton thought that matter had to be examined from both a physical and a
metaphysical standpoint and it was his original theory of perception as part of his
first principles ofmetaphysics which was the key that unlocked this theory ofmatter
on which the rest ofHutton's physical and intellectual systems were built.
The challenge to the existing paradigm regarding the nature ofmatter made by
Hutton from a physical standpoint was made in his 1792 Dissertations on Different
Subjects in Natural Philosophy in which he thought it was evident that,
if the resistance, which is opposed by a natural body to the exertion of
our will endeavouring (sic) to destroy the volume, should be as perfectly
overcome, as is that of hardness and in fluidity, then the common opinion
ofmankind, which supposes the extention (sic) of a body to be
permanent, would necessarily be changed. For, at present, we think that
this resisting power, which preserves volume in bodies, is absolutely in
its nature insurmountable, as it certainly is in relation to our moving
power.
Instead then of saying, that matter, ofwhich natural bodies are
composed, is perfectly hard and impenetrable, which is the received
opinion of philosophers, we would affirm, that there were no permanent
property of this kind in a material thing; but that there were certain
resisting powers in bodies, by which their volumes and figures are
presented to us in the actual information, which powers, however, might
be overcome. In that case, the extention (sic) of the most solid body,
would be considered only as a conditional thing, like the hardness of a
body of ice, which hardness is, in the aqueous state of that body,
perfectly destroyed.169
So matter could only be known through its active power which could be utilized in
either "exciting motion and resistance among perceived things" or in "changing the
sensible qualities of those things which are perceived."170 Therefore, by examining
the sensible qualities and the perceptible qualities of changes in bodies then a
168





conclusion formed in reason, that is an inferred quality, could be concluded "in like
manner as a mathematical proposition is demonstrated and believed with no less
confidence than the axiom on which it had been founded."171 Furthermore, it was
Hutton's correction of his predecessor's first principles which was the key to his
entire system and this he was equally forthright about in his physical dissertations as
he was in his metaphysics. Indeed, he pointed this out to his audience as he wrote
that,
If I am wrong, in giving an unjust representation of our philosophic
principles, and I have reasoned ill, in endeavouring to correct that error in
our science, the physical work, which is founded upon this examination
of our knowledge, will deserve little attention from those who are thus
satisfied with the present state of their philosophy. But if that defect of
our first principles be acknowledged, and the proposed correction be
approved of, men of science, whose object is to pursue truth, will be
inclined to examine carefully every step that may be employed, in
proceeding upon those grounds, and in forming theories for the
explanation of natural appearances.172
Thus Hutton's system ofmind and universe, of natural and moral philosophy was
founded upon his first principles of distinct faculties of sensation and perception
through which he was able to formulate a theory ofmatter.
Since Hutton believed that natural phenomena could only be accounted for
empirically whilst believing that all knowledge is internal, it was vital to uncover
how both the metaphysical and the physical were ordered. So it was by separating
sensation from perception that he organized his first principles of the mind to show
how external information was processed. Sensation was absolute knowledge;
whereas perception being a compound ofboth sensation and conception meant that
Hutton had interpreted that in the order ofmind a faculty existed whereby the






conceptualization. It was through the application of perception that Hutton was able
to distinguish between matter and body and therefore to upturn the existing paradigm
in regards to the theory ofmatter. John Playfair showed how Hutton had
distinguished between matter and body as he noted that,
we do by no means explain the nature ofbody, when we describe it as
made up of small particles; because ifwe allow to these particles any
magnitude whatsoever, we do no more than affirm that great bodies are
made up of small ones. The elements ofbody must, therefore, be
admitted to be something unextended. To these unextended elements, Dr
Hutton gave the term ofMATTER, and carefully distinguished between
that term and the term BODY, which he applied only to those
combinations ofmatter that are necessarily conceived to posses
impenetrability, extension and inertia.173
And it was in fact by distinguishing between body and matter Hutton was able to
avoid falling into a trap that so many ofhis predecessors had done as,
Body is an extended thing, of definite dimensions, consequently figured;
it is capable ofbeing moved; and, when moved, it is capable of retaining
that motion, or of imparting it to another body. Matter, on the other
hand, is an unextended or an indefinitely extended thing, according as it
is considered metaphysically or physically. By indefinite or conditional
extension, as applied to matter, I mean, that the greatest quantity may be
comprised in the smallest space, and the smallest quantity may occupy
the greatest space. But, whatever matter is of itself, it must be considered
as the cause ofmotion and resistance in natural bodies; and this is all that
we are permitted to judge of in the science of physics.174
Therefore, Hutton believed that matter was active resistance and not passive solidity
as his predecessors had done. Indeed, Hutton believed that the concern of natural
philosophy was to "investigate the powers or laws of action, by which material
things are made to undergo those changes that constitute the system of this world."175
But of course, Hutton noted that it is impossible to know what matter is and that only
the effect ofmatter is known "in the action ofnatural things" and that it was "from
173
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this known effect that matter, as the active cause, must be inferred."176 Although
Hutton thought that it was impossible to know what matter is, "we certainly may
know what it is not"; and he noted that it was clearly not body, "an extended,
definite, moveable thing, which is properly considered as passive or inert."177
Therefore, by this method Hutton found that "matter must be active, and a cause for
that which in a physical body we perceive."178 Indeed, it was through the perception
ofbodies and motion which Hutton held that our knowledge ofmatter and substance
was inferred.
Another two years passed until 1794 when Hutton published his theory of
perception in Principles ofKnowledge. This theory tied together his physics and
metaphysics and performed what he thought was a double proof that his first
principles were sound while challenging the Newtonian position concerning matter.
In Part I ofPrinciples ofKnowledge Hutton noted that until then philosophers had
reasoned upon first principles without science and that the only purpose of their
arguments was "to discover the fallacy of each others reasoning."179 Instead and "in
order to proceed upon true principles" Hutton thought that "there are truly such
erroneous opinions, which are employed in our philosophical speculations" and "that
it is only in this metaphysical science that those errors may be properly or best
corrected" in order to proceed in physical speculations.180 But, had proper first
principles been found or completely understood "in like manner as with regard to
geometry, where the principles are undoubted" then all philosophers would be in
177 Ibid., 315-2
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agreement as to what they are.181 So Hutton s investigation into what amounted to
proper first principles was the most crucial part of his philosophy since,
If this is the nature ofhuman understanding, as consisting neither in
knowing what external things are in themselves, nor what that thing is
which in us thinks, but in discerning various relations, with regard to the
operations of our mind and those of an external cause, or in
distinguishing the passion of the mind, by which we are made to know
and act without thinking, and the action of the mind, by which we are
made to think or to conceive without reason or reflection, this may be
made the subject of a philosophical inquiry. And, if in this inquiry, any
discoveries shall be made, with regard to those primary operations where
knowledge is produced, and where the intellect is made to grow; or if any
errors shall be detected, in the principles on which philosophic reasoning
proceeds, this examination may be attended with important
consequences, both in relation to physical and metaphysical philosophy.
For, in reasoning, so much is built upon a few first principles, that the
smallest reformation or correction in the beginning of such a series, may
lead in the end to a conclusion very different from what had been before
deduced; and thus, principles which had been before received, may, in
reasoning with more attention, be found erroneous, and may be
formed.182
And having held that all of the sciences must be examined through a proper
understanding of the human mind, and since he considered physics as being the first
science to be examined; Hutton thought that the way forward was to inquire into the
faculties that are used in the science ofphysics, "whereby we have received that
knowledge and understanding, which is found in our thinking principle previous to
more general science, and which serves as the basis of our reasoning when entering
on philosophy."183 Indeed,
our scientific notions, ofmaterial things, are not acquired without the
study of our own thoughts; and, the study of our thoughts cannot be
made, to any proper purpose, without our understanding having been
deeply and extensively informed in the science of physics. We cannot
know ourselves, without forming the distinction of knowledge and
opinion; we cannot advance in natural philosophy, without making the
distinction ofbody and matter. But, in the distinction of knowledge and
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opinion, we necessarily include the influence or effect of an external
thing; and, in the distinction of body and matter, we must have recourse
to the conscious operations of our mind, by which we abstract or analyse
our natural knowledge, in order to form principles or scientific
• • 184
opinions.
So Hutton endeavoured to investigate and to form first principles that would be
found to be exact so that enquiries into natural and moral philosophy could be made
accurately as
in order to establish natural philosophy upon a basis that will remain
unshaken, and stand the test of all examination, the science of physics, on
which it is to be built, must be reformed, in correcting the errors of the
vulgar, with which, even in this inlightened (sic) age, it will be found as
yet infected.185
Therefore, Hutton believed that if his discovery in regard to original knowledge was
to be deemed successful then consequently both metaphysical and physical reasoning
would need to be built upon solid first principles.
In the Preface ofPrinciples ofKnowledge Hutton restated what he had told
his readers in Dissertations on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy that,
Our natural philosophy has been founded upon this ground, That matter
is inert, extended, solid, and impenetrable; and, this we believed, as
supposing it to have been learned from the examination of natural bodies
or actual things, the only information by which that knowledge is to be
attained. But, from the most accurate and strict examination of those
external things, we now find no reason for concluding any such property
in matter; because, there is no such property in the things which we
examine.186
But furthermore in the Preface ofPrinciples ofKnowledge Hutton noted that,
The metaphysical system of philosophy, which is commonly received, is
founded upon the physical notions ofmaterial things, so far as those
things are considered existing externally with magnitude and figure, and
thus affecting our mind by means of those properties. But the physical
system, which I have given in those dissertations, is plainly inconsistent
with that received metaphysical system; therefore, it was necessary for
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me to shew (sic) wherein those received physical and metaphysical
notions were erroneous, or inconsistent with natural appearances. This I
endeavoured to do, in the first of those physical dissertations; and this I
considered as a subject so far adapted to that place in a physical work, as
well as it is to this place in a metaphysical dissertation, where our notions
ofmatter form the subject of examination.187
Therefore, Hutton's aim was to obtain proof that his philosophy was correct from
both a physical and a metaphysical perspective. It was of course through perception
1 oo
that "extension, direction, magnitude, and figure are made known" , so Hutton
investigated the relationship of sensation and perception and he explained that,
sensation, which is knowledge, may be considered as an effect,
proceeding from the action of a cause, a thing external in relation to the
mind in which the knowledge exists; but that this effect, when existing as
knowledge in the mind, may also be a cause in relation to an action of the
mind, which will then conceive, and thus form another species of
knowledge, which is perception, a process ofmind in which figure is
known in connection with sensation. When, therefore, sensation is thus
considered as the cause of our knowledge of figure, it is not that any of
our bodily organs excites this knowledge of figure in the mind, as they do
the knowledge of sensation, but the organ excites the knowledge of
sensation, and this knowledge excites, or is the cause for, that action of
the mind by which the conception of the conception of figure is made. It
is observing this order of things, that the nature of perception will be
properly understood.189
Thus in Hutton's first principles perception is an intermediate stage between
sensation and conception in which the mind is excited passively by sensation and
actively through conception. Indeed, perception is "neither simply knowledge as
distinguished from conception, nor pure conception as distinguished from sensation;
and this must be esteemed an operation different from either of those two, so far as it
is properly compounded of them both."190 But although this compound includes
conception it is nevertheless a purely instinctive faculty as the active part of
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perception has been made only as a consequence of the mind being excited passively
in sensation as
the knowledge or idea ofmagnitude and figure is not acquired in
sensation, considered as the passion ofmind knowing immediately in
consequence of the action of a thing which is external; but that this is
attained by the proper action of the mind itself, then conceiving
knowledge, and therefore forming to itself those ideas ofmagnitude and
figure,—not voluntarily, as it is performed on other occasions when
imagination operates without perception, but instinctively, or necessarily
in consequence of a feeling, by which the mind is excited to this mode of
action, wherein a certain conception is formed.191
Therefore, since, in the progress ofmind, perception was within the instinctive
faculties or first principles of knowledge, "there is no deception; for, here we are led
by nature to form the conception of extension, and to imagine figure, ideas as
necessary to our animal constitution as to the progress of our science."192 So since
Hutton believed that nature could not deceive, then his perception along with
sensation were the first principles that he used to build his general system on
connecting the intellectual and physical systems.
As he had advanced in his physics, Hutton reiterated in his metaphysics that
while matter should be considered as "the substance, essence, or principles of
external things"193 it was only body in which magnitude and figure could be
perceived. The cause of our knowledge then, for Hutton, was the "power to act,
power to affect and be affected"; andpower he thought should "be considered as a
term implying an unknown thing in action, or the action of a known thing, to both of
which this term may be applied."194 In other words, matter and power as far as
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experience was concerned, were "found to mean the same thing."195 Berkeley,
having disagreed with Locke that things with magnitude and figure were the cause of
sensation, denied the existence of an external world. But Hutton thought that it was
"absurd" ofBerkeley to have jumped to this conclusion and that this was
"concluding without premises, at least, if not contrary to principles."196 While
Hutton believed that "external things, as we conceive them, do not exist independent
of our mind", that was not to say that there was no external world.197 Indeed,
through Hutton's theory ofmatter
it has been shewn (sic), that material things are ultimately resolvable into
power and energy. Consequently, there is nothing really external,
besides cause and action; although we most erroneously imagine that
there are things existing with magnitude and figure, besides the activity
which we perceive as proceeding according to rules wisely conceived in
the constitution of this world.
Material action, therefore, is all reduced to those general laws of
efficiency which we comprehend in gravitation, in light, heat, &c. in
elective attractions and repulsions. It is nowise concerned with
magnitude and figure, which are pure conceptions in our thought, and are
198
produced by the action of our mind.
So while there can be no knowledge ofmatter through perception; matter can "be
inferred as an active power that causes our sensations."199 Therefore, Hutton thought
that although we can only know internals, it was through the effects of the external
world on our senses that he believed in the existence of an external world which was
in direct contrast to Berkeley. Metaphysically Hutton wrote it is impossible to form
a concept ofmatter because it is "the last abstraction, or that which remains after
abstracting every thing known; and thus, it is a judgment of our mind, respecting
something truly existing, unknown, but in reason understood, that is, known in
195
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, , „2oo Therefore, the metaphysical idea ofmatter wasreason only, and not in sense. ' a J
derived from perceptions of external objects, whereas the physical idea ofmatter was
arrived at by way of the idea of power.201 So Hutton believed that,
Matter, as a term, must either belong to physical knowledge, or to that
which is properly metaphysical. If it be physical, we have no right to
attribute to this thing any other than the properties by which perceived
things are made known to us, or which we in this route of science believe
as belonging to external things. In this case, therefore, matter would
mean no more than the parts ofbodies which are too small to be
perceived, or the minute division ofbodies beyond the examination of
the senses by which the greater bodies are made known. Matter, as a
physical subject, cannot be judged of from any thought of our mind, or
any conscious principle which we have of our proper knowledge; for,
matter is the principle of that which we cannot know consciously, as
being extrinsic in relation to mind; and it would be as absurd to judge the
nature ofmatter, in that case, upon metaphysical principles, as it would
be to describe the nature ofmind upon those ofmathematics, or to
conclude apriori the effect in physical action, or the succession of
natural events.
If, on the other hand, the term matter is to be considered as
metaphysical, or as properly to be judged of from our knowledge of
ourselves, and from our understanding the principles of our knowledge,
then, matter, though a principle in things which are perceived, is not to be
considered as having in that magnitude and figure, which in our animal
opinions or common understanding we necessarily judge as belonging to
external things, but which, from science more accurate, we judge to be in
the imagining and conceiving power of our mind. Matter, in this view,
will appear to be a thing absolutely different from that external thing
which is perceived by our mind; and the proper attribute ofmatter will
be, the having power to affect our mind in making us to know. This is all
that matter has in relation to our mind of knowledge; and this is the
proper metaphysical idea ofmatter.
Having thus taken a view of the physical and metaphysical ideas of
matter, we must be satisfied that this is a complete investigation of the
subject.202
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And so having examined matter from both perspectives, Hutton concluded that his
predecessors had erred and that he had found a new and proper system ofknowledge
founded upon just first principles of both physics and metaphysics.
By making perception a compound of sensation and conception, as well as
being an instinctive operation of the mind, Hutton's theory of perception was
considered innovative. Indeed, he noted that "to this day the subject ofperception, as
here understood, has been untouched"203; and the review ofPrinciples ofKnowledge
in The Analytical Review stated that his "theory ofperception is new, and we hesitate
not to say, ingenious, consistent, and well supported."204 Hutton informed his
readers that it was this enquiry into physics that prompted him into conducting a
metaphysical investigation as
having found principles, which superseded the necessity ofbelieving in
the commonly received opinion, with regard to matter and bodies; and
having found, that volume, in natural bodies, may be only a thing
imagined in our mind, I entertained a suspicion, that the employing this
property ofbody as a principle in natural philosophy, like those of
mathematical figures, might be only a supposition; consequently, that the
scientific definitions ofmatter, taken from this quality ofbody, were
mere conjecture, and only founded upon the vulgar notions ofmen. This
led me to inquire into the nature of our knowledge, when we judge in
relation to this subject, volume and figure.
It was here that I discovered, as I persuade myself, the principle upon
which our knowledge ofmagnitude and figure is founded; and, this
science, being distinctly different from that ofphysics, led me to examine
metaphysics, as the proper science to which this subject of our
knowledge then belonged.205
Consequently, Hutton not only developed metaphysical means to support his physics
but he subsequently constructed an entire 'general system' that connected his
Dissertations on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy and his Principles of
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Knowledge into a full physical and metaphysical system. Indeed, initially Hutton
"began to form a metaphysical theory, for the support of a physical theory"206 and in
fact in Dissertations on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy he wrote
extensively on metaphysical issues especially the instinctive faculty of perception, as
it was "in thus applying to metaphysics" that Hutton believed that he had "obtained a
perfect confirmation" of his physical theory.207 But in several cases within
Principles ofKnowledge he also referred to illustrations which he had made in
Dissertations on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy as it was "in reconciling"
his metaphysical speculations "with matter of fact or the phenomena of nature", that
Hutton "procured a confidence in that abstract science, to which the principles
employed in the other sciences are to be submitted."208 Therefore, it was as the result
of these reciprocal speculations between physics and metaphysics that Hutton
"acquired a desire to cultivate the science, in which man is made to know himself'
and consequently he studied metaphysics "for its own sake."209 As a result of these
enquiries Hutton's general system then was built upon his first principles that he had
confirmed both physically and metaphysically and which he believed were perfect.
Hutton's theory of perception had given him what he concluded was a double
proof—both physical and metaphysical—that his first principles were proper and that
his philosophy was built on bedrock. On the other hand as his approach was often to
revise the positions ofhis predecessors, he pointed out where Locke and his
followers, Berkeley and most notably Hume, had gone wrong in the assembling of
their first principles. Hutton's aim in mapping the progress of knowledge was to
206 PK I, xvi.
207 PK I, xxxii.
208 TU. J
70
establish the order of the mind; whereas he noted that Locke had "inverted the
natural order of things" by confusing instinctive and conscious ideas.210 Indeed,
sensations for Hutton were "original and primary" whereas Locke had considered
them as secondary; and while Locke thought that solidity and extension were
"original and primary", Hutton maintained that these are "certainly only secondary,
so far as these follow in consequence of sensation, which in the production of
knowledge, or progress ofmind, is primary."211 As a result, Hutton believed that
Locke had reasoned erroneously "when he assigned things with magnitude, figure,
and motion, as the cause of our sensation; for, nothing is more evident, than that it is
only by means of sensation that we attain to the knowledge of things with magnitude,
figure, and motion."212 And while Hutton thought that "we are made to know by
external information" through sensation and perception (that is, knowledge)-, it is
only when we reflect on sensation and perception that this "is properly termed
idea."213 Indeed, Hutton pointed out that Locke had expressed how 'ideas' were
produced erroneously as "Mr Locke says, a snow-ball has the power to produce in us
the ideas ofwhite, cold, and round; whereas he should have said, it has the power to
produce the knowledge or sensation ofwhite and cold; and that then the mind has the
power to produce the idea of that knowledge."214 And in the case of 'understanding',
Hutton believed that this was an operation that was beyond sensation and perception
and required the mind to make a judgment and so he criticised Locke as,
The powers to produce in us that knowledge, he [Locke] calls qualities in
external things, which things are then contrasted with the mind; and, as
these qualities are sensations or perceptions in our understanding, he
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[Locke] calls them ideas; but, it is evident, the term understanding is here
improper, being employed in place ofmind, which is, on this occasion,
contrasted with the external thing. Nor is this to be considered as a
frivolous distinction, for, understanding is an operation ofmind, and is
performed posterior in relation to knowledge and idea.215
In other words, Locke had not only confounded sensation and perception as well as
understanding in relation to knowledge and idea; he had also "confounded idea and
knowledge" which Hutton believed were "perfectly distinct."216 As Locke had failed
to distinguish between knowledge and idea it was impossible for him to have
produced a theory of perception similar to Hutton. Indeed, he had fallen into the trap
"of considering our ideas as representing external things, when truly they represent
nothing but our knowledge."217 Now as Hume had been influenced by Locke
regarding ideas, Hutton was then critical ofHume as,
Mr Hume considers all human knowledge as consisting of ideas, of
which he says there are two kinds, one strong and lively, the other faint
and weak. Now it is knowledge and idea, that Mr Hume here considers
as things of the same species, and only differing in degree. No wonder
that a philosopher reasoning upon those principles, should find some
difficulty in distinguishing truth and fiction, reality and fancy, and thus
should be led, in his philosophy, towards scepticism.218
And so instead of criticising Hume's sceptical conclusion, Hutton chose to attack the
first principles upon which Hume had grounded his philosophy thus undermining
Hume's scepticism. Consequently, Hutton believed that he had pointed out the
errors in the first principles and—since so much depended upon first principles—the
philosophies of Locke, Berkeley and Hume.
Now since he thought that he had perfect first principles Hutton also thought
that he was in a position to persuade his philosophical audience that even at their
PK 1,321.




advanced state of intelligence the correct way to proceed in philosophy was by
'remounting to principles' as "no science can be perfect, or absolutely free from
scepticism, unless it be traced to its principles."219 Furthermore, Hutton believed that
when he and his audience were scrutinising their philosophies it was still "necessary
to analise (sic) our principles, and thus remount from step to step, until we either
arrive at the error, or deduce the principle from that primary knowledge of the mind
which is unerring."220 Thus science should proceed in the "inverted order of our
natural knowledge"221 as,
Our knowledge is considered as proceeding from that which is absolutely
simple, to that which is compound; and this is the natural progress of the
mind in general, or, this is the case before such a mind has become a
conscious being in reflection. But here again, our knowledge of our
knowledge, or our understanding of our knowledge and ideas, which is
the progress of a conscious mind, must be considered as proceeding, in
an inverted order, compared with that of our natural knowledge, that is, it
proceeds from the compound to the more and more simple. It is only
when we can separate the most compound idea into its different parts,
and, by subdividing these, trace them to the knowledge which is original
and simple, that we frilly understand the compound natural idea, and that
we have formed the highest abstracted ideas, which are absolute and
999
original.
Therefore, it did not matter how intelligent a philosopher was, if they did not use
both analysis and synthesis to great affect then according to Hutton they could not
arrive at truth.
Hutton thought that his a posteriori progress of the mind to philosophy
inferred that there were intellectual, natural and social principles that had been
ordered by God benevolently for the happiness ofmankind. However, illustrating
proof after proof of design including order in the mind was of course no challenge to
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Hume's scepticism. So Hutton's system contained several ways in which he argued
for theism. Among them was an argument indicating that since man is limited in his
powers then there must be a God. Although humans cannot be the cause of their
sensations and Hutton states that it must be God who is ultimately the cause, he does
not indicate exactly how but merely rules out alternatives. Another ofHutton's
theistic arguments was that happiness through virtue and wisdom would not occur if
God or nature deceived us. And in keeping with his methodology he reasoned on
this a posteriori and thought that anyone could test these positions. In another of his
arguments for theism Hutton eliminated the alternatives ofpolytheism and atheism
by reasoning that there can only be one positive principle. And since scepticism
cannot be a conclusion then theism must be the only conclusion possible. The
connection through first principles of physics and metaphysics was another way in
which Hutton thought he had proved the existence ofGod. If it is in man's
constitution to uncover how the universe is designed then there can only be a single
explanation that is true and so by elimination all other explanations are false. Having
joined first principles in the physical as well as the metaphysical areas Hutton
thought that he had double proof of a single explanation. Furthermore, since those
who could understand both physics and metaphysics were limited to a few, it was
mostly in this respect that Hutton was directing his philosophy to a restricted
audience. And he believed that if his audience could understand his work then there
would be no reason for them not to believe that the universe was designed. Because
the individual parts ofHutton's system do not rigidly depend upon each other many
modern interpretations ofHutton have ignored the relationship between the parts and
have missed how in checking the consistency ofhis theories in relation to his
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theology that "there is more happening than meets the eye."223 Therefore, Hutton s
argument for design was reinforced in a number ofways including being "buttressed
with the epistemological and elimination arguments."224
In his opposition to Hume, Hutton also took issue with one of the most
celebrated aspects ofHume's philosophy: cause and effect. Again, he chose to attack
a specific area ofHume's theory so as to undermine it in its entirety as he believed
that cause and effect is the "most important object perhaps of our inquiry; for, unless
we judge of the truth in those ideas... instead of leading to philosophy, our science
might terminate in scepticism."225 Hutton argued that Hume had confused the order
of our knowledge through sensation with the idea of causation. Indeed, in his An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume had written that, "When we
reason a priori, and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind,
independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct
object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable
connexion between them."226 Hutton quoted this passage as evidence ofHume's
"misunderstanding" of cause and effect since he believed that we can only acquire
the idea of connection in reason.227 Hume's illustration of the connection of cause
and effect as occurring in experience was that,
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay
even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of
natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a
child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle,
he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a
similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and
223 Galbraith, James Hutton, 24.
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appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is
led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I
may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any
pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the
argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you
confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate,
therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or
profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess
that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling
the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to
appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intend to enforce in
the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made anymighty
discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a
very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which,
it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out ofmy
cradle.228
But Hutton pointed out that in this instance Hume was "only considering an object of
natural history, which respects the order of our knowledge"229 and therefore Hume's
idea of causation was not accurate since the relationship of cause and effect is not a
related pair of external things but is instead a way in which the mind orders events.
Further in his response to Hume, Hutton noted that,
a philosopher must not allow himself to fancy, that he is reasoning with
regard to cause and effect, while he is only putting a question with regard
to the natural succession of events, the knowledge ofwhich requires
sensation, memory, and discernment, or must be ascertained by
observation and experience; neither is it to be concluded, that because
reasoning cannot here proceed to form a judgment a priori, therefore,
experience should give us the conception of cause and effect without the
use of reason; observation itself cannot discover either effect or cause.
But this process of observation and experience, accompanied with
reason in relation to events, necessarily suggests conclusions in
conscious and reflecting minds, or employs the faculty ofjudging, in like
manner as the proper impression of the organ or action of the external
cause necessarily excites sensation; and it is by reasoning on what has
passed in sensation, or has been transacted during those operations in the
mind, that the relative ideas of effect and cause are produced or
conceived, not perceived. The observation of light or a body of flame is
one event, and the sensation ofheat another; of themselves, those
different events have not any relation or the smallest affinity; but, being
connected properly in place and time by the action and consciousness of
228 Hume, Enquiries., 39.
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our mind, there is hence formed an idea or conception of those things
thus related; this idea, however, is formed in reason, not in sense.230
Therefore, the connection of cause and effect must take place in the mind and so
Hume was mistaken in his philosophy. Hutton pointed out that Hume had fallen into
the trap that had befallen many of his other predecessors as having confused
metaphysical and physical ideas since,
Mr Hume, therefore, makes a very improper question, when he inquires
for the connection or relation of cause and effect, as he may very
properly do with regard to flame and the feeling of heat, or snow and the
feeling of cold. Cause and effect, properly speaking, are abstract general
relations; and, the connection of these is necessarily understood, in the
knowledge of this order in our thought. In a metaphysical investigation,
he may properly inquire, how we acquire the knowledge of cause and
effect, in like manner as, reasoning physically, we inquire after the
connection or proper relation of flame and heat; but, there to alledge (sic)
that cause and effect are known, while we are ignorant of their
connection or relation, is to reason metaphysically with physical ideas;
231
and, this will certainly introduce error into our philosophy.
Hutton thought that this was in fact a significant error that Hume had made since,
This theory, concerning the progress of the mind in knowledge, so far as
our moral sentiments and actions are not thereby affected, would appear,
to mankind in general, to be as trivial in its purpose as it is abstracted in
its nature. But, to a philosopher, who is to contemplate nature as
contained in the material and intellectual systems, and to consider things
as existing without and within the mind, the subject here examined is, of
all others, the most important, seeing that it is only in distinguishing what
is the proper object of sense, and what is the operation of our thinking
principle, that any solid judgment may be formed with regard to what
really exists in nature, and what eventually exists only in our mind.232
Therefore, by poking holes in Hume's theory of causation and thus rattling the
foundations of his philosophy, Hutton thought that he was undermining the
scepticism ofHume.
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There were other ways in which Hutton dealt with scepticism as he noted that
if there was no uniformity in nature then we would be unable to understand it since
"understanding is founded upon similarity, or, it is in assimilating our knowledge
that we understand scientifically."233 However, in the case of the idea of chance
when it is
applied to cause, it is a negative proposition, implying, that we see no
design. When the same term is applied to effect, we are apt to persuade
ourselves that the proposition is positive, as when we say, that we see
nothing but disorder in the thing. But here we only deceive ourselves;
disorder is no absolute thing, it is only negative, implying, that we do not
perceive the order of what has come to pass.
That material things should be ruled by chance, is either a confused
idea or a contradictory expression. If there is any order in material
things, there must be design; for, the one of those expressions necessarily
implies the other. Consequently, if there be any design perceived in the
order of things, there can be no chance; for, chance is only a negation of
design.234
Overall though Hutton thought that "Scepticism is the doubting upon a general—an
universal principle of disbelief. But, there is no such general principle; on the
contrary, there is nothing in nature but belief; and doubting is properly in science."235
So having ruled scepticism as a negative or an "artificial" principle of "disbelief'236
then it cannot be an universal in human nature. Indeed,
A general principle of disbelief is synonimous (sic) with, or equal to, a
general principle of ignorance. But, what would mean a general principle
of ignorance? Would this be any other than the knowing of nothing?
But, such a state ofmind would be the farthest from a principle; and, it is
the greatest misunderstanding to confound, with this, the knowledge of
our ignorance; for, before a mind can know its ignorance, it must know
wherein it knows; and this, if employed as a principle in reason to
conclude, is the very opposite of scepticism. Thus, inordinate scepticism,
however competent to defeat prejudice, ends in absurdity, and prepares a
233 PKII, 176-177.
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triumph to the common sense ofmankind, in opposition to the abstract
r ■ 237
reasoning of science.
This final remark "separates Hutton as much from Hume as from Hume's critic
Reid"238, since Hutton believed that it was only those who were philosophers who
could properly understand physics and metaphysics thus comprehending the design
ofboth material and human nature.
In terms of a first cause on which Hutton's entire system was built he
reasoned that,
no man of rational understanding can find any principle for concluding
that there is no first cause; for, this necessarily implies, that he
understands how things could be produced without a cause. Now, if a
man has seen this truth, That things may be produced without a cause, he
has but to reveal it, that so it may be believed by other men; but, to deny
the existence of a first cause, from no other reason than this, that to him
the first cause is unknown, would be equally absurd, as to deny his own
existence, because he knows not how he had a being.
Thus we will be justified in affirming, that the first cause is absolute,
self-existing, efficient, and final.239
The final cause was human happiness and it had been benevolently intended so that
"Man is actuated in his moral conduct by two different motives.. .the sensual and
intellectual."240 The human constitution is designed so that mankind then has "a
double part to act.. .on the one hand, his animal nature to maintain, and his species to
preserve; on the other, he has to acquire an independent source of pleasure, in the
enjoyment ofhis proper thought, in order to complete his happiness when animal
pleasure shall decay."241 Indeed, happiness could only be achieved by abstaining
from overindulgence in sensual pleasures and instead being led through the moral
principles leading to virtue, philosophy and ultimately happiness. Therefore, this
237 Ibid.
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242"intellectual system, or design of virtue" was a natural progress in which human
nature is the effect ofwisdom and benevolence as "Human nature, therefore, is the
cause of virtue; and, virtue is naturally the cause of happiness."243
It took Hutton 2,173 quarto pages to investigate the progress of reason from
the universal animal instincts to the natural religion of the few in Principles of
Knowledge and in spite of his efforts it has been largely ignored. Since he did not
hold an academic position there were no proteges that might have retold or modified
Hutton's philosophy. But while Playfair took the trouble to extract Hutton's deism
from his Theory ofthe Earth thus popularizing it in his Illustrations of the Huttonian
Theory of the Earth, the by then out of fashion deist position remained unedited in
Principles ofKnowledge. However, the main reason that Hutton's philosophy has
been neglected is due to its writing style and thus how difficult it is to read as the
"repetitious character ofHutton's work often obscures his thought or line of
reasoning"244 Although Hutton's writing has been criticized for being dense,
repetitive and prolix, what has never been taken into consideration is that Hutton
himselfwrote regarding his composition style in the Preface to Principles of
Knowledge:
an author who has to support a theory which is opposed by the natural
prejudice ofmankind, and by the received doctrines of a philosophy
founded upon those vulgar notions, labours under a certain disadvantage.
If he illustrate (sic) his theory, in applying it to every particular with
which it is concerned, the work becomes voluminous, and his readers are
disgusted with frequent repetitions, which he is necessarily induced to
make, in order to illustrate a doctrine which is not familiar to them. If,
again, to avoid that evil, he shall give the theory without those
illustrations, in leaving the particular applications to his reader, his
doctrine runs the risk of being condemned; not from being inapplicable
242 PK III, 334.
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for the explanation of our opinions, as it ought, but from the occasional
difficulty ofmaking those applications, that is, from misstatement of the
case, misunderstanding of a new doctrine, and misapplication of the
principles.
The theory, ifjust, must be applicable to every particular appearance
and event; but, to trace the general in every particular, is not always
easy.. .Here then are two evils, which appear to me in this case
unavoidable, but, ofwhich an author maymake a choice; I have therefore
preferred that which I think the least, viz. prolixity, in bringing the theory
to the test ofmany particular applications, and exposing the subject in
many different points of view, in order to have it fully considered.
The proper object, of this work, is not to give a book which should
please the reader, either by the elegance of the composition, or by
flattering fallacious opinions which he may have entertained; nor is it to
make proselytes of those who can only believe upon authority, or in
superstition, without seeing proper evidence: It is to give to those, who
may be willing to correct their prejudices and able to analise (sic) their
thoughts, the means of examining their opinions, and ofjudging for
themselves, by reasoning in the strictest rules of science, with regard to a
subject where the data are neither deficient nor beyond the reach of the
inquiring mind.245
This extraordinary passage has never been taken into account and whilst Hutton is
difficult to read, it is unfair that writers have commented upon the prolixity of
Principles ofKnowledge without acknowledging Hutton's unusual intentions.
While it has been ignored, until now, that Hutton himselfwarned his readers
in the Preface ofPrinciples ofKnowledge what to expect in his style of composition;
he did in fact note that "there are two difficulties which attend this undertaking" in
regards to "both the author and the reader."246 In addition to the "method or
composition", the second difficulty that he cautioned in reading his work was
regarding the "matter or doctrine of the work"247 or the "nature of the subject."248
And this other difficult aspect of reading Principles ofKnowledge has, again, never
been taken into account when writers have commented upon the obscurity of
245 PK I, xxx-xxxi.
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Hutton's writing, and as a result Hutton has suffered undue criticism. The subject
that Hutton was referring to was physics since it was his inquiry into physical
principles that first led him to inquire into metaphysics. And regarding this subject
matter that would present another difficulty for his readers, Hutton wrote that,
Without understanding that physical investigation, with regard to the
nature ofbodies, which has been given in another place [249], the
metaphysical process, here employed for establishing the nature of our
perception, may perhaps appear to many (who may not follow every step
of the investigation) as purely chymerical (sic). Because, judging from a
false appearance, with regard to the solidity of those bodies which we
perceive, and not seeing the full force of the metaphysical demonstration,
the proposition here maintained, with regard to the nature ofmagnitude
and figure as the creature of our imagination, must seem to them as
founded on nothing but supposition. In like manner, without the
metaphysical investigation which is given in this work, and by which we
come to understand the nature of our opinions, men of science, who may
see the full force of the physical argument against the absolute solidity of
bodies, will still be doubtful, in allowing that conclusion which is so
strongly opposed by their prejudice or animal ideas.
But, in examining the subject both physically and metaphysically, and,
after seeing clearly how we perceive by means of sense without any real
solidity, and how we deceive ourselves in reasoning from false
appearances in those supposed things, we shall have every sceptical
notion, as well as every natural prejudice removed; we shall so far
understand the nature of external things, in knowing what they are not,
and we shall so far understand our own nature, in knowing what we
actually do in order to perceive. Such, at least, is the result of that
investigation in my mind; and, such were the motives and method ofmy
250
inquiry.
This was also a warning that the nature of his subject could not be understood by all
who read it and that his audience was restricted as, "it is only to those who are
learned in the science of physics, or who understand the nature of things, that such a
chain of reasoning, as is necessary for leading to the science ofmetaphysics, may be
properly undertaken, or can be rendered intelligible."251 Indeed, Hutton believed that
w Hutton, Natural Philosophy., Part III.
250 PK I, xxxi-xxxii.
251 PK I, ii.
82
only a small group of the intelligentsia could understand his system and it was
therefore only the few who had advanced their intelligence to natural religion.
Another confusing aspect of reading Hutton's work is how he published his
physics [1792] before his metaphysics [1794] as it may have been easier to
comprehend if he had published his metaphysics first since he would not have had to
include metaphysics in his physics and then physics in his metaphysics. Hutton
apologised for publishing in the confusing order that he did as,
I would here beg leave to refer the reader to the dissertation upon the
laws ofmatter and motion already quoted; he will there find the
application of this doctrine to subjects of natural philosophy. In that
preliminary dissertation, there is some metaphysical reasoning, (perhaps
improper in a physical work), which would have been unnecessary, if this
metaphysical work had preceded those physical dissertations.252
In addition to this chronological confusion was the bewildering inordinate use of
examples. But when it came to his examination of first principles in which he made
the connection between physics and metaphysics the reason for his excessive use of
examples was made clear as,
What has required so much repetition of this fundamental part of the
doctrine, is the general opinion ofmankind, who believe the direct
contrary; for, it is thought that external bodies really exist as they appear
to the thinking principle, that is, with magnitude, figure, colour, &c.; and,
when a reflecting mind considers these several qualities separate and
distinct, this is thought to be an abstract speculation; as if that conception
had not a foundation in reality, and did not necessarily flow from the
nature of our knowledge, whose principles are all simple, absolute, and
distinct.
But if, in consequence of the present investigation, a proper distinction
shall be made of the judgment, or fruit of the discerning faculty, and the
first knowledge on which the discerning faculty ofmind proceeds, it will
be admitted, that it is the abstract passion ofmind excited in sensation,
and the abstract action ofmind employed in perception, which constitute
those principles of our understanding here termed knowledge.
Consequently, the abstracting operation of reflecting minds,
(distinguishing the several qualities of length, breadth, and colour, &c. in
252 PK 11,395.
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bodies) will appear to be a natural progress of intelligent minds,
advancing in an order opposite to that of infant minds, when these are
learning to form ideas, and thus to know the natural appearances of
things.253
The examples of others mistakes is tedious and while Hutton noted the difficulty
involved he did feel that it was important to include them so that he could strictly test
his own philosophy as
error has no place in science, properly speaking, no more than in
instinctive reason, which is nature. We are however so little accustomed
to that propriety of speech, or to that rigour of scientific language which
is so usefully employed in mathematical reasoning, that it is sometimes
difficult to express to others, by terms employed so often in lax senses,
ideas that may be clear in a man's own mind; it is therefore necessary so
often to illustrate with examples, perhaps not always properly adapted to
the purpose, and to use tedious repetitions of the same thing in varied
expressions.254
Nevertheless, reading Hutton's 'prolix' and 'repetitious' Principles ofKnowledge is
arduous and in this respect it is not surprising that it has been neglected.
There is one further reason why Hutton's philosophy is so difficult to read
and that is due to the manner in which he employed geometric reasoning throughout.
Although Hutton never claimed to have been a stellar mathematician, Playfair noted
that he did however possess an "aptitude ofhis mind for geometrical reasoning"
which was "proved on many occasions"255 and this was to be of great importance in
shaping the arguments of his Principles ofKnowledge. Hutton's writing was not
presented in a mathematical style but it did display a geometric influence with
illustration upon illustration until he had exhausted all angles that an issue could be
investigated from as well as defending all perspectives from which his work could be
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attacked. Indeed, Hutton thought that the correct method "employed by
philosophers, is that of definition, axiom, and proposition."256
This geometric method employed in Hutton's metaphysics was as in
geometry founded in solid first principles. Indeed, in order to establish "clear and
uncontrovertible" principles for natural philosophy, Hutton thought that "the
examination of first principles must appear to be the proper means for attaining that
which is required."257 And it was only once he had properly defined and
distinguished axiomatic first principles in metaphysics that philosophical
propositions could be built knowing that there was already truth in the axioms.
Subsequent judging in relation to these axioms, that is propositions "which follow in
consequence of axioms" become principles themselves as propositions are "formed
in succession, by employing the truths before discovered; and in this manner, science
is advanced, by a similar employment of the rational faculty, always judging in
relation to acquired principles."258 While propositions were purely intellectual, that
is they were seen by Hutton as being completely scientific; axioms were formed
upon instinctual knowledge and he noted that "Science, therefore, is only perfect, so
far as the intellectual process is compleat (sic), and so far as the propositions or
truths employed have been founded upon axioms."259 This geometric reasoning was
in fact central to Hutton's science as, "In scientific reasoning, knowledge is produced
by steps; in each of these a principle is acquired on which to proceed in reasoning,
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certainty without seeing every step."260 This in essence is the geometric method.
However, the overuse of illustration employed throughout Hutton's writing has
subsequently led to criticism resulting in his metaphysics being ignored and
consequently the misunderstanding ofHutton and his works.
The root ofHutton's geometric reasoning most probably derived from his
time as a student at the University ofEdinburgh where he studied under Professor
Colin MacLaurin who was the most brilliant and celebrated mathematician of the
time and as Playfair pointed out, that "Of the masters under whom he studied there,
MacLaurin was by far the most eminent, and Dr. Hutton, though he had cultivated
the mathematical sciences less than any other, never mentioned the lectures of that
celebrated Professor but in terms of high admiration."261 Hutton began his studies at
the University of Edinburgh in 1740 when geometrical reasoning was instilled in the
students of Colin MacLaurin's elementary class not just as a schooling in
mathematics but so that they would initially be filled with sound philosophical
principles. This could be described as a first principles examination of first
principles. Indeed, in Scotland there was a "pedagogical superiority of geometry
over algebraic analysis" and the reason for this was that it was believed that
"Geometry kept one aware of the steps of reasoning involved in a mathematical
argument and algebra did not; therefore, geometry was better for training the intellect
than algebra."262 And this Scottish tradition, of the link between geometry and
philosophy continued until the nineteenth century when Sir William Hamilton
probably best summed up its importance to intellectual development by writing that,
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The mathematical process in the symbolic method (i.e. the algebraic) is
like running a rail-road through a tunnelled mountain; that in the
ostensive (i.e. the geometrical) like crossing a mountain on foot. The
former carries us, by a short and easy transit, to our destined point, but in
miasma, darkness and torpidity, whereas the latter allows us to reach it
only after time and trouble, but feasting us at each turn with glances of
the earth and of the heavens, while we inhale health in the pleasant
breeze, and gather new strength at every effort we put forth.263
Hamilton was also here reinforcing the significance of geometry to the Scottish
educational tradition, a tradition that was broad and general as opposed to the
specialised analysis of algebra. Moreover, he believed that geometry has "always
been reckoned as the transition study from the concrete to the abstract, from the
science ofmatter to the science ofmind"264 And it was within this geometrical and
philosophical Scottish pedagogical tradition that James Hutton's intellectual
development was nurtured.
Colin MacLaurin graduated from the University of Glasgow in 1713 where
he was a student of Robert Simson who was Professor of Mathematics from 1711
until 1761. Simson also taught Matthew Stewart, John Robison, and Adam Smith,
and in restoring the ancient Greek geometry, especially through his The Elements of
Euclid, he not only shaped Scottish mathematics but was influential in forming
Scottish pedagogical practices. Indeed, Simson wrote in the Preface of The Elements
ofEuclid that it was his intention to restore the,
Elements to their original Accuracy.. .since these Elements are the
Foundation of a Science by which the Investigation and Discovery of
useful Truths, at least in Mathematical Learning, is promoted as far as the
limited Powers of the Mind allow; and which likewise is of the greatest
Use in the Arts both of Peace and War, to many ofwhich Geometry is
absolutely necessary.265
263 Hamilton, Sir William., A Letter to the Lord Provost. 1838. as cited in The Democratic Intellect
by George Elder Davie. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961. (1999 reprint) 127.
264 Ibid., 128.
265 Simson, Robert. The Elements ofEuclid. Glasgow: Robert and Andrew Foulis, 1756.
87
The Scottish pedagogical tradition was a general education and by utilizing geometry
as illustrating how the mind operates the initial schooling in geometry was
subsequently of critical importance in the development of the Scots philosophers.
Furthermore, the connection of geometry and geometric reasoning to the other
disciplines was a key component in the general education of the eighteenth century at
a time when there was thought to be a unity of the sciences. But specifically as
MacLaurin's biographer Patrick Murdoch wrote,
In the first or lowest class, (sometimes divided into two) he taught the
first six books ofEuclid's Elements, plain trigonometry, practical
geometry, the elements of fortification, and an introduction to algebra.
The second class studied algebra, the 11th and 12th books ofEuclid,
spherical trigonometry, conic sections, and the general principles of
astronomy. The third class went on in astronomy and perspective, read a
part of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia, and had a course of experiments for
illustrating them, performed and explained to them. He afterwards read
and demonstrated the elements of fluxions: those in the fourth class read
a system of fluxions, the doctrine of chances, and the rest ofNewton's
Principia,266
Therefore, it was under the guidance ofMacLaurin whose use of geometry was
paramount that Hutton's education transpired on a solid footing, but it was also
through this examination of geometry which emphasised philosophical principles
that Hutton would have developed further as,
The same emphasis on cultural and liberal values which characterised the
work of the elementarymathematical class was also found in the
advanced class. In fact, just as the introductory class was taught its
Euclid and its arithmetic in a very philosophical way, so the treatment of
the calculus in the third and highest mathematical class was dominated
by an obsession with the question ofmetaphysical foundations.267
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And while it was Simson who "more than anyone" was responsible for the "tie-up
between mathematics and scholarship and philosophy"268; it was MacLaurin who
transmitted this method to Hutton as part of a general education that was a "broad,
uniform curriculum of Scottish tradition, with its subjects drawn from the three fields
of language, philosophy, and science."269 It was within this tradition that James
Hutton received his education, an education with which he went on to become a
genius not only in science, but philosophy and indeed language.
Hutton's thoughts on religion were also reminiscent of Colin MacLaurin's
and it has previously been noticed that Hutton "closely followed Maclaurin's
language in inferring God's wisdom and foresight from nature."270 Indeed, in one of
many examples MacLaurin wrote that,
natural philosophy is subservient to purposes of a higher kind, and is
chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural religion and
moral philosophy; by leading us, in a satisfactory manner, to the
knowledge of the Author and Governor of the universe. To study nature
is to search into his workmanship: every new discovery opens to us a
new part of his scheme. And while we still meet, in our enquiries, with
hints of greater things yet undiscovered, the mind is kept in a pleasing
expectation ofmaking a further progress; acquiring at the same time
higher conceptions of that great Being, whose works are so various and
hard to be comprehended 271
Similarly Hutton wrote that,
instead ofmaking that metaphysical investigation subservient only to
physical science and natural philosophy, I discovered a much more
important end for metaphysical inquiry; this was, the making natural
philosophy subservient to a general system, in which the nature or
constitution of things must be considered as the proper means of intellect,
a system, in which the human intellect appears to be the benevolent
intention of the first cause; a system in which man is made to understand
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his proper happiness, in seeing its causes; and a system, in which man,
knowing his greatest good, is made to act voluntarily in having a
conscious choice, and to conform his will to the wise laws of human
nature,—laws which he thus learns in studying the constitution ofhis
own mind,—and laws which he cannot learn without admiring the
benevolence in which they have been ordained.272
So in addition to the geometric, Hutton may have been influenced by Colin
MacLaurin—his professor at the University of Edinburgh—in other respects such as
moral philosophy and natural religion.
Another possible way in which Hutton was influenced by MacLaurin was
from what MacLaurin had written about bees. In explaining the progress from the
instinctive to the scientific faculties, or animal to human operations, Hutton offered
an interesting illustration by showing that science is only to be attained by
humankind while juxtaposing the instinctive operation of a bee's hexagonal cell as
opposed to the scientific operation of a mathematician in the drawing of a
hexagon.273 Philosophers throughout the centuries, for example Pappus of
Alexandria and Johannes Kepler, had made speculations regarding the hexagonal
form of the cells of the bee's honeycomb. Indeed, there is a "vast literature through
the centuries mentioning the bee as a geometer.. .During the 18th century, the
mathematical architecture of the honeycomb was viewed as evidence of a great
teleological tendency of the universe."274 With Hutton using the example of a bee's
instinctive operation, this was quite possibly another instance ofhow Hutton had
been influenced by Colin MacLaurin. Certainly, MacLaurin would have been
working on his "Of the Bases of the Cells wherein the Bees diposite (sic) their
Honey" which was later published in The Philosophical Transactions [of the Royal
272 PK I, xxxii-xxxiii.
273 PK I, 509.
274 Hales, T. C. "The Honeycomb Conjecture" in Discrete & Computational Geometry. New York:
SpringerVergal, 2001. Volume 25, 1-22. 2.
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Society ofLondon] while Hutton was one of his students at the University of
Edinburgh. It was in this work that MacLaurin wrote that,
the Bees do truly construct their Cells of the best Figure, and that not
only nearly, but with Exactness; and that their Proceeding could not have
been more perfect from the greatest Knowledge in Geometry. How they
arrive at this, and how the wonderful Instinct in Animals is to be
accounted for, is a Question of an higher Nature.275
Even from this short passage it is possible to demonstrate a great deal of the
influence that MacLaurin most likely had on Hutton's philosophy, teleology and
indeed his geometric reasoning.
While Hutton was a student at the University of Edinburgh he was also
greatly influenced by Professor John Stevenson. Indeed, at the beginning of
Playfair's biography ofHutton is an account of an illustration made by Stevenson
976
that was clearly influential to Hutton's intellectual development. Stevenson made
the point that gold can be dissolved in aqua regia. This 'kingly water' is a mixture
ofnitric and hydrochloric acids which separately can dissolve base metals, but when
united they dissolve the 'noble' or precious metals of gold and platinum. This
illustration deeply impressed Hutton and led to a life-long interest in chemistry. But
as well as influencing his intellectual activities it was also to become lucrative in
influencing his business interests as his chemical knowledge was instmmental in the
success of his sal ammoniac business which made him financially independent.
However, although much has been made since Playfair's biography of how
Stevenson was the main influence in Hutton's development due to this aqua regia
illustration, it could have also been made in MacLaurin's class as part ofHutton's
275
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(Presented 3 November, 1743) in The Philosophical Transactions [of the Royal Society ofLondon],
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introduction to Newton since it is dealt with in Newton's 31st Query277 which he
would have read whilst a student in MacLaurin's class. Nonetheless, it was in
Stevenson's Logic and Rhetoric class that Hutton was introduced to Locke's Essay
Concerning Human Understanding which would have had an enormous impact on
his thinking as well as Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman
Knowledge, and certainly it was in this class that most ofHutton's formative learning
on metaphysics and language took place.
The education that Hutton received at the University ofEdinburgh especially
from Stevenson and MacLaurin laid the groundwork for his later thoughts on
science, philosophy and language. But it was also from the education that he
received from MacLaurin based upon the revival of Euclidean geometry by Robert
Simson that most likely led to Hutton's aptitude for geometric reasoning and it was
this reasoning applied to his writing that many of his readers have found difficult.
Indeed, the trouble as far as reading and understanding Hutton is concerned, is that,
to use Hamilton's analogy, he is 'crossing a mountain on foot'; but just as the reader
feels that Hutton is moving forward, all of a sudden he decides to halt his progress by
defining how far he has progressed up to that point, and instead of gathering 'new
strength' Hutton exhausts his readers with constant repetition ofwhat ground he has
previously covered before he embarks on a new step forward. So as he moved
through the order ofmind progressively at each stage Hutton reiterated what he had
proved to be self-evident and built upon that with illustration upon illustration to
demonstrate each new step along the way and the reader is left with an at times
seemingly endless stumble across a Himalayan-style expedition. And it was this
277 Newton, Sir Isaac. Opticlcs: or, a Treatise ofthe Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and Colours
ofLight. (4th edition) London: Printed for William Innys, 1730. 357-358.
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style of composition which contained Hutton's geometric reasoning that led to
criticism by some of the reviewers ofPrinciples ofKnowledge.
The first review ofPrinciples ofKnowledge was by The Analytical Review?1*
97Q
While it contained some criticism for being a "ponderous work" , for the most part
it praised Hutton as his
talents for physical investigation we remarked with pleasure on a former
occasion: his abilities as a metaphysical inquirer will be amply attested
by the work before us. Ingenuity of invention, perspicuity ofjudgment,
with a spirit of free inquiry unfettered by any undue deference to ancient
systems, or great names, constitute a claim to praise, which the doctor
possesses in no small degree.280
However, the writing style ofHutton received considerable condemnation as it was
thought that the "form in which it is presented, we are sorry to say, is in many
instances not only inelegant, but to every reader of taste highly offensive and
forbidding."281 Nonetheless, this review also noted that the style ofHutton's writing
should in no way
detract from the general merits of the work, which we deem deserving of
the highest commendation, or to derogate from the author's well-founded
claims to literary honour.—This investigation alone would justly intitle
him to a distinguished rank among the philosophers of the present age,
and we dismiss it with returning him our grateful acknowledgements for
the pleasure and the improvement we have reaped from its perusal.282
Indeed, The Analytical Review found particular merit in Hutton's theory of
perception which was deemed as "ingenious and correct."283 Furthermore, The
Analytical Review also recognized Hutton's theory of language and commented on
278 The Analytical Review; or, History ofLiterature, domestic andforeign, on an enlargedplan:
Volume XX—October 1794. London: J. Johnson, 1794. 149-162; Appendix to the Twentieth
Volume—September to December 1794. London: J. Johnson, 1795. 449-465; Volume XXI—May
1795. London: J. Johnson, 1795. 449-460.
279 Ibid., Appendix to the Twentieth Volume—September to December 1794., 449.
280 Ibid., Volume XX—October 1794., 149.
281 Ibid., Volume XXI—May 1795., 460.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid., Volume XX—October 1794., 158.
93
the originality of his theory of orthography.284 The second of the contemporary
reviews was by The English Review which totaled eighty-seven pages over eleven
issues.285 Again it directed criticism at Hutton's style ofwriting as "although often
animated, and sometimes eloquent, it is yet not unfrequently (sic) debased by vulgar
and unusual expression."286 But it also heaped praise on Hutton as "the opinions of
the author are so new, so bold, and so remote from common habits of thinking, that
they must soon attract the attention of the philosophical world."287 In addition,
Hutton's theory of language was thought to be "ingenious."288 And while The
English Review wrote that it would be "presumptuous" to give a "decisive opinion",
it was thought that Hutton's Principles ofKnowledge "has evidently employed many
years of thought and investigation, and which is, perhaps, to be considered as the
boldest and most singular inquiry that this age has produced into the philosophy both
of nature and ofmind."289 A third review by The British Critic290 noted that
9Q1
Principles ofKnowledge was "comprehensive beyond comparison." And a fourth
and particularly harsh contemporary review was made by The Critical Review but
not until three years after publication in 1797.292 It began with an attack on the
printer since apparently it was a source of annoyance that, "Five times the printer
reminded us of the length of time this work has been upon our hands"; but the review
284 Ibid., Appendix to the Twentieth Volume—September to December 1794., 465.
285 The English Review; or An Abstract ofEnglish and Foreign Literature: Volume XXIV December
1794. 431-443; Volume XXV January 1795. 42-49; February 1795. 120-125; March 1795. 201-206;
April 1795. 289-295; May 1795. 378-382; June 1795. 414-419; Volume XXVI July 1795. 24-32;
August 1795. 95-100; September 1795. 166-173; October 1795. 252-263. London: H. Murray, 1795.
286 Ibid., Volume XXVI, October 1795., 263.
287 Ibid., Volume XXVI, October 1795., 262.
28« Ibid., Volume XXV, May 1795., 382.
289 Ibid., Volume XXIV, December 1794., 431.
290 The British Critic: Volume VI—September 1795. 217-229.; October 1795. 366-374.
291 Ibid., Volume VI—October 1795. 374.
292 The Critical Review; or, Annals ofLiterature, extended and improved. A new arrangement,:
yfumeXIXMarch 1797. London: A. Hamilton. 308-315.
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itselfwas ruthless as "we are dragged without mercy through the science of
philosophy, and the philosophy of science—through the theory of idea, and the idea
of theory, till we know not whether we stand upon our head or our heels."293 Again,
the style ofHutton's writing came under attack as The Critical Review noted "we
wish that he had paid a greater degree of attention to style, language, and
composition."294 Indeed, some advice was given as "we recommend our author to
cut his work down to the size of three duodecimos, when we promise him to examine
it with still further attention; and also we assure him, that not only the number but the
satisfaction of his readers will be greatly increased."295 But The Critical Review did
offer some commendation most notably for Hutton's theory of language especially
his "thoughts on spelling, which deserve praise."296 Nevertheless, The Critical
Review declared that "we shall congratulate any student who can get through the
three volumes by fair reading, without meeting as many disappointments as
ourselves."297 However, as it was published in the March 1797 edition it was
unlikely that Hutton read this merciless review since he died on the 26th March 1797.
Hutton's legacy has been marred due to the obscurity in his writing, and his
non-geological work including Principles ofKnowledge has been essentially
forgotten. In fact had Playfair not rewritten Hutton's Theory ofthe Earth it too
might have resulted in oblivion. Playfair was equally critical ofHutton's writing
abilities as he noted that,
Truth, however, forces me to add, that other reasons certainly contributed
not a little to prevent Dr Hutton's theory from making a due impression












facts, for a system which involved so much that was new, and opposite to
the opinions generally received. The descriptions which it contains of
the phenomena of geology, suppose in the reader too great a knowledge
of the things described. The reasoning is sometimes embarrassed by the
care taken to render it strictly logical; and the transitions, from the
author's peculiar notions of arrangement, are often unexpected and
abrupt. These defects run more or less through all Dr Hutton's writings,
and produce a degree of obscurity astonishing to those who knew him,
and who heard him every day converse with no less clearness and
precision, than animation and force. From whatever causes the want of
perspicuity in his writings proceeded, perplexity of thought was not
among the number; and the confusion ofhis ideas can neither be urged as
298
an apology for himself, nor as a consolation to his readers.
Others among Hutton's contemporaries were of a similar opinion as, when in his
biography of Joseph Black, his friend Adam Ferguson wrote that,
Having said so much ofHutton in this occasional notice, so far short of
his merits, it may not be improper to prepare those who may consult him
as an author, to meet with a disappointment for which his friends could
never rightly account. Though uncommonly luminous and pleasant in
conversation, he was obscure, unintelligible, and dry in writing, to an
equal degree.. .In company, he spoke to be understood by such as were
present, and when obscure, was called upon to explain himself. But
alone, he was not aware that others could be at a loss for a meaning so
clear to himself.. .his very ingenious conceptions, to be received as they
ought, must come from some other pen than his own.299
Of course it was Playfair's pen that rescued and popularized Hutton's geology when
he published Illustrations of the Huttonian Theory ofthe Earth300 and he was well-
qualified to do so. Certainly, in the nineteenth century Sir Archibald Geikie believed
that it was not only Playfair's friendship with Hutton nor his understanding of
geology that made him best qualified to popularize Hutton's geology, but it was that
he was "Gifted with a clear penetrating mind, a rare faculty of orderly logical
arrangement, and an English style of altogether remarkable precision and
298 Playfair, 'Biographical Account', 61-62.
299 Ferguson, Adam. 'Minutes of the Life and Character of Joseph Black, M.D.' from Volume V of
Transactions ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh, (Edinburgh: Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1805) 101-
117. 115.
3°° playfair, John. Illustrations ofthe Huttonian Theory of the Earth. Edinburgh: Cadell & Davies,
1802.
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elegance "301 In fact Geikie thought that "For precision of statement and felicity of
language" the Illustrations of the Huttonian Theory ofthe Earth had "no superior in
English scientific literature."302 But although Playfair was aware that all ofHutton's
writings are difficult to read it was only Hutton's geology that he chose to popularize
in spite of the fact that both Adam Ferguson and Dugald Stewart suggested that he
extend his popularisation to Hutton's metaphysics. Indeed, while Dugald Stewart
noted that although Hutton had been an "amiable and excellent friend", and "so
ingenious and original in his writings as a geologist and natural philosopher"; he also
thought that Hutton was "often so dark and even incomprehensible as a
metaphysician."303 Nevertheless, Stewart additionally wrote that Hutton was
a philosopher eminently distinguished by originality of thought, and
whose writings could not have failed to attract much more notice than
they have yet done, if the great variety of his scientific pursuits had left
him a little more leisure to cultivate the arts of composition and of
arrangement.304
But Stewart suggested, as Ferguson had done, that Playfair should rewrite Hutton's
metaphysics since,
It would be fortunate, in this respect, for his literary fame, if the same
friendly and skilful hand [John Playfair] which has illustrated and
adorned his geological researches, would undertake the task of guiding us
through the puzzling, but interesting labyrinth of his metaphysical
discussions.305
Whether Playfair considered this task is unknown, nevertheless he agreed with
Ferguson and Stewart as he thought that Hutton's metaphysics "certainly merits more
attention than it has yet met with.. .An abridgment of it, judiciously executed, so as
301 Geikie, The Founders, 166.
302 Ibid., 167.
303 Stewart, Dugald. The Philosophy ofthe Active andMoral Powers ofMan—Volume II (1828) from
The Collected Works ofDugald Stewart—Volume VII (1855) edited by SirWilliam Hamilton.
Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co., 1855. 175. nl.
304 Stewart, Dugald. Philosophical Essays (1810) from The Collected Works ofDugald Stewart—
Volume V (1855) edited by SirWilliam Hamilton. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co., 1855. 96.
305 Ibid., 96-97.
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to state the argument in a manner both perspicuous and concise, would, I am
persuaded, make a valuable addition to metaphysical science."306 However, even
Playfair's work on Hutton's geology did not stay true to Hutton's intention and so a
popularized account by Playfair ofHutton's metaphysics would most likely have also
strayed from what Hutton was intending his readers to grasp.
One scathing attack on Hutton's writing style was made by Samuel Taylor
Coleridge (1772-1834) who inscribed in his copy ofPrinciples ofKnowledge:
'I can not walk with them, because I could walk in them', said a wag of a
very too large pair of shoes. Something of the sort might be applied to
this work.. .In short, there is sense, and strong sense; but it loses itself in
its enormous House, in the wilderness of the multitudinous chambers and
passages—As poor Sarah Stoddart (afterwards, poor Lass! Mrs Hazlitt)
complained to me of her Brother's Lectures and Remonstrances; 'He
drives it in, and in, and in (to my head) till he drives it out, out, and out
again. I feel as if there was a hole thro' my head and nothing remaining
but a Buz.'307
Yet while Coleridge's criticism ofHutton's composition was stinging he did give
Hutton's philosophical abilities great praise as he thought that in Principles of
Knowledge,
There is a great metaphysical talent displayed in it; and the writer had
made an important step beyond Locke, Berkeley and Hartley—and was
clearly on the precincts of the Critical Philosophy—with which and the
previous Treatises ofKant he appears to have had no acquaintance.308
However, in terms of comparing Hutton and Kant,
Hutton's interest is not so much in how the trick is done as in where the
generally received views (e.g. Newtonian physics) have gone wrong and
what can be done to revise them. Thus with regard to perception, which
both men understand to be a process of interpreting sensations in the light
of concepts, it barely interests Hutton that a priori material is introduced
306
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in this process and the nomena placed beyond discovery. It is enough for
Hutton that the process is 'simple' and nearly infallible, that the results
are vouchsafed by God. The process itself cannot be the source of error,
though the failure to recognise that the process takes place accounts for
the confusions of Locke and the scepticism of Hume.309
So in spite of his confusing composition, Hutton was still considered to possess
enormous ability as a philosopher.
In spite ofPrinciples ofKnowledge being Hutton's longest work and
containing the method upon which his general system was built it has largely been
ignored. Hutton's geology has often been treated in isolation thus not taking into
account what he had to say about the principles that he applied to it. But it is
difficult to understand Hutton's scientific method unless his metaphysics is taken
into consideration. And by ignoring his theory of language which is embedded
within his metaphysics it is impossible to attain a complete understanding ofHutton.
Indeed, without a proper means of communication there would be no science so in
relation to all the other sciences language "may be considered as their handmaid."310
Therefore, a corrupt language meant a corrupt science and so Hutton was determined
to establish proper first principles of language so that they would be as certain as the
"elements of geometry."311
309 Galbraith, James Hutton, 111.




Chapter Two—The Exposure ofHutton's Work on Language at the Royal
Society of Edinburgh
The earliest account ofHutton's work on language was the reading of his
Dissertation on Written Language as a Sign ofSpeech at the Literary Class of the
Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1786. Hutton was an enthusiastic member of the
Royal Society of Edinburgh and he was active in both the Physical and the Literary
Class as well as holding positions as an Office-Bearer. It has been thought that
"From the beginning the Literary Class lacked any great ongoing theme or
themes."312 However, this chapter will take a contrary position by illustrating how
language was a theme which engaged a number of significant literati at the Literary
Class during the early years of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and show how within
this philological discussion Hutton presented his paper as an appeal to the literati to
reform language.
Being financially independent and with no family or professional
responsibilities, once Hutton moved back to Edinburgh in 1767 he was able to focus
completely on his studies as well as his activities amongst the literati. He became a
member of the Philosophical Society in 1768 and "he read several papers" in that
society during the period of 1771 until 1783.313 These included "Observations on the
Theories of artillery"314 [which was never published] and an "Account of some
remarkable appearances on Arthur's Seat"315 in June 1778, which was later published
in 1790 as On certain Natural Appearances of the Ground on the Hill ofArthur's
312 Campbell, Neil, and R. Martin S. Smellie. The Royal Society ofEdinburgh (1783-1983): The First
Two Hundred Years. (Edinburgh: The Royal Society ofEdinburgh, 1983) 9.
313 Playfair, 'Biographical Account', 50.
314 Minutes ofthe GeneralMeetings ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh from its Institution (June 23
1783, to July 6 1791). MS, National Library of Scotland, Acc. 10000, Item 1, 32.
315 Ibid.
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Seat.3lb But a flurry of activity by Hutton in the mid-1780s was a result of his
enthusiasm for the newly formed Royal Society of Edinburgh. He read "A
dissertation on the condensation of aqiuous vapours, and a Theory of Rain"317 at the
Physical Class on 2 February and 12 April, 1784 which was later published as
Theory ofRain in the first volume of the Transactions ofthe Royal Society of
Edinburgh in 1788.318 And in 1785 Joseph Black read the first part of "Examination
of the System of the habitable Earth" on 7 March; with Hutton reading the second
part and its abstract on 4 April and 4 July.319 This is Hutton's most famous work and
it was published in the Transactions in 1788.320 While these activities confirm what
Playfair noted about Hutton's enthusiasm for the Royal Society ofEdinburgh, his
activities weren't confined to reading papers as he was also an active Office-Bearer
of the Society, first as one of the six Counsellors of the Physical Class from 1783
until 1790, and then as the President of the Physical Class from 1790 until his death
in 1797. During the year that he presented his work on language at the Literary Class
in 1786, he attended at least four out of a possible eight Physical Class meetings at
three ofwhich he was President pro Tempore, and at the Literary Class he attended
at least five out of a possible eight meetings reading his paper at three of those and
his abstract at another. Therefore, it would seem that he was more active in the
Literary Class that year than he was in the Physical Class.
316 Transactions ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh, Volume II (Edinburgh: Royal Society of
Edinburgh, 1790) 10.
317 Ibid., 32.
318 Transactions, Volume I (1788) 49.
319 Minute book ofthe Physical Class [ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh] November 1783-June 1793.
MS, National Library of Scotland, Acc. 10000, Item 2, 21-22.
320 Hutton, James. "Theory of the Earth; or an investigation of the laws observable in the
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The meetings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh during Hutton's lifetime
were held in the College Library of "the 1617 building on the north side of the
University property which had been refurbished to accommodate the library in
1753."321 The meetings of the Literary Class were held in the College Library "on
the third Mondays of January, Lebruary, March, April, June, July, November, and
December, at Six o'Clock in the Evening."322
It is impossible to know what the meetings of the Royal Society ofEdinburgh
were like as the Minute-Books as well as the Transactions of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh only provide minimal information such as the date ofmeetings, the titles
of the papers, the names ofEellows proposing new members and who they were
proposing, as well as who was the presiding officer. There is no record ofwhat was
discussed about the papers read, who was in attendance, or how many were at each
meeting so it is impossible to have a complete portrayal of the audience. However it
is known that there were fifteen at the very first meeting of the Society and that a
quorum of twenty-one was required at General Meetings. A number ofmeetings
were adjourned however due to a lack of attendance but an "informed guess of the
audience for normal Physical Class meetings would be about 20 and, possibly, as
large as 50 during the most exciting phase of the geological debate." And
although no attendance rolls were kept, some of those in attendance when Hutton
read his papers are included in the entries of the Minute Books.
321 Waterston, Charles D. The Home ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh from
<http://www.royalsoced.org.uk/archives/homes.pdf> [accessed 17 October 2007]
322 Minutes ofthe GeneralMeetings, 9.
In the first volume of the Transactions the time ofmeeting was noted "at 7 o'clock afternoon." [13.]
323 Shapin, Steven Arthur. The Royal Society ofEdinburgh: A Study ofthe Social Context of
Hanoverian Science. University of Pennsylvania, PhD, 1971. 269.
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On election to the Royal Society of Edinburgh each Fellow was required to
point out whether he wished to become a member of the Physical Class or the
Literary Class but this did not prevent him from participating in the activities of the
other Class. Indeed, there were regular examples of cross discipline work including
Sir James Hall's On the Origin and Principles ofGothic Architecture as well as Dr.
James Gregory's The Theory of the Moods of Verbs?2* Hutton, as with Hall and
Gregory, was a member of the Physical Class but of course it was in the Literary
Class that he presented his work on language as part of an ongoing philological
discussion.
The Literary Class held what is described in the Minute Book as "Enquiries
relating to Antiquities, Philology and Literature."325 In the first volume of the
Transactions History and Speculative Philosophy were also included as being within
the department of the Literary Class.326 Papers on language were commonly read at
the Literary Class and at least six were read from the founding of the Royal Society
ofEdinburgh in 1783 until Hutton read Dissertation on Written Language as a Sign
ofSpeech in 1786. These were the Dissertation on the Theory ofInflection in
Languages by Thomas Robertson, read 23 January and 16 February 1784; On the
English Genitive by Dr. James Anderson, read 10 April 1784 an abstract ofwhich
was published in TRSE I, 1788, 23-24; A Grammatical Essay on the Nature, Import
and Effect ofcertain Conjunctions by Professor John Hunter of St. Andrews, read by
Andrew Dalzel 21 June 1784, and published in TRSE I, 1788, 113-134; Certain
Analogies observed by the Greeks in the use oftheir letters by Andrew Dalzel, read
19 December 1785 and 19 November 1787, published in TRSE II, 1790, 111-153; as
324 Transactions, Volume II (1790), 193-250. [Paper read 18 June and 16 July, 1787]
325 Minutes ofthe GeneralMeetings, 8.
326 Transactions, Volume I (1788), 12.
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well as The Subjunctive Mode in English Verbs by Thomas Robertson, read by
Andrew Dalzel on 18 April, 1785 and 17 December 1787. And in the months
leading up to when Hutton read his paper, Professor John Young of the University of
Glasgow read Essay on the Middle Voice ofthe Greek Verb on 20 February, 20
March and 17 April 1786. So Hutton was by no means the first to read on the subject
of language at the Society. Nor was he the last. In fact from Hutton's paper in 1786
until the end of the decade at least four more papers on language were read at the
Literary Class. These were John Hill's An Essay upon the Utility ofDefining
Synonymous Terms in all languages; with Illustrations by Examples from the Latin
which was read on 18 February and 15 December 1788, published in TRSE III, 1794,
93-130; Dr. James Gregory's The Theory ofthe Moods of Verbs read on 18 June and
16 July, 1787, published in TRSE II, 1790, 193-250; Dr. James Anderson's
Observations on the Personal Pronouns read on 15 June, 1789; and The Latin
Compound Perfect Tense by Professor John Hunter of St. Andrews, read by Andrew
Dalzel on 15 February, 1790. Therefore, during the early years of the Royal Society
of Edinburgh a linguistic theme was evident in the Literary Class and Hutton
contributed to this philological discussion in 1786.
The minutes of the Royal Society of Edinburgh reveal that it was customary
for members to announce the title of their papers at the meeting prior to the first
reading and to read an abstract of the paper the meeting after the last reading (some
papers were read over more than one meeting—in Hutton's case his paper on
language was read over three meetings). It was at the twenty-first meeting of the
Literary Class of the Royal Society of Edinburgh on Monday 17 April, 1786 that "An
Essay was announced for next meeting to be read by Dr. Hutton, intituled (sic) On
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the Nature ofWritten Language as a Sign of Speech."327 On Monday 19 June, 1786
at the twenty-second meeting of the Literary Class the Presidents were all absent and
Dr. Adam Smith took the Chair. "Dr. Hutton read a part of a Dissertation on the
nature ofWritten Language as a Sign of Speech; and engaged to read the remainder
at the next meeting." Afterwards a "short conversation took place on the subject of
Dr. Hutton's paper." 328 Other than Adam Smith, the only other member noted in
attendance in the Minute Book was the secretary Alexander Fraser Tytler, however
this does not necessarily confirm Tytler's presence at this particularmeeting as at
times some entries were entered by the secretary on a later date than the actual
meetings. Smith however would have been interested in what Hutton had written
about language as he had earlier published Considerations concerning the first
Formation ofLanguages in PhilologicalMiscellany (1761) and it was then included
as an Appendix to Theory of the Moral Sentiments from the Third Edition of 1767
onwards, but since they were close friends Smith probably already knew about
Hutton's work on language.
At the following meeting, on Monday 17 July 1786, William Robertson,
Principal of the University ofEdinburgh, sat as President and "Dr. Hutton read a 2nd
part of his Essay on the Nature ofWritten Language as a Sign of Speech; and
engaged to read the remainder at a subsequent meeting. The conversation on the
subject of said paper was resumed."329 The secretary's entry for this meeting was
made by Andrew Dalzel, Professor ofGreek at the University of Edinburgh from
327 Minute book ofthe Literary Class [ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh] November 1783-November




1772 until 1805, who had already presented a contribution to the philological
discussion.
There is a slightly more detailed picture ofwho was at the twenty-fourth
meeting of the Literary Class that met on Monday 20 November 1786, as "Dr.
Hutton read a third and last part ofhis Essay on the nature ofwritten language as a
sign of speech; on which a short conversation took place."330 The President of the
meeting was Hugh Blair; and others present according to the minutes were Allan
Maconochie, Alexander Fraser Tytler, Dr. James Gregory, Henry Mackenzie, Robert
Henry, and Robert Walker.331 It would have been a well-informed discussion as
most of those present were to publish their own thoughts about philology. Indeed,
Hugh Blair, who was Professor ofRhetoric and Belles Lettres at the University of
Edinburgh from 1762 until 1781, had a great interest in language and published his
highly popular overlapping works The Rise andProgress ofLanguage on Rhetoric and
Belles Lettres (1765) and Lectures on Rhetoric (1783). Dr. James Gregory's Theory of
the Moods of Verbs was published in the second volume of the Transactions. And as
a novelist, essayist and poet Henry Mackenzie had an abiding interest in language.
Nevertheless there is no way ofknowing what sort of response Hutton received at these
meetings.
At the last meeting of the Literary Class for 1786, on Monday 18 December,
Hugh Blair again sat as President of the Meeting at which "Dr. Hutton read an
Abstract of the 3rd part of his Essay on the Nature ofwritten language as a sign of




John Hill, and John Walker.332 So another well-informed conversation would have
taken place at this final gathering of the reading ofHutton's contribution to the
philological discussion as in particular John Hill was to enter the discussion two
years later and publish his contribution in 1794, as well as subsequently publishing
further philological works.333 But again it is impossible to know the reaction to
Hutton's linguistic work by the Edinburgh literati.
The essence of the ten-page abstract of the Dissertation was that Hutton
believed the alphabet to have been corrupted and he thought that this was
"disgraceful to a nation that is wise and learned."334 He thought that speech should
be typified in the most accurate way possible and therefore undertook an analysis of
the principles of speech by first showing how articulate expression in humankind is
limited by nature. Hutton examined the vocal power ofman "from experience"335 by
distinguishing the various notes and modifications of the human voice in order to
have a complete and universal alphabet. He methodically examined how each sound
is made by illustrating the position of the vocal organ and describing how the breath
is modified in the articulation of each sound. The closeness of the lips, whether or
not the passage ofbreath is through the nose, and the use of the teeth, tongue and jaw
are described in detail as to how each letter of the alphabet is produced. He went so
far as to describe "the guttural or Northumbrian r in the vibratory modification; the
Spanish ID and "the French I mouillee, in the liquid modification" as well as "the
332 Ibid., 44.
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guttural n, or English ng, in the nasal modification."336 Once Hutton had described
the various positions of the vocal organ with their separate modifications, he went on
to show how among the voice articulators there is a distinction ofmutes and
consonants due to either the sound being produced in the windpipe or the simple
drawing ofbreath before modification by the articulating organ. These mutes and
consonants in turn can either be perfect or imperfect. This he goes on to explain in
detail. Therefore, Hutton considered "every possible vowel and articulator which are
proper for distinct speech" so that he could construct a universal alphabet.337
Having shown that in nature there are elements of speech Hutton proposed that
the communication ofboth speech and writing should strictly adhere to this alphabet.
So the art of speech and writing should progress hand in hand rather than how it was
since speech was not being properly reflected in words. By pursuing any other
method from "the scientific analysis of our speech, and elemental characterizing of
our vocal sounds, there will then be no fixed relation between our writing and the
pronunciation of our language."338 So while there was no point changing to another
orthographic system the present use of the alphabetical method needed reforming.
Or as Hutton's scientific method would have stated, by 'remounting to principles.'
Indeed, Hutton pointed out that the English method "is not truly" the "alphabetical
method" since it has adopted the "verbal method" by representing words in which a
combination of letters do not properly represent the sound.339 However, by
correcting the orthographical practice of the English language and by adhering






in two advantages. The first would mean that "the people" would obtain "great
facility in learning to read and write" as once a person had learned how to write all of
the sounds and articulations that the vocal organ produces in speech "within the
compass of the alphabet" then it would be in their power to write what is
pronounced.340 The other advantage of adhering strictly to the scientific method of
the alphabet, for Hutton, was that the language would "become uniform and steady"
and "avoid corruption."341 But having digressed from the rules of the alphabet the
literary advantage that this method brought had been lost and Hutton was concerned
that if the language was not returned to alphabetical principles then English could
eventually descend into a logographic system like the Chinese. And Hutton believed
that this inaccurate practice of orthography was a serious matter, indeed he described
the "little apprehension there is in general of this error" as a dangerous "growing
evil."342 But he thought that it could be corrected straightforwardly by the "exertion
of literary men" hence his reading to the literati at the Royal Society of Edinburgh.343
The full version ofHutton's Dissertation on Written Language as a Sign of
Speech was not published in full in the Literary Class section of the Transactions',
instead only an abstract version of it was published in the History ofthe Society
section.344 However, the content of the full version of the Dissertation was most
likely identical to what Hutton would later publish as his Principles ofOrthography
eight years later in Principles ofKnowledge which will be examined in Chapter Four.
Curiously, in Principles ofOrthography it would seem that at least part of the







used when he read his Dissertation in 1786, because in it he mentions that he knew
nothing of the vocal octave ofAntoine Court de Gebelin "until a month after
announcing this paper to the society"345 despite the fact that he makes no other
mention of "the society" in Principles ofKnowledge. Another sign that the 1786
work was almost identical to the 1794 work was in the length of the work. The
number ofpages in the Principles ofOrthography is similar in length to other fully
published works read at the Royal Society of Edinburgh over a similar number of
readings. So this further suggests that the three readings of the Dissertation in 1786
contained the same material that is to be found in Principles ofOrthography. An
additional point to back up this inference is that Playfair wrote that although Hutton
had long been studying the theory of the earth he had also directed his attention "to
the formation of a general system, both of physics and metaphysics"346 and that
before they became acquainted in about 1781 Playfair "had reason to believe" that
Hutton "had completed a manuscript treatise on each of them, the same nearly that he
afterwards gave to the world."347 Therefore, Playfair believed that Hutton's
metaphysics was complete at least five years before his reading of the Dissertation.
The decision to publish the abstract ofHutton's theory of language was
probably made by Hutton and Hutton alone. While there was a definite process that
papers went through before publication in the Physical Class Section and the
Literary Class Section of the Transactions, there is no record of a procedure to
decide what would be published in the History ofthe Society Section. However,
Steven Shapin noted that ultimately the editing of papers for publication in the
Transactions was "the responsibility of very few Fellows" and at least until "the turn
345 PK, II, 675.
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of the nineteenth century, the major share of the work seems to have been John
Robison's often assisted by John Walker and James Hutton."348 So with the
considerable influence that Hutton had in the publication process of the Transactions
he would have decided himself only to publish an abstract of his work on language in
the History ofthe Society Section rather than a full version in the Literary Class
Section.
By reading the Dissertation at the Royal Society of Edinburgh Hutton was
appealing to the literati as he noted that it was the "learned of the nation" that would
need to make the necessary linguistic improvements.349 But Hutton wrote that those
who had the power to make the necessary changes lacked the desire, while those who
would have benefited by the reforms lacked the power.350 Nonetheless, it would
seem that he thought that the remedy should have been taken by his fellow members
of the Royal Society ofEdinburgh as he noted that, "The first learned society, then,
which should occupy itselfwith this useful art, would set an example of true science
in the practice."351 And this is perhaps the clearest indication yet that his 1786 paper
was the same as his 1794 published version. Furthermore, the importance of the
scientific utility of the alphabet for Hutton was evident in his 1794 published work,
but also from the tone employed in this passage it is easy to imagine Hutton reading
this to his Fellows in the Literary Class as,
Nothing would seem more unnecessary, than the pointing out to men of
science the great utility of an alphabet; and yet, it is only to men of
science, that an address of this kind can be made. But, men of science do
not always take a scientific view of every branch of science; and, it will
not be impertinent to observe, that science may be corrupted in one
348 Shapin, The Royal Society ofEdinburgh, 285-286.




branch, while it is much cultivated in another. Nothing can better
illustrate this proposition than the subject now considered.352
Nevertheless this appeal by Hutton was to fall on deaf ears.
What is worth noting at this point is that a number ofworks have blamed the
rise in Earth Sciences [mainly as a result ofHutton's Theory of the Earth] for the
decline in the fortunes of the Literary Class at the Royal Society of Edinburgh.
Indeed, at first glance it might seem that Hutton's activities at the Literary Class,
especially in 1786, helped to keep the Literary Class flourishing. However,
The decline of the generalist nature of the RSE stems as much from the
unsuitability of literary communication to the Society's format as it does
from the vigor (sic) and excitement of the scientific debate.. ..Most
communications on non-scientific subjects were embedded in larger
works. They did not stand by themselves as incremental contributions to
an ongoing debate. The unit of literary production was the book, perhaps
more so in Edinburgh than elsewhere. The second publishing city of
Britain, Edinburgh made it far too attractive for a prospective author.
Papers were almost always destined for separate publication and
withdrawn from a society's periodical.353
So it can be argued that Hutton's decision not to publish the full version of his
Dissertation in the Literary Class Section of the Transactions helped along the
demise of the generalist nature of the Society perhaps more so than the publication of
his Theory of the Earth in the Physical Class Section of the Transactions. But
Hutton was not the only member of the philological discussion whose paper was
'destined' for another publication as Thomas Robertson's Dissertation on the Theory
ofInflection in Languages formed "a detached chapter of a work composed.. .on the
Theory andHistory ofLanguages, which he intends to offer to the public in a future
volume of his Enquiry into the Fine Arts" and therefore it was mentioned in Volume
I of the Transactions that "it was, on that account, judged improper to present it here
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in a mutilated or imperfect form."354 And another example of a paper 'destined' for
a future publication was Dr James Anderson's On the English Genitive as he only
offered "an abridgement" for publication like Hutton in "the historical part of the
volume."355 Therefore, although Hutton tested his theory at the Royal Society of
Edinburgh it would seem he had no desire to have it published in full as a stand¬
alone piece on language and instead he only put it forward for publication within a
metaphysical context eight years later. So Principles ofOrthography was clearly
integral to his metaphysics and Hutton withheld the full version for inclusion as part
ofPrinciples ofKnowledge and thus part of his general system. Nevertheless, in
spite ofHutton's decision to allow only an abstract of his Dissertation to be
published in the Transactions, the fact that he read his Dissertation at the Royal
Society ofEdinburgh meant that he wanted the Edinburgh literati to be exposed to
how the alphabet was corrupted and how speech and writing should progress hand in
hand.
354 Transactions, Volume I, (1788), 19.
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Chapter Three—Hutton's Principles of Speech
While the 1786 abstract version ofHutton's Dissertation on Written
Language as a Sign ofSpeech was a sample of what he would later publish on
written language, Hutton did not make his work on spoken language public until
1794 when it was published as Scientific Analysis illustrated, in examining the
Principles ofSpeech in Section Two ofPart Two ofPrinciples ofKnowledge. This
Section is comprised of two chapters which were intended to oppose the revival of a
theory of natural language by showing how language was most definitely artificial,
as well as illustrating how the formation of language was a clear example of the
progress ofmind. However, Hutton's treatise on speech was equal to what he
intended throughout his metaphysics which was to scrutinize his own science and to
empirically reinforce that the universe is ordered and designed.
Hutton spent a substantial portion of his work on speech engaged in a
response to his contemporaries Charles de Brasses and Antoine Court de Gebelin the
philosophes who he believed had erroneously revived the concept that there were
natural signs. In his Traite de la formation mechanique des langues et des principes
physiques de I'etymologie (1765), Charles de Brasses had argued that it was not
possible to recover the original language since it was too far in the past and it had
probably "been destroyed at Babel."356 Indeed, when he wrote of 'langues
adolescentes' he did not cite any, since all languages are so distant from their origin
that they have now reached 'maturite.'357 Nevertheless de Brasses thought that
language had arisen from a single source and that nature was the author of the
356 Juliard, Pierre. Philosophies ofLanguage in Eighteenth-Century France. The Hague: Mouton,
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"germination of sound and the first true words" and even the "gradual evolution of
languages towards arbitrariness does not eliminate this link."358 And so de Brosses
was opposing what Locke had established which was that words are most definitely
arbitrary. De Brosses attempted to show that in addition to cries, the origin of words
could also be found in
such 'necessary words' as papa and mama which all children would
automatically produce, in words associated with the particular organs of
the mouth—such as gorge, langue, dent, bouche—in 'les mots qui
peignent par onomatopee,' and in the invariable symbolic 'meanings' of
particular sound combinations such as st- for something firm and
steadfast andfl- for something flowing or liquid.359
Although these explanations lacked originality, de Brosses was the first to join them
together in this context.360 Furthermore, his originality was in the belief that
language was a product of the "primary intellectual impulse to imitate."361
Antoine Court de Gebelin expanded on the ability to closely imitate nature in
the principle of 'phonmimetism' and which Edward Nye describes as
a sixth sense which allows us to reproduce synaesthetically our
perception of the outside world in the sound of language. What is so
seductive about his idea of sound symbolism is that 'nature' is perfectly
reproduced in a universally comprehensible manner through the
362
application of subjective faculties of sensory perception.
De Gebelin published the enormous nine-volumes ofLe monde primitive analyse et
compare avec le monde moderne between 1773 and 1782. His work on language
later appeared in a summary ofVols. II and III under the title Histoire naturelle de la
parole, ou Precis de I'Origine du Langage & de la Grammaire Universelle ("Natural
358 Hafiler, G. "Charles de Brosses (1709-1777)" in The Encyclopedia ofLanguage and Linguistics
(second edition) Volume 2, ed. Keith Brown. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 2006. 134-135.
359 Aarsleff, Hans. The Study ofLanguage in England, 1780-1860. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
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history of the Word, or a sketch of the origins of language and of universal
grammar") in 1776. Although de Gebelin gave man a part in the creation of
language through imitation, he qualified his beliefwithin the Biblical tradition by
putting forward that God had given man his vocal organs. However, as with de
Brasses, de Gebelin believed that there had been one original language and that
imitation was the determining factor in shaping this first language. Sounds were then
articulated to imitate nature and were used simultaneously with gesture.363 And as
Sophia Rosenfeld observed, throughout the 1770s he attempted to "rediscover and to
catalogue the original, universal mother tongue, the collection of radical sounds and
images that he took to be given by and representative of nature."364 Although both
de Brasses and de Gebelin believed that man's first language was a 'langage natural';
de Brasses denied that the mother language could ever be found, but de Gebelin in a
Celtic-nationalist hypothesis put forward that Gaelic was the original language.
Although Hutton wrote that he was "ashamed to protract a dispute of so little
importance"365 by focusing a substantial portion ofhis work on spoken language in a
response to de Brasses and de Gebelin; he clearly saw their revival of nativism as a
threat to the conventionalism which was the widely-accepted position on nomination.
Despite mixed contemporary critical reaction to de Gebelin's nine-volume
encyclopedia in which his etymological dictionary of French appeared, it nonetheless
"had a successful publishing record, and subscribers included Diderot, Batteux de
Brasses, d'Holbach, Turgot, Naigeon, Montesquieu, Senancour, Vigny and also
Benjamin Franklin who sent Gebelin information on American languages in
363 Juliard, Philosophies ofLanguage, 35-38.
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1781 ,,366 g;Ven more influential was Charles de Brasses as the President de
l'Academie des Lettres de Dijon where a debate on language was taking place and in
which Rousseau was a prize-winner. In June 1751 de Brasses read his 'Memoires
sur la matiere etmologique' at the Academie de Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in Paris
from which Diderot extracted four articles: 'Langues,' 'Lettres,' 'Metaphore,' and
'Onomatopee,' and published them in the Encyclopedie. Inspired by de Brasses'
work, Turgot wrote the article 'Etymologie' for the Encyclopedie and then Nicolas
Beauzee wrote the article 'Inteijection' also for the Encyclopedie. And in Traite de
la formation mechanique des langues et des principes physiques de I 'etymologie
(1765) de Brasses included the material from his 'Memoires'367, and subsequently
numerous articles appearing after 1765 in the Encyclopedie "quoted the Traite at
great length."368 Hutton would have known how influential de Brasses and de
Gebelin had been on some of their fellow philosophes and he clearly felt the need to
respond and to defend the conventionalist position.
Hutton responded to de Brasses and de Gebelin by attacking their theories of
natural signs as well as the discipline of etymology as an invalid approach to the
study of language. According to Hutton, de Brasses had concluded that there are "in
things, natural signs for the expression of those objects in the speech ofman."
However, Hutton's response was to point out that, for example in the case of cuckoo
the "note of the bird is only the accidental cause"370 in relation to speech, but it is
"not however necessary" as it may be named "by another name."371 The
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methodology of de Brasses was to engage in exhaustive etymological studies in
order to find the 'germ' of a word372, and he produced a phonetic theory linking
words from different languages to their 'organic root.'373 The pivot of de Brasses'
theory was "the mechanical structure of the vocal organs"374 and the fact that this
imposed a physical restriction on the number ofpossible sounds that can be
expressed. Although Hutton likewise thought that the sounds that could be produced
by the vocal organs were limited and he founded his phonetic theory upon this basis
in his work on written language; on the other hand de Brasses' search for the 'germs'
ofwords went to extraordinary lengths "in order to justify linguistic imitation, and
one can only assume that the contemporary debate required a systematic treatment
such as his."375 For in the formation of words, 'germs' which could only be arranged
in combinations that were restricted by nature would be used to imitate the sound of
an object but in addition to this the vocal organs would have to produce a sound
resembling the object, for example a hollow sound would represent a hollow object.
376 But to this Hutton replied that,
We must not therefore allow ourselves to entertain false principles in our
philosophy, in order to make etymology appear important. Just
etymology will be pursued with greater success by acknowledging that
names are purely arbitrary, or belong properly to the mind ofman; at the
same time, there are some occasions in which we are led to perceive the
motive, which had actuated man in giving a proper name; and here
etymology would find in things some principle, no doubt, if it had a
valuable purpose. But, if it is more necessary to know what is meant by
words actually employed, than what had been the invention of the word,
the science of etymology, though not altogether destitute of rule, will of
all others appear to be least interesting to mankind, as well as the most
"inn
uncertain in its principles.
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And while Hutton saw the value of etymology in attempting to trace the history of
humankind through deriving one language from another, he considered the attempt to
derive languages from a "natural motive" completely useless since the proof that
nomination is arbitrary is in the inconsistency of languages. Indeed, of the arbitrary
nature ofnomination Hutton believed
That man must have a motive, by which he is determined to give a name
when he first expresses a thought, is certain: Without this, it would not be
the speech ofman. Man, also, must in similar circumstances be
determined by similar motives. Consequently, in the speech invented by
different men, there may be some affinity, so far as the motives of their
nomination were alike. But, the examples of this will be extremely rare;
and, nothing can so much evince this truth, that the speech ofman is
merely artificial, than the discrepancy which is found in the languages of
men, notwithstanding the few principles on which language in general
depends. How useless, therefore, the attempt to derive the various
languages ofmankind from its natural motive!378
Hutton then put forward that since "M. le President de Brasses and I" have "reasoned
a priori upon the subject" resulting in different conclusions, then in order to decide
370the question it was now time to "appeal to experience or matter of fact." The
evidence that Hutton put forward was that examples of onomatopoeia are rare since
"excepting those animals, like cuckoo, and cri-cri, which are named from a sort of
articulate cry, or those sounds which are imitated in speech, it requires great
ingenuity to find out this agreement which we look for between the object and the
expression."380 He then extended his response towards de Gebelin who, Hutton
noted, had carried de Brasses' ideas "in relation to this subject of natural ideas, much
farther still."381 De Gebelin, Hutton wrote,
378
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pretends to have discovered, that the vocal sounds are those which nature
has appointed to express the objects of sensation, and the consonants
those of intellect. There is no question here with regard to the ingenuity
of such discoveries; we are only concerned in examining how far they
may appear to be true.382
And again Hutton pointed out that there is no natural connection between words and
ideas nor could one be found in examining language etymologically.
In contrast to Antoine Court de Gebelin and Charles de Brasses, James
Hutton believed in the polygenesis of language. Human nature Hutton thought is so
far beyond the instinctive reasoning of the brute "who forms no art, and who is
taught immediately by nature" that the expression of language is "purely in art"383
and subsequently the operation ofman's art is that man teaches man. Regarding
nature providing a perfect language, Hutton believed that would mean that it had
been corrupted. It is only by allowing that nature is the cause of everything
including art, that nature played a part in the production of human speech. Indeed,
nature had no part in the formation of speech; unless by that term shall be
meant human nature, by which assuredly speech is made. The giving to
language an original in nature, which original is afterwards to be
modified and enlarged by art, is a theory that never can be proved; and, if
it could, it would not be perhaps more useful; for, it truly teaches
nothing.384
Instead, of natural signs Hutton thought that,
nature has widely contrived man for the production of his proper
language, by enduing him with the capacity of forming to himself
resemblances of things which do not actually resemble, of conceiving
similarities where things are truly not similar, and of knowing with
certainty the dissimilarity, the inequality, of things which are perceived.
Now this is science, the creator of articulate speech; this is human art, the
inventor of a language; and this is that intellect which man arrives at by
means of those imagined similarities and equalities, which do not exist in
IOC
nature, but which are necessarily imagined in the mind ofman.
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So nomination for Hutton was clearly arbitrary and there can be "no other origin for
rational language, or articulate speech" other than "man, with conscious ideas,
appropriating words to express those thoughts."386 But of course while nomination is
arbitrary in its origin as soon as a name "is chosen or received, the use of that name
is no longer arbitrary, so far as the word must be strictly employed to express the
idea, and no other" although variations of the primary are expressed through
declension.387
A further illustration made by Hutton was that the arbitrariness of nomination
is a matter that the literati find difficult when faced with having to name a new
concept. This difficulty arises from the consciousness that there is no natural
connection between the concept and its nomination; and while there is a desire to
find a name "that is sanctified by some former application, or associated with its
sense by some sort of analogy", there also exists the knowledge "that any name is
•500
equally applicable to the subject." An example of this was Locke's adoption of
the word idea as he
might have used many different words, such as phantasm, notion,
species; but, for fear that his readers might have attributed to these words
other conventional senses than what was implied in his definition, he had
recourse to the expression of a Greek author, whom it is possible he
might not very well understand; and, having adopted the word idea, this
has been received by the learned, and even by the vulgar. If, instead of
idea, he had taken the word bibu, the very same purpose would have been
served; but, he could not then have introduced it under the authority of
Plato.389
However, while Hutton believed that he had escaped this misdeed by using existing
words with what he thought were proper definitions, his critics did not agree.
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Indeed, an example of this was his use of 'science' that is evident in his explanation
of artificial language.
In Principles ofSpeech the purpose of Chapter I—Nature ofSpeech as the
Sign ofThought—was to "consider the general design ofman, in forming speech"390
and Hutton's method was to differentiate between animals and humans to show that
while brutes are not prevented from speech due to the lack of vocal apparatus, only
humans are designed for language. Hutton believed that 'reason' was an instinctive
faculty and an example of this in language was how an animal can recognise its
name. Although both man and brute possess "sensation, perception, memory and
reason", the decisive difference between humans and animals was that brutes do not
possess "any degree of that which is properly termed science."391 As explained
earlier in Chapter One Hutton defined 'science' as the ability to analyse, or
"Knowing by reflection."392 Indeed, Hutton noted that although both humans and
brutes have the vocal apparatus for producing speech, only humans distinguish the
relation of things and thoughts, and with this general faculty they forms signs for
their thoughts.393 In this regard he followed the view of abstraction that Locke had
expressed in his Essay as "beasts" cannot "compound and enlarge their ideas" since
the "power of abstracting is not at all in them", furthermore the "perfect distinction
betwixt man and brutes" is that animals do not possess general ideas and therefore
cannot make general signs for universal ideas.394 But Hutton was critical of the way
that 'reason' and 'science' had been defined elsewhere as
391 PK 1,579.
392 PK I, 30.
393 PK I, 588.
394
Locke, John. An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) edited by Roger Woolhouse (5th
edition, 1706) London: Penguin Books, 2004. Book II, Chapter XI, Section 10. 156.
123
People who have only superficially examined the nature of their
knowledge, are apt to fall into a double deception; first, in undervaluing
the human faculty of science, by which man aspires to the divine attribute
of universal knowledge; and secondly, in overrating reason, which as an
instinctive operation of the animal is perfect, but is not always productive
of that species of knowledge which is properly scientific.395
Therefore, Hutton's definition of'science' was what he thought was the determining
factor in how humans were designed for speech. And of course for Hutton this
design was made by a benevolent deity that had "intended man as the contriver ofhis
proper speech" in order to progress towards the final cause of human happiness.
Hutton defined spoken language as the "regular adapting ofmodified or
articulate sounds to distinguished ideas or conscious thoughts."397 These sounds are
systematic and they represent thought conveyed by speech put forward to the mind of
the listener. And thoughts that have already been put forward in speech suggest the
sounds that are associated with these thoughts so that there is a conscious association
between the mind's ideas and the vocal powers. The articulate sounds that are
produced in the "intellectual operation of a voluntary agent" are therefore the
expressions ofman's art.398 Indeed, speech is simply a matter ofman
communicating upon a voluntary operation as "the moment that he desires either to
communicate his knowledge to another person, or to know what that other person
thinks, he proceeds to form a sign for thought."399 Consequently language is
artificial as it requires 'science' for its formation since thoughts cannot be expressed
without distinguishing knowledge through reflection.
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As an illustration of how language is only natural to humans Hutton showed
how a child's grammatical error, for example in uttering "many sheeps" is proof of
the scientific nature of humankind in comparison to, for example SirWilliam
Temple's Brazilian parrot which would not have had the power of ordering.400
Indeed, the ridiculous story of a rational parrot, which had been recounted by John
Locke401 leaving himself open to undeserved criticism402 beginning in the 4th edition
(1700) ofAn Essay concerning Human Understanding^, was used by Hutton to
show that animals were precluded from language in spite of their vocal abilities. The
tale had been told to John Locke by SirWilliam Temple having himself heard it from
Prince Maurice (Dutch colonial governor, Johan Maurits ofNassau-Siegen) who had
spoken to the so-called rational Brazilian parrot in Dutch through a Brazilian
interpreter the conversation ofwhich was recorded in French! However, Hutton
pointed out that although some sagacious animals are well-adapted for speech in the
form of imitation, that to believe an animal such as the Brazilian parrot could hold
rational discourse would require a faith in miracles equivalent to the belief "that a
tree could walk."404 Still Hutton noted that imitation does in one manner have a part
to play in the development of human language. As with Sir William Temple's
rational parrot children are taught to imitate sounds despite having no knowledge of
the ideas connected to the sounds. However, children in contrast to animals
gradually gain knowledge of the connected ideas due to their capacity for reflection.
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Hutton did not follow in the footsteps of Mandeville, Condillac, Rousseau
and Smith who had constructed 'conjectural or theoretical' histories which featured
accounts of savages uttering the first passionate sounds of humankind. Nor did he
choose to discuss whether or not society preceded language. The break from
rationalism via Locke's Essay demanded that an investigation into the origin of
language would take place and by the late eighteenth century it was clear that
language had developed over a considerable period of time as the sensationalists had
to find an explanation for the origin of language in man's experience. But as with his
geology Hutton avoided hypothetical speculations or conjectural timescales, and of
the difficulty in tracing the beginning of language he wrote that "for us, who have
received our language modified though such a series of improving nations, it is not
an easy matter, to investigate the natural progress of this intellectual operation;
although it be abundantly clear, that it must have had a beginning which was much
more simple."405 Instead of constructing a conjectural history of language he focused
on the interdependence of an individual mind and language in its formation and
progress, but also acknowledging of course that communication takes place between
at least two individual minds. Nevertheless, Hutton's focus was "with respect to an
individual mind" and how thought must be the "mean employed in the producing of
language."406 So he noted that while language is "a system of thoughts and a system
of sounds properly adapted to each other" 407 one of them must have preceded the
other and of course for Hutton that one was thought.
Hutton was therefore interested in the origin of language principally in






artificial language began. He identified that along with an animal's ability to
recognise its name humans can make sounds without them being signs and
collectively he referred to this as 'instinctive language'. So for Hutton to find the
moment at which point language began he had to draw a "distinction between the
instinctive and the artificial speech ofman" that was
When we suppose man having thoughts to be expressed, that is,
conscious thoughts; and when we suppose man a thinking being capable
of understanding thoughts by means of signs, we can have no difficulty
in seeing how language must begin. Not because there is any necessary
connection between the thought and any particular expression of that
thought in language; but, because every effort ofman, to express to
another what he feels himself, would, in that state ofman, serve the
purpose of the intention. He could not, on this occasion, utter a sound
which would not have a signification; and, this connection of things
would be recorded, in the mind ofhim who understood the occasional
expression. Here, artificial language is begun; and, it is proper language,
however imperfect for the end of science, or however little progress may
have been made in this attempt; because, this first step is infinitely more
than all that may be afterwards performed, in pursuing this design.408
Furthermore, in appropriating a sign to a species, there "must be science in the
thought" and this
must be done, before one step is made in forming language; but, having
made the first step, all the rest are easy: He that makes a ladder of only
one step, requires no more inventive powers, to make one which should
reach the moon, were his physical powers equal to his intellect.409
Therefore, once artificial language has begun it then progresses as does mind.
After the formation of language there is a mutual progress of science and
language, since "Without language, how could science grow by means of the
intercourse ofmen? and, Without science, how could language be produced?"410
This was in stark contrast to Hobbes who had earlier written that it is "once we come
to a knowledge" of all the "consequences of names appertaining to the subject in
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hand" that we reach what "men call SCIENCE."411 Indeed, Hutton referred to
Thomas Elobbes' "opinion" whereby "language is in man the cause of science, and
not science the cause of language."412 Although he thought it was "natural" for "Mr
Hob's (sic)" to form "such an opinion, when a person limits his views to the effect of
language upon science; and when he does not analise (sic) science, so as to see in it
the cause of language."413 So this was another example ofHutton announcing that he
had accurately identified the order of the progress ofmind.
Just as Hutton had shown that 'science' [as the analytical stage in the
progress ofmind] and language progressed together in the individual; he also noted
how a mutual progress took place between 'science' [as a large body of knowledge]
and language in the human species. Indeed, "science and language always keep pace
or some proportion in a state or people." 14 At this point Hutton chose not to engage
in stadialism, theories such as those representing a number of stages of human
development that were typical of some ofhis fellow literati; however he did later put
forward that in spite of its flaws English was the most advanced of languages.
Nevertheless, during the mutual progress of science and language error creeps into
both, and so Hutton's method of 'remounting to principles' had to also be applied to
language and its improvement.
In order to communicate accurately, Hutton noted that language is much
more than the multiplication of signs, but requires judgement, modification and
understanding to analytically process the knowledge of signs as well as synthetically
411
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producing an arrangement of ideas in sound in a similar order to the actual
knowledge within the mind. Indeed, it was also Hutton's intention that his work on
spoken language was to be an illustration that the progress ofmind "is so well
exhibited in the formation of language."415 So man is taught to speak and to think
through language and even if a listener is unaware of an abstract term that is being
communicated to him, provided he understands the other speech referring to the
abstracted idea he can then form the distinction of the idea. However, in acquiring
knowledge by means of speech this must be done in steps,
That is to say, the whole intellect ofman consists in a progress
from one operation to another; and, it is impossible to go from the
first to the last, without passing through those which, in the natural
order of knowledge, are intermediate; in like manner as, one cannot
step from the bottom to the top of a ladder, except by the
degrees.416
As a result, this progress of knowledge that is expressed in speech is a procedure that
forms steps by reflecting on what is known and "on which he is again to stand, and
from thence to proceed still higher in his knowledge."417 Consequently language and
knowledge progress axiomatically and just as "language is in man, and not in
nature"418, the mind ofman "forms axioms; but, nature, without forming any axiom,
forms the mind ofman."419 So while 'science' is part ofman's constitution,
humankind nevertheless had to axiomatically invent language. Therefore, Hutton's
geometric reasoning was evident in his theory of spoken language.
Hutton had shown in the first chapter ofPrinciples ofSpeech "that science is
required, in order to form any language"; but in the second chapter—Of the
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Constituent Parts in Speech—he focused on "how much science is required to form a
proper language."420 In this examination Hutton proceeded through the "different
orders of knowledge"421 which are attained in the progress of our mind and its
expression in speech, thus Ofthe Constituent Parts in Speech examined "the
constitution of speech."422 To show how much science is required to form a proper
language, Hutton proceeded to explain the progress of the mind in showing how
thoughts are named arbitrarily in the mind and then articulated. The three sorts of
ideas to be typified in speech are: ideas or objects which are natural and do not imply
relation; secondly, abstract ideas between natural ideas; and thirdly, words that
reflect on knowledge including the comparing of generals in generalising abstract
ideas. In other words nomination is something that occurs for all ideas whether or
not this happens to be a particular "natural idea" distinguished by nouns substantive,
or artificial ideas formed by the generalising of generals these ultimately all require
nomination.
Knowledge to be nominated was divided into the instinctive and the
intellectual part of the human constitution. The instinctive part distinguishes
material objects whereas the intellectual part of our constitution is the knowledge of
our knowledge or the subject of our thoughts in reflection. Hutton was interested in
the method of science that is used to convert thoughts into articulate language. A
total of three subjects to be nominated in this order of knowledge were divided into
natural and intellectual objects. The first subject to be nominated was external
objects, or material things known by sensation and perception which included four
classes of nomination: [in order] "proper names", for example, 'the name of a dog';
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"special names" or "the sameness between the thing which is individually named",
for example, 'dog'; those which are "generic", for example, 'animal'; and universals
which are generals of general things known by sensation and perception 423 The
second subject in the order of nomination was the abstract qualities of our sensation
and perception (animal knowledge): [in order] "absolute" qualities which are
comparative; "quantity" and "quality"; and "thing" which comprehends change or
the action of things in particulars, generals and universals.424 Although these
thoughts are part of our instinctive faculties Hutton made it clear at this point that
reflection upon sensation and perception is required before these thoughts can be
communicated to another reflecting person. So while physical thoughts "derive their
origin immediately from objects that are natural or material", when we reflect and
communicate to another reflecting person the distinction perceived in our own
thinking, it is this contemplation formed in "reviewing those thoughts by which" our
"former actions had been conducted" that begins the thoughts which are "properly
metaphysical."425 The intellectual part of our constitution is the third subject in the
order ofnomination and the same method is employed as: individual thoughts are
generalised, for example knowledge by the eye or ear is sight and hearing; those
species are generalised "in order to form a genus or more general" 426 and are called
sensations or ideas depending upon whether they are caused externally or internally;
and perceptions which for example require particular names for magnitude and figure
and are then generalised in "those terms ofmagnitude andfigure"; then all of the
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ideas of sensation and perception can again be generalised into universals,427 p js
therefore the case that whether internal or external objects are being contemplated
the highly generalised process arrives at the "same universals."4~8 But the
intellectual part of our constitution proceeds and in distinguishing "memory" and
"judgment" creates knowledge in forming opinions.429 Opinions are then designated
as being "true orjust", "false or erroneous", thus leading to either agreeable or
disagreeable and pleasing or displeasing thoughts.430 This leads to the formation of a
"conscious motive or principle, for the direction of our voluntary actions, and a
source either of satisfaction or remorse, according as we either preserve our
conscious principle, or transgress it, in our acting."431 A conscious motive or
principle amounts to an understanding of the "universals truth and falsehood, good
and evil" which has been formed to influence our moral conduct.432 And at this point
Hutton commented on how the area of thought from sense to the moral sentiments is
both extensive and complicated, and as language becomes confused through its
complexity man is led "scientifically" to simplify it again so that there are both rules
for generalised thought as well as rules within rules to express relations occurring in
the "extension of complicated thought."433
Although ideas are articulated in sound, Hutton was most concerned about
the internal nomination of ideas in successive processes of abstraction. Indeed,
For, so far as speech is the sign of thought; and so far there is a natural
progress for thought, in the constitution of the human mind which first
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should consist of certain species or distinct parts, which may be again
generalised, in whatever manner those specific expressions shall be
signified in different languages. By thus generalising every individual
expression of thought, we shall see the formation of language in general;
and, this is then the science of our language. As therefore language is the
creature of science, and the subject of our knowledge, so, in seeing the
science of language, i.e. the order and disposition of those signs of
thought, we shall obtain a certain view of science as the natural progress
of human understanding.434
Therefore, the purpose of the second chapter on speech was to "show, that all
composition, inflexion, conjugation, and declension ofwords, ought to be considered
in no other view than as a regular nomination of thoughts"435 and so Ofthe
Constituent Parts in Speech did not focus on the grammatical but on the logical as he
only took a 'cursory' view of the actual parts of speech.
Once Hutton had shown how nomination of thoughts occurred he then took a
"cursory view" of the parts of speech.436 Indeed, an important trait of this chapter
was that rather than take a grammatical examination of the parts of speech in the
manner ofmost of his contemporaries, Hutton's study of the parts of speech was
simply in relation to the progress of the mind. In fact throughout this 'cursory' view
Hutton barely mentions the actual names of the parts of speech and remained focused
on the particular operation of thinking. And as with thoughts, the formation of
speech is progressive and begins with words which refer to "natural objects, and
imply no relation, nor generalisation."437 Words are then contrived to imply the
operation ofjudgment "in knowing relations, such as black and white, hot and
cold."428 And finally words are used to reveal abstract speculations reflecting on
knowledge "which apply properly to abstract ideas, but also those that signify the
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generalisation of those abstract terms; such as those ofmore or less,"439 In
wondering "where begins the generalisation of our ideas?" Hutton answered that he
believes it is "where the science ofman begins, there also begins the generalisation
of his thoughts, which are all at first particular."440 If there were only natural
particulars or nouns substantive, then in comparing these man "would reason
instinctively, or without science; but, as he generalises in idea, he has the capacity of
reasoning in science, of distinguishing species, and of comparing generals, in order
to form ideas still more general."441 So nomination is particular or general and in the
general or species of things is required the idea ofunity and number which is
accomplished through "repetition, changeable termination, or by preposition."442
Particular qualities are distinguished in nomination followed by the comparison of
qualities by also distinguishing quantity, as well as space and time, action and
passion. However, in remaining fixed to his intention of illustrating the formation of
language in nomination of thought Hutton does not once use the term "adjective" in
this particular explanation.443 Ofmore complexity is conjugation, and in describing
the expression of verbal inflection Hutton does infrequently refer to "verbs" and
"adverbs" but is still ultimately concerned with the nomination of a type of thought.
Conjugation is the most complicated point ofprogress for Hutton in the nomination
of the actions and passions of things or "their change in relation to his ideas of space
and time, of necessity and will."444 Like the declension ofnouns, the conjugation of
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verbs can be performed by either "the various termination of the primary vocable"445
which when done distinctly "has the advantage of beauty and of force"446, or by "the
association of abstract terms" which "is most simple and most perfect, as being
conform (sic) to the nature of knowledge, although not natural to the most simple
state ofman: It is scientific in the highest degree; and therefore, it would be last in
the order of discovery."447 In this last point Hutton had been influenced by his friend
Adam Smith and he acknowledged that indeed it had been expressed earlier by "Dr
Smith on the first formation of languages."448
Adam Smith's Considerations concerning thefirst Formation ofLanguages
(published in PhilologicalMiscellany in 1761 and then included as an Appendix to
the Third Edition of Theory ofthe Moral Sentiments in 1767) essentially focused on
the order in which the parts of speech evolved and the explanation behind their
development. The concept that the best way of acquiring insight into the mind
through language was a method that Adam Smith had earlier expressed as,
The best method of explaining and illustrating the various powers of the
human mind, the most useful parts ofmetaphysics, arises from an
examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts by
speech, and from attention to those literary principles which contribute to
persuasion and entertainment.
It is important that this observation by John Millar is placed in its proper pedagogical
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while on the other hand, Hutton's 'illustrating example' essentially remained focused
on the logical and how the operations of the mind were nominated.
Having shown how through the process of nomination and his 'cursory view'
of the parts of speech that this equates to progress in the human mind, another reason
for Hutton's illustration was surely to show how it is only the few who have
progressed to philosophy and thus natural religion. Indeed, Hutton drew a distinction
between those who know language and the few who can see language systematically
since,
Though science be natural to man, and language be the artificial
operation of his science, yet, there is an almost infinite difference
between the expressing a thought in good language acquired by
human art, and the understanding of those principles of science by
which that art of expressing thought had been acquired; the one is
the fruits of science, operating in a conscious being trained by the
species to think, and to express his thoughts; the other is the
progress of a mind, arriving at extreme perfection in the talents of
scientifical (sic) reflection, and then knowing those principles of
science, by which the species had arrived at the art of training him
in science and in language. A mind that is trained to speech, and
made perfect in the art of language, is not necessarily informed
with regard to the science of logic, or he may be ignorant in
relation to the principles ofhis artificial speech and distinct
expression; this science however he may attain; in which case, he
would be infinitely more knowing than he had been before, when
he only had the art of speech, being supposed absolutely ignorant
of the science. Therefore, though this science of logic be necessary
in the person who invents speech, and thus trains another mind to
language, it is not necessarily in the person trained. This person,
though a scientific mind, and possessing science as an art which he
had learned, has not the science of that art, or the knowledge of its
principles; this is a superior sphere in science, to which few of the
multitude ofmankind arrive, or not in any considerable degree.450
So those who had only rudimentary linguistic abilities might also believe that
"parrots understand the language which they speak" as this is "common, or it is
natural to the common people, who have not science sufficient forjudging in this
450 PK 1,614-615.
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matter "451 But while some in society might not have been as credulous as to believe
in a rational parrot, they may however have been without the ability to know the
order of language as represented in the parts of speech which Hutton noted are
inscrutable to the common man. And as to the individual who had been taught
language artificially, "this knowledge of order, or this understanding of the language,
would be unobserved."452 But those who 'understand' language in general learn it
through grammar and scientifically know language by having the ability to
distinguish the parts of speech.453 Of course, an "infinite difference" exists between
'knowing' a language that is the ability to speak a language, and 'understanding' a
language which is the ability to know a language by "scientific analysis" that
includes the "distinctive knowledge of its several parts, their uses and relations, in
the application to our distinguished ideas."454 And an example of someone
'understanding' language would be comparing
the Greek for example and the French, with a view to determine
which of those two is the most perfect language, [this person] has
certainly learned a great deal more than to speak a language; he has
learned to know language in general; which is perhaps infinitely
more than speaking Greek and French in the purity of those
languages.455
So Hutton was equating the ability to see the system in language with those
philosophers who can see the system in the intellectual, moral and natural systems and
are thus led to natural religion.
When Hutton began his work on language his intention was to illustrate how
the progress of the mind is displayed in the formation of language. However, his
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treatise on language grew "into a complicated dissertation, which has an end or
proper object of its own; namely, to exhibit the science of logic or communicating
thought, in order to improve the useful art of speech and written language."45
Improvement was necessary since Hutton had proven that language was artificial and
thus imperfect. The fact that there is indefinite variety in language was the proof that
Hutton gave for speech being artificial. Indeed, the evidence which Hutton offered
was that
all men do not form the same language; and, the artificial language
of one man, tribe, or nation, is not naturally known to another, so as
to communicate their thoughts. This art, no doubt, is natural to
man; because, science is natural to him, and art naturally follows
science. This is the reason, that all nations have the use of speech
in language; although the specific differences, in the speech of
nations, are indefinite.457
But another reason that Hutton gave to prove that speech was artificial was to note
that if nature had provided language then it would have been perfect, continued
without change, and been the same in each person. So much so that he thought that it
would have "been equally difficult to corrupt a perfect language, as it is to perfect
that which is so naturally imperfect."458 Therefore, an imperfect language at least
required improvement.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were countless apriori
schemes to construct a perfect language, but Hutton thought that these attempts were
worthless. Indeed, he thought that there was no point in designing an a priori
universal language as there can be no one-time fix for language since it is a living
entity. However, since Hutton thought that language is artificial and had progressed
in its complexity he nevertheless believed that it could be improved. Hutton's
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prescriptive method for the improvement of language was mainly expressed in his
work on written language. But in his work on spoken language he did note that since
man's articulating and sounding powers are limited and the rules of forming
language are "fixed in the nature of things" it is inevitable that there must be "one
best of possible languages"; however it is not possible to form "the most perfect
language"459 as man is prejudiced towards the sounds ofwhich he is most
accustomed to articulating, as well as the words used in the environment in which he
lives. Although there is no possible "perfection, and indefinite variety"460 in
language, there are rules in which language may be "perfected"461 and because man
acts from choice and learns through seeing his error, language is "at best imperfect,
but is improved with his science."462 Since the history of language was one of
haphazard development and a living language thus resulted in continuous change,
Hutton realised that language could not be perfected however through applying
certain rules it could strive towards perfection.
Hutton's work on language was therefore also a prescription for "both for the
perfect pronunciation of speech, and for the perfect representation of that spoken
language."463 The rules that Hutton put forward were that words used frequently
should be formed from sounds that are easy to pronounce, whereas words used
infrequently should be formed from sounds that are more difficult to pronounce. In
other words, general principles exist in nature on which the expression of language
should be made so that it is better articulated and more easily understood. Indeed, "If
we are to consider what it is that should constitute the perfection of language, this
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will appear to be —The power of expressing every thought, with the greatest facility
to the speaker, and the greatest pleasure to the hearer."464 In order to achieve this
aim several requirements were put forward: the nomination of thoughts is the
essential aspect of speech, and this includes "all composition, inflexion, conjugation,
and declension" ofwords which should be "the most simple, distinct, and easy
pronounced."465 Less essential but required for perfection are the ornaments of
speech, which are "the most natural or perfect order of syntax", and the music of
language or the "most melodious and pathetic expression of sounds and marking of
time."466
While Hutton thought that Rationalist attempts at constructing a perfect
language were futile, he nevertheless thought that language could be improved as
"though man has not knowledge sufficient to form a language a priori, his science is
abundantly sufficient for improving it a posteriori."467 Hutton believed that words
from other languages that better serve the intended idea should be adopted, but as a
taste ofwhat he wrote about in regards to improving orthography he thought that
these words should be phonetically accurate. An example that he gave was that in
the word amorous the syllable ous should be made redundant and the word should be
nominated amor as in the Latin. But even this method would have its problems as
Hutton thought that to introduce compounds from another language would require an
explanation for their arbitrary marks.468 However, despite problems that might arise
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of a better construction of grammar would benefit the language and thus through
communications between nations a natural improvement would occur in language.469
Although Hutton believed that English was flawed he nonetheless thought
that it was the best of languages. By making a clear distinction in having only one
declension in nouns and by having the nominative case separated from the common
vocable, in comparison to Latin, French and Spanish, English tends towards
perfection as for example compared with "penna", "a pen" in "simplicity forms the
greatest beauty in speculation, and utility in practice."470 Hutton pointed out that
English also has different ways of expressing the singular in either particularity or
generality, for example "a man, and one man", and this too "arises from the greater
perfection of our grammar."471 Moreover, Hutton thought that by joining the particle
a to the nominative in order to obtain for example a pen, was as "simple as the nature
of things, or distinction of thoughts, can admit of; and is much more perfect than the
472
Latin, which did not always distinguish the number without knowing the case."
This was also a point upon which Adam Smith had remarked in Considerations
concerning thefirst Formation ofLanguages when he compared the Latin which had
different nominatives to the English nominative a which he related to the
simplification ofmachinery.
As with most eighteenth-century writers on language Hutton was also
influenced to some extent by the Cartesian notion ofuniversal grammar473 the thesis
underlying the Port-Royal Grammar (1660) that languages share a fundamental
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structure representing human thought. However taking into account that the
objective ofHutton's work on language was first and foremost, "to exhibit the
science of logic or communicating thought, in order to improve the useful art of
speech and written language,"474 then Hutton's work on language was probably also
influenced by the Port-Royal Logic as Arnauld and Nicole had expressed that "Logic
is the art of conducting reason well in knowing things, as much to instruct ourselves
about them as to instruct others."475
Since Hutton was illustrating how the interdependence of thought and speech
resulted in mutual error, he was also showing that both science and language could
be improved upon in order to ascertain reliable knowledge by using proper
principles. Although science is both the object and the cause of language,476 science
"is only perfect in capacity" since it is imperfect with regard to the individual as
"man errs in speech, as well as in thinking."477 A consequence of this imperfection
of language, is that philosophy "suffers in the erroneous, reasoning of the man; and,
man occasionally suffers in the errors ofphilosophy."478 Therefore, by
understanding language philosophers have a tool with which erroneous thinking can
be traced through the examination of the formation and progress of language as this
provides a device to see the order and progress in our thinking. Subsequently, our
thinking can be retraced to first principles in order to eradicate what is false or
erroneous in both thought and language. Even though language is erroneous or
imperfect by its nature, "man must know error, in order to know truth", and
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therefore, "man errs in order to know; and, he knows in order to become wise."479
So while the species accumulates truth through the errors of the individual and since
man is "educated in society" the individual gains through the wisdom of the
species.480 Yet, as "the progress of science is committed to the wisdom of the
species" this can also result in error "sometimes propagated in place of truth."481 But
since science and language are "conjoined,"482 it is therefore by adhering to proper
principles in science and language that a mutual benefit accrues resulting in greater
scientific accuracy. Certainly, Hutton's metaphysics including his logic was
designed to test and retest his own findings by continually remounting to first
principles from philosophy having already progressed to philosophy from first
principles.
Although clearly influenced by a number of his predecessors, Hutton was
concerned about the accuracy of thought and language rather than many of his
audience who had written about language in relation to taste, politeness, grammar,
rhetoric and belles-lettres. While the eighteenth century saw a huge out-pouring of
grammatical and rhetorical publications, Hutton's work on language including his
method of improving language was primarily a work of logic designed to provide
scientific accuracy. In fact although Hutton thought that the study of language was
"a curious as well as useful branch of science", he noted that it was "not properly the
subject of this treatise."483 Instead, Hutton wrote that "the analysis of our language is
truly that of human thought, which is the proper object of this work."484 So Hutton's
479 Ibid.
480 PK I, 593.
481 PK 1,612.
482 PK I, 578.
483 PK I, 629.
484 PK 1,616.
143
work on speech was essentially an examination of its place in the progress of thought
as well as the progress of thought in speech. But while Hutton dealt with language
first and foremost as a logician, his aim was also to show the literati how they were
communicating imprecisely and how the way in which sounds are articulated can be
improved so that science is understood and recorded accurately. Therefore, while
Hutton's Scientific Analysis illustrated, in examining the Principles ofSpeech
opposed the theory of natural signs by confirming that language was artificial as well
as illustrating how the pattern in language formation was equitable to the progress of
the mind, it was nevertheless distinct in that his work on speech was no different
from the rest of his Principles ofKnowledge in that he intended it to be an
epistemology that remounted to principles especially to test his own physical science
and to empirically show that there is order and design in the universe.
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Chapter Four—Hutton's Principles of Orthography
Hutton had initially intended his work on language to illustrate the mind's
progress, but it grew into a "complicated dissertation" which also included how
language should be improved. So instead of presenting a "dissertation within a
dissertation" he thought that it was better to place his work on written language at the
end of the second volume ofPrinciples ofKnowledge as an Appendix to Part II,
Section II: Being A View ofthe Principles ofOrthography, in illustration ofthe
4X r
Theory ofScientific Analysis. In this work on orthography Hutton identified
problems in the English orthography such as foreign spellings and the same sound
not being connected with the same symbol. The solution for Hutton was to develop a
universal alphabet and then to show how such a perfect alphabet could be applied to
English. The two main advantages that he thought would result from reforming the
alphabet were that there would be a more efficient way of learning to read and write,
and that pronunciation would become more stable. But just as Hutton's work on
spoken language was ultimately part ofhis process of remounting to principles in an
attempt to test knowledge internally, his prescription for written language was also
fundamentally part of the method of remounting to principles in an effort to achieve
scientific accuracy.
Principles ofOrthography was arranged in four chapters. Chapter One—
Nature ofwritten Language as the sign ofSpeech explained how the alphabet was
founded on principles which had been corrupted, thus resulting in confusion and
threatening scientific accuracy. The second chapter Science ofthe Alphabet sought
the means to perfect the alphabet and illustrated how it was important to understand
485 PK I, 574.
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"not only the scientific principles of speech, but the natural elements of those
principles."486 The utility of a perfected alphabet was the focus of Chapter Three—
General Reflections with regard to this Doctrine ofthe Alphabet, and in the fourth
chapter Advantages arisingfrom the Science ofthe Alphabet Hutton studied the
advantages of adhering to a 'perfect alphabet' as well as the disadvantages of
neglecting the alphabetical rule.
Hutton thought that there was a danger that if the alphabetic rule of one
symbol to one sound continued to be disregarded then eventually the English
language would descend into a logographic system ofwriting. As an illustration of
the possible dangers that might materialize if Britain did not adhere to proper
orthographic principles Hutton examined the literary state of various nations
throughout history, and he wrote that the circumstances of some societies had
reached an advanced state of affairs in spite ofnot having the art of alphabetical
writing. He provided the example ofhow the Incan empire did "honour to the
human intellect" by carrying the art of government and moral principles to "high
perfection", but it was not from any "defect of understanding that prevented the
germinating of any literary production" depriving us of the history of the Incans.487
Instead it was from
the want of a dozen or two of letters, which our children learn in as many
days; it was the want of a certain analytical operation of science, an
operation which does more honour to the inventive power ofhuman
wisdom, than all the mechanical and chymical (sic) arts by which the
enlightened species make so great a figure in the world.488
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But while the alphabetical method is "naturally perfect"489 the English language he
believed had become corrupt by discarding the principles of the alphabet, and despite
the fact that there was as much science in England as anywhere else, the English had
forgotten that their science had evolved from using the alphabet. Therefore, Hutton
thought that it was foolish to ignore the principles upon which the science ofBritain
was founded.
Another example which Hutton gave to show that it is impossible to measure
the advancement of a society based upon its linguistic development was China and
how the Chinese writing system required a tenacious memory. But while he
recognised that the Chinese did not have the advantages of the alphabetical method
they did at least have the benefit ofhaving their writing symbols utilized for
international communication. Indeed, he thought that in spite of its deficiencies, "the
Chinese have some reason, at least, to preserve their present orthography" whereas
the "English have no reason to continue any manner of absurdity in writing their
language."490 So Hutton thought that the English language should not be allowed to
degenerate into a writing system based on memory instead of rule and the way to do
this was to return to the principles on which the alphabet was founded.
The alphabetical rule is that sounds and symbols correspond but this rule was
corrupt by the eighteenth century. This corruption was the result of numerous factors
but the most important changes occurred through urbanization, the technology of
printing, and the development of the alphabet itself. Along with Christianization the
alphabet arrived on the shores of England in the sixth century but speech had




through urbanization. However, improvements in the orthography had not kept pace
with the developments in the spoken language. The technological advance of
printing also contributed to the changes in orthography. Indeed, Middle English
spellings were the printed norm, but since the Great Vowel Shift speech had changed
significantly to Modern English, and so English spelling had become frozen in the
speech of the fifteenth century when the sound-sign system was much closer. Also,
one of the major effects of printing was that since books were affordable to those
who did not have a classical education, the translation of the Greek and Latin classics
into English resulted in the introduction of thousands of adopted Greek and Latin
words into the English language. But the spelling of these words was preserved in a
revered etymological practice that created confusion and replaced the alphabetical
rule as a standard. Therefore, by the eighteenth century a serious discrepancy existed
in the English language as the same sound was not always attached to the same
symbol.
One of the major causes of the corruption of English orthography was the
adoption of foreign words which Hutton thought was "neither founded in science nor
in wisdom"491, and he illustrated how the preservation of etymology was reverential
but nevertheless erroneous by responding to the supporters of this practice with
sarcasm:
What a transgression of the rules in our orthography, to write the word
philosophy, for example, with the letter f, as we do filiation! for, this
would betray an ignorance of the etymology of those two words. Now
here is no question concerning etymology, for, it is not proposed either to
dispute its use, or to deny the pleasure of this exercise of intellect. But, it
may be allowed to demand, whether more general good, to language and
writing, would not arise, from the losing this criterion of the Greek, in
perfecting our orthography, than we have by preserving it, and losing the
491 PK II, 657.
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benefit, to our orthography, of perfect science in a general rule. It is
plain, that, to a person who understands Greek, and studies etymology,
the word philosophy would be equally understood, whether wrote with
the Roman f or Greek (/>; and, to a person who understands not Greek, nor
concerns himself with etymology, it is to no purpose the giving him a
rule, by which he should know that certain words are derived from the
Greek.492
The other major cause of the corruption of English orthography was that the same
sound was not attached to the same symbol. Hutton thought that vocal sounds were
being made without rule, and having the same sound not connected with the same
symbol he believed was a threat to scientific accuracy. Thus the vowels in speech
and speak are spoken alike but written differently, and neither of these two words are
"sounded according to the Latin alphabet which we have adopted".4 3 Another way
in which linguistic confusion had arisen was through the interchanging of letters due
to a particular national affinity of usage. Hutton gave an example ofhow a single
word "Persia, as is commonly written" could be spoken in four different ways as it
"may also be pronounced Perzia", then by changing to Hutton's fifth position of the
modification of consonants it would be pronounced "Pers/zia" and then "by taking
the sounded letter instead of the simply aspirated" it could be pronounced "Per/ia."494
While Hutton acknowledged that this compound word would not present any
difficulty in understanding, in other cases where a single consonant is altered the
consequences could be far more significant. He demonstrated this point by showing
how the sense as well as the sound might be altered as,
Sot, for example, is a word which has a meaning in our language; then, in
changing the aspirated for the sounded letter, we should have the word
zot, which would no longer convey the same idea. But in taking the
sibilating modification of the fifth position instead of that of the fourth,
we should have the word shot, which has a proper meaning of its own;
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and, in changing this for the sounded letter of the same species, we
should pronounceyot, a different word again 495
Therefore, Hutton had shown how the neglect of the elementary rule is critical in
terms of accuracy as one error in a sound or in the representation of a sound can
convey a completely different meaning and he put forward that it is "of great
importance" to the accuracy ofboth speech and writing, "to understand the science
of the alphabet, so as not to confound two different letters, however similar in their
nature."496
Another side to the problem of English orthography put forward by Hutton
was that it was either from "inaccuracy ofpronunciation" or a "national predilection
of one letter for another" that two letters of the same position ofmodification may be
interchanged thus resulting in inconsistency.497 Indeed, he thought that while vowels
change in pronunciation within the areas of a nation, it is the consonants that are
changed as the terms of one nation are adopted by another resulting in the cause of
national errors. He attributed this idea to Johann Georg Wachter who had proposed
that while dialects differ by vowels, languages differ by consonants.498 Hutton
observed that a deviation from the alphabetical rule occurred since although two
consonants are from the same position of the vocal organ, one of these letters is
sounding and the other is not. Examples of letters confounded are "thep and b, the/
and v, the theta and th, the t and d, the 5 and z, the k and g, the sh andy."499 And as
well as the error ofmistaking two letters from the same position ofmodification,
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of the fourth and fifth positions, in which different parts of the tongue and palate are
employed, as happens in the two sibilating modifications. S, of the fourth position, is
thus confounded with sh, of the fifth."500 So through the adoption of foreign words
the national preference for a particular way of pronunciation results in a further gap
between sounds and symbols.
Hutton thought that the gap that had materialized between English orthography
and the alphabetical rule was shameful, and that we had reached a point in which we
had "little dependence" upon the alphabet.501 And he specified the errors evident in
the English alphabet as:
The alphabet which is taught in England consists of the following
sounds; e, i, a-e, o, i-u; of these five there are but three simple vowels, e,
i, o; for, the other two, a-e, i-u, are either diphthongs, or not a proper
letter.
Therefore, in the English radical alphabet, which consists of six figures,
there are only three proper vowels; and, of these three, two have not the
proper signs affixed to them; for the e is written with the sign of a, and
the i with that of e, according to the Roman character which is adopted.
Consequently, of the six vowels which are taught in England, or
employed in their orthography, there is only one which is not taught
erroneously. At the same time, in the English language, as spoken, there
are no less than eight distinct vowels.
Therefore, with regard to the radical or vocal alphabet of England, there
appears to be only one, of the eight sounds, properly characterised; and
there are seven gross errors committed against the principles of
alphabetical orthography.
The vowel, we have already shown, is not only essential in the
formation of syllables in general, but is that element of speech which
makes the proper sense, or marks the meaning of those simple words.
Consequently, if the vocal alphabet, which is taught, contains seven
errors out of the eight elements ofwhich it is composed, it is almost the
same thing to us, as ifwe had no alphabet for this most useful art of
teaching the elements of speech. Let us now see how it is with the
consonants, which are far from being erroneous in the English alphabet.
In the English alphabet there are the following consonants; b, c, d, f g,
h, j, k, I, m, n, p, q, r, s, t, v, x, z. Of these nineteen letters there are three
superfluous, viz. the c and q, which are supernumerary, and the x, which
is a compound; so that these nineteen which are taught must be reduced
500 Ibid.
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to sixteen. Here, therefore, are three capital errors committed, in regard
to the alphabet of consonants which is taught. These are in superfluity;
let us now see what other errors there are in defect.
We find, in the English language, four different consonants for which
we have not proper letters in our alphabet. These are first, the Greek or
aspirated theta, and the sounded theta, neither ofwhich have a letter
appropriated as a sign, and which two letters are confounded in both
being written with th; here are three errors in our practice. Secondly, the
sibilating letter of the fifth position, which we write with sh; and, lastly,
the nasal letter of the same position, which we write with ng. The sum,
therefore, of errors, comprehending exuberancy (sic) and defect, which
we find in the English alphabet of consonants, are no less than eight.
Thus, in the whole English alphabet, as comprehending vowels and
consonants, we find fifteen capital errors, or transgressions against the
plain, simple, and only principles of alphabetical orthography.502
Therefore, without reform, since we were relying upon memory instead of rule,
Hutton thought that written English could reach a point in which it had no relation to
spoken English and the consequences for science in Britain would be dire.
While Hutton had responded against the theory of natural signs by the
philosophes and in particular their practice of etymology, he was also scathing
towards British authors who thought that the language ought to be based upon
etymology. The situation was further compounded as an erroneous standard of
spelling based upon etymology rather than phonetics had been fixed in the
lexicography of Samuel Johnson's influential A Dictionary ofthe English
Language.503 The impact of Johnson's Dictionary was immediate as Adam Smith in
spite ofhaving a "very contemptuous opinion"504 of Samuel Johnson, wrote in his
'Review of Johnson's Dictionary'' in the Edinburgh Review that,
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In this country, the usefulness of it will soon be felt, as there is no
standard of correct language in conversation; if our recommendation
could in any degree incite to the perusal of it, we would earnestly
recommend it to all those who are desirous to improve and correct their
language, frequently to consult the dictionary.505
Another British conservative subscriber of a standard language based upon
etymology instead of alphabetical principles was James Beattie and he supported
Johnson in his DissertationsMoral and Critical,506
Contrary to Johnson and Beattie, Hutton thought that etymologists were
amiss in attaching extraordinary significance to the pursuit and he censured the
supporters of the practice by pointing out the enormity of their transgression from
proper orthographical principles. The only thing that Hutton thought would result
from this practice of putting etymology before alphabetical rule was to make "our
mind a dictionary", in other words at the expense of adhering to rule it requires us to
rely purely upon our memory.507 So instead ofpreserving foreign spellings, Hutton
thought that words should be spelt to reflect the way in which they are spoken in
English—with a phonetic system of spelling.
The solution to the problem of a corrupt orthography, Hutton thought, was to
develop a perfect alphabet containing all the sounds of speech known to man and
then apply it to the English orthography. So his remedy was to illustrate the
"scientific principles of speech" as well as to show the "natural elements of those
principles."508 By employing the same methodology of remounting to principles that
he had used throughout his metaphysics, Hutton returned to the fundamentals of
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language since the alphabet "should be a perfect thing, like the elements of geometry,
as an error in those principles, if suffered to remain, must corrupt the science which
should be founded on them."509 Therefore, Hutton's geometric reasoning was also
evident in his theory ofwritten language.
While Hutton acknowledged that there had "not yet appeared any alphabet
which in all respects is perfect"510, he believed that by following certain principles it
was possible to achieve a perfect alphabet. Indeed, he considered the alphabet as
"containing the principles of language, and as being the rule ofwriting speech"511,
and he aimed to show that "a perfect and an universal alphabet" was a "practicable
thing" so that there would "be a standard with which every erroneous alphabet might
be compared."512 Furthermore, Hutton aimed to correct the defects of language and
pronunciation without, "making any application to particular national practices"513
Therefore, while Hutton was most concerned about English orthography in order to
bring about a national improvement, his initial method was to find a universal
alphabet that could be used for all languages.
Hutton thought it was essential to remount to first principles or the elements
of language in order to build a perfect alphabet. So he began his return to principles
by descending through the variety of systems ofwriting known to humankind. The
first system that he examined was the portion of speech as "a whole" whether this
was "a book, a paragraph, or a sentence."514 A species of this type ofwriting would
be hieroglyphics and although the representation of "speech fixed in a body" was
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what first suggested "the utility ofwriting" to man, with progress the impracticability
of this method ofwriting eventually became evident.515 The second system of
written language was words, which are the "last part, in the division of discourse,
that has a proper meaning."516 The advantage of this method ofwriting which
Hutton referred to as the "verbal method"517 was that the words of one language
correspond with the words of another; however, the disadvantage of this verbal
method ofwriting was that it would require the study of a lifetime. Hutton added a
• 518
footnote prior to publication indicating that he had read Bayeri Museum Sinicum
and could "speak more distinctly upon the subject" of the disadvantages of this type
ofwriting as was evident in the Chinese language.519 The third system ofwriting
speech was the syllabic, but learning characters for all possible syllables would also
require a lifetime's study; and it would lack the advantage of the verbal method as it
would be impossible to correspond between languages using figures for syllables,
since unlike words, syllables do not have meaning. So Hutton then reduced speech
to its most simple and elementary part, "a sound which cannot be divided" to acquire
"the principles of our language."520 This was the fourth system ofwriting or
"elementary method" which is that of symbols to sounds the number ofwhich
according to Hutton could never "exceed thirty, which will comprehend all the
vowels and consonants, i.e. the vocal sounds and articulators that can be well used in
language."521
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Four requirements were proposed by Hutton for a perfect alphabet, and the
first requirement was that it should contain every distinction of vocal sound, and
each distinct articulation of human voice.522 This requirement would result in a
general alphabet to suit all languages since Hutton wrote that "the organs of voice are
the same in every race ofmen."523 So the alphabet would apply equally to all
possible languages, and although "no nation, perhaps, requires to have every possible
letter to be contained in their alphabet, which is the practical rule of their
orthography, yet, science requires that we should understand the formation of every
possible letter."524 The second requirement of a perfect alphabet was that it should
contain the fewest number of sounds and modifications possible. The letter x was
given by Hutton as an example of our alphabet having a "useless exuberance of
letters."525 And a perfect alphabet should not contain compounds such as diphthongs
or double consonants, although the orthography may contain "compendious
methods" to characterise "either speech, or elements which are compounded."526 By
keeping this alphabet as simple as possible a third necessity was to avoid
compounding it "with any other systematic typification (sic) of sounds, such as that
ofmusic, i.e. measures of time and intonation."527 Finally, provided the alphabet
was perfect then the writing "will be perfect; and the reading, which is the converse
ofwriting, will be therefore perfect."528
Having established that it was necessary for one symbol to represent one sound
in the alphabet, and since he thought that man was an "organised body" in which
522
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speech had a restricted range, Hutton then put forward each of the distinct sounds of
human speech.529 He looked first at the vowels and then the consonants or the
"natural constitution of vocal sound, and then the various modifications of that
proper voice".530 And since the range of vocal sounds were thought by Hutton to be
limited in human nature, the pronunciation of the alphabet should, according to how
each sound was expressed through voice and the position of the mouth, be clear and
accurate. In Hutton's examination of the vocal sounds, which are the "first principles
or the proper foundation of speech" he found that there are "seven distinct sounds
natural to the human voice" and these are, "a, 77 (of the Greek), e, i, o, v (of the
en I
Greeks), and the Latin w." Hutton illustrated the pronunciation of each of the
vowel elements in relation to how they sounded in particular words and he wrote
In this radical alphabet, the a is sounded as in the English word all; or
shorter, as in man. The second letter in this vocal alphabet is the eta of
the Greeks; it is sounded as the e in the words men, guess, ken, let, sell.
The third letter is the e of the French, as sounded in the infinitive of their
verbs terminating in er, or in the other tenses before the z; and in the
English words way, say. The fourth letter is the i, a letter sounded
properly, that is, uniformly, by perhaps all nations except the English,
who, in place of this simple vowel, substitute the diphthong ae. This
vowel is properly sounded in me, we, ye. The fifth letter, o, is perhaps
sounded properly by every nation that has an alphabet. The having an
omicron and omega of the Greeks, if only differing in long and short, was
certainly superfluity, which in science should be retrenched. The sixth
letter here proposed is the upsilon, as supposing this was the sound given
to it by the Greeks; however that be, the sound here understood is that
which the French give to their u, or the sound which is given in their
words feu, buvez. The seventh and last of these vocal sounds is what we
suppose the u of the Latins to have been, and which is now sounded in
French when o is put before it, as in vous, pouvez. In English, this sound
is absurdly wrote often with an o, particularly with the double o, as in
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too, good. This letter, in the English pronunciation of the alphabet, is
commonly made a diphthong, in which the i or iota is first sounded.532
After describing the sounding of vowels in reference to particular words, Hutton then
illustrated how these sounds are made so that they can be understood by someone
unfamiliar with these words. And by describing the vowels in such a specific way
Hutton was also discriminating them from all other types of sound. This was
accomplished on a physiological basis, so for each of the vowels Hutton described
the conformation of the mouth and the position of the tongue in relation to the palate,
the lips, and the teeth. An example ofhow he described the way in which each
sound was made is evident in the case of the letter i
Thus the conformation of the mouth, in sounding the letter i, seems to be
the best adapted for the sharp, as the cavity of the mouth is here the most
diminished, by making the whole tongue approach near the palate, the
two sides of the tongue being closely applied to the palate, and a narrow
channel formed in the middle, through which the sound is made to pass.
In this cavity is formed the sound of the letter i, independent of the teeth,
or cavity which may be made before them by the lips.533
Therefore, through his belief that vocal sounds are fixed in the human constitution
and his description ofhow each sound was made, Hutton's universal alphabet was
physiologically based.
Hutton thought that the sounds of the human voice were fixed in nature for
man to discover and subsequently make an art of language. Indeed, just as there was
order in the human mind, there was order in the "precisely seven"534 vowel sounds of
the human voice. Therefore, the finite number of sounds was benevolently designed
by God as otherwise there would be Babel. And he noted that it is evident "that man
is thus calculated by nature for speech, by having the organ of sound determined to
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act in a certain manner."535 So by performing his analysis Hutton believed that he
had arrived at the "natural element" or the "limit of our knowledge."536 As a
consequence of there being a "certain number of distinct articulating powers" and
"precise vocal sounds" in the "constitution ofman"537, then the "formation of an
alphabet has been an operation perfectly scientific, in proceeding to distinguish in
words syllables, and, in syllables, elementary parts, which are fixed, definite, and
unalterable."538
After considering the "natural constitution" of vocal sounds or vowels, in his
analytical examination of the alphabet, Hutton then turned his attention to the various
"modifications" of voice, or consonants.539 Just as he had done with the vowels and
the voice organ, Hutton described the position ofparticular parts of the mouth in
relation to one another, and distinguished the "active operation of the breath and
sound, combined with the position of the mouth, for the general end of
pronunciation" of the consonants.540 He also explained how some consonants are
sounded or "liquid" consonants while others are not sounded or "mutes".541 The
throat is the "proper organ for producing sound" or forming vowels, but the
consonants articulate these sounds in the mouth which is the "proper organ for
modulating" sound, thus forming "speech or human language."542 Therefore, by
terminating or preceding a vocal sound, a consonant is an 'element' in speech, and
because it is by a modification of the "articulating organ or mouth that this effect is
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produced," Hutton distinguished the consonants "upon mechanical principles."543
Attempting to leave no stone unturned in his Science ofthe Alphabet Hutton
described in detail how individual letters are formed and this was followed by a
description ofhow articulations of two or more letters are formed. He also dealt with
four distinctions in the consonantal alphabet: those between perfect mutes and
imperfect mutes as well as perfect consonants (or sounding letters) and imperfect
consonants (or aspirated consonants).544 And he even extended his examination of
the alphabet to the theory of "speaking without voice" or the "whispering operation",
and how the alphabet was pronounced by the "whispering organ" in speech "below
the breath."545
Once he had completed his description of the alphabet, Hutton drew an
Analytical Table of the Articulating Powers which gave his analysis of the "positions
of the organ for articulating voice, and the modifications of those positions, as well
as the modifications of sound, or the employment of the voice and breath in forming
speech."546 And by drawing and then examining this 'alphabetical table', Hutton
thought that it would be easy to recognize from the articulators which letters are
"closely allied" in their formation, and which letters would "most naturally be
changed for others, in the transference of speech from men to men" as the purpose of
this was to identify which consonants were mistaken in the national choice of
adopting one of two similar modifications of sounds.547 The table also exhibited the
"distinction between the natural differences of languages, and those of dialects" and
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as mentioned by M. de Brasses, in saying, that languages differ from one another by
consonants, and the dialects by the vowels."548 Although Hutton included the
Spanish 11 and the English ng in his table, he thought that neither should be
admitted as a distinct letter in the alphabet [that is the English
orthography not his general alphabet which of course they were a part
of]; seeing they are indistinguishable, in the effect, from that which is
produced in speech by employing the elements which must be
necessarily admitted as the principles of our speech.549
He felt the same in regards to the Northumberland (or guttural) r. But his alphabet
came in for criticism for not examining enough languages as The Critical Review
noted that if the "Spanish is to be introduced, why not the peculiar sounds of the
Germans and the Arabians?"550
Once the scientific principles of orthography or the alphabetical rule was
fixed in one symbol for one sound Hutton thought it was of great importance not to
deviate from it. He considered diphthongs, in the word Caesar for example, are
"very improperly employed as a type of figure in orthography" since two vowels
written in a single syllable and sounded as a single vowel "is not a diphthong; it is
only an absurdity."551 Thus he pointed out that if the word "Caesar" was to be
written differently from our speech and was to retain the Roman orthography then
552
why was the Roman pronunciation not retained which he supposed was "Kysar."
But Hutton provided few examples of how the orthography would appear using his
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Having fixed the symbols of the perfect alphabet, Hutton believed that this
could then be applied to the language of any nation, and he gave an example of the
universal alphabet "adapted to the language of this country,"554 which was
First, Vowels, in the order ofpronunciation; beginning at the highest, or
most acute, and ending with the lowest, or most grave.
These are the perfect vowels.
i, e, ?i a, o,v, u.
To these perfect vowels, we are to add the two semitones or imperfect
vowels, which are expressed in the words this and thus. Let us suppose
these to be typified by a small i and u, thus, iu. The Greek characters
have a line under them.
Secondly, Consonants; taking the five positions of the organ for the
order in which they shall be classed and announced.
First position, p, b, m.
Second position, / v.
Third position, 6, th.
Fourth position, t, d, s, z, r, I, n.
Fifth position, k, g, sh, j, ng.
To which must be added the aspiration h.
Thus it will appear, that we have, in our alphabet, nine vowels, (one of
which the English have not), seven perfect, and two imperfect. Of these
seven, two of the signs here given are Greek letters. The two imperfect
vowels have here only an arbitrary mark.
Of the consonants again, we have twenty. Of these, only fifteen have
proper Roman characters. I have taken a Greek character for one of the
other five; and the remaining four are expressed with the double letters
which are employed for that purpose presently in our orthography.
These, with the aspiration h, and the consonant u complete the
enumeration.555
In referring to adapting the universal alphabet to the language of 'this country'
Hutton clearly meant Britain, since 'one of [the nine vowels] which the English have
not' was what he had earlier referred to as the "Scots" upsilon556
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The physiological description ofHutton's universal alphabet was derived
from a basic self-analysis. This was evident in Hutton's description of the difficulty
in pronouncing the two imperfect vowels "when they are continued as a vocal sound"
as he wrote that, "I find this to be the case with myself; and I presume this is the case
in general, as I do not find one word in any language, so far as I know, in which they
are not of the shortest pronunciation."557 Also in self-analysis Hutton distinguished
between his vocal octave and that ofAntoine Court de Gebelin, with Hutton putting
forward that he had reasoned a posteriori with regard to his vocal octave while
Gebelin in his Origine du Language had "discovered his vocal octave by reasoning a
■ ■ ,,558
priori.
Hutton's external proof that the restricted range in the elements of speech was
physiologically fixed was that deaf and dumb persons pronounce the sounds of the
alphabet. He referred to Thomas Braidwood at whose Academyfor the Deafand
Dumb, nicknamed the Dummie Hoose, the deaf and dumb were taught to read and
write.559 Hutton wrote that Braidwood "teaches dumb or deafpeople to pronounce;
now, How could Mr Braidwood teach this to a person, if there were not, in our
organs of speech, a certain definite manner in which they are made to act?"560
Indeed, in 1779 in his The History ofEdinburgh Hugo Arnot wrote that "the boys" of
Thomas Braidwood's Academy "could converse by the help of the artificial alphabet
557 PKII, 673.
558 PK II, 676.
559 Thomas Braidwood (1715-1806): in 1764 he opened the Academyfor the Deafand Dumb in
Edinburgh, the first school for the deaf in Britain, and he developed a sign language that was the
forerunner of the British Sign Language that is in use today. Braidwood left Edinburgh for London in
1783. The Academy received international acclaim as pupils from England and as far as America and
Sierra Leone attended classes. It was situated in the Dischflat where the Dumbiedykes (pronounced
and once spelled Dummiedykes) housing scheme is today and where the community centre is named
in his honour. [The History ofEdinburgh by Hugo Arnot. Edinburgh: W. Creech, 1779. 425-426.
and The Place Names ofEdinburgh: Their Origins and History by Stuart Harris. Edinburgh: Gordon
Wright Publishing, 1996. 246.]
560 PK II, 648.
163
they learned."561 However, Arnot also noted that Thomas Braidwood "begins with
learning the deaf articulation, or the use of their vocal organs; and, at the same time,
teaches them to write the characters, and compose words of them" but, the "deaf (Mr
Braidwood observes) find great difficulty in attaining pronunciation, but still more in
acquiring a proper knowledge ofwritten language."562 So Hutton's proof of the
elements of speech having a physiological basis that he based on the pronunciation of
the deafwas not as straightforward as he would have liked his readers to believe.
Nonetheless, although his a posteriori reasoning that led to the physiological
description of how each sound was made was basic, Hutton's thoughts were
sophisticated for the period and they were made at a time when experimental
phonetics was in its infancy. Having advanced his solution to orthographic problems
in the Science of the Alphabet, Hutton then held that there are two main advantages
of this system of 'perfect' written language: the first "relates immediately to the
people, the other to the language."563
The first main advantage of adhering to the Science ofthe Alphabet Hutton
thought was "great facility and perfection in learning to read the written language,
and to write the speech."564 As it was in Hutton's time, and still is today, the
absurdity of un-phonetic spelling in the English language with the misapplication of
nearly all of the vowels as well as some consonants has resulted in a reader and
writer ofEnglish requiring a "tenacious memory" and his abilities can be measured
in relation to the "greater or lesser degree ofmemory, or retentive faculty, which he
561





possesses "565 To ihustrate the corrupt roots of this problem Hutton gave an example
of the French wordflambeau which has been introduced into the English language
without modification noting,
Now is there, at the reading-school, an ignoramus, who would not spell
the word flambo (with an o) as it ought? And do we not all remember, to
have once valued ourselves on our literary achievement, when we had
learned the modish error, in reading or spellingflambeau! But whether it
is ofmost importance to a boy, to learn, upon the one hand, the
derivation of a word, or, on the other, to see the analysis of his speech.
If a boy could think, as he ought to think when he is a man, how absurd
would he find his master's system!—first, to give him a rule to
remember; and then to learn (sic) him to transgress that rule without
reason! But, in place of discovering the absurdity of his master's system,
he is thus habituated to suffer inconsistency to mingle with his science;
and he is trained to reason upon false principles, or, which is worse, to
believe, without a principle of truth. Thus the docility of youth lays the
foundation, either for dogmatic ignorance, on the one hand, or the
infallibility of science, on the other, according as the growing mind
happens to be directed in its artificial education. By this docility, science
may be taught to a man, as speech is to a parrot, without being
understood; and conclusions are formed, without seeing the principles
from whence they flow, that is to say, principles are admitted, without
knowing the truth or evidence on which they rest.566
Therefore, it was important to learn the general principles ofwriting and reading,
since the particulars do not increase understanding but merely "load the memory."567
So instead of erroneously teaching language based upon etymology the correct
principles should be "infused into the pupil's mind."568 Consequently, Hutton
believed that the first advantage of adhering to the alphabetical method would be that
reading and writing could be taught to perfection in a "few days"569 in contrast to the
way that learning to read and write takes years to learn through memorization.
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In opposition to the English orthography being ahered to upon the
alphabetical rule were those in support ofpreserving the etymology such as Samuel
Johnson and James Beattie. Despite acknowledging that the alphabet was
"imperfect" and spelling was "irregular", Beattie thought that "neither ought to be
altered."570 Johnson was not in favour of change and he asked rhetorically, "who can
hope to prevail on nations to change their practice, and make all their old books
useless?"571 But in response to this attitude Hutton wrote that,
The case, indeed, seems desperate; But why? only because we are not
willing to undertake the remedy. The case may now be stated thus: At
present, with our corrupt orthography, we have difficulty in learning to
read and write with propriety our own language; but, when we have once
acquired this art, however imperfect, we read with facility modem
writings, while we have some difficulty in reading the old manuscripts of
this country. On the other hand, ifwe should correct the errors of our
writing, and perfect our orthography, then, though we should learn with
great facility to read and write with every possible perfection, yet former
writings would be troublesome to read; in like manner as our antiquated
language is at present. Now, the answer is plain; if it be truly worth our
while to correct the error of our orthography, and thus to acquire all the
facility, beauty, or simplicity of the art, the inconveniency of reading
those books which are truly useful will soon be removed, in the exercise
of the art ofprinting, now possessed in such perfection.572
Beattie followed Johnson's position, indeed he thought that orthographic reformation
would be impracticable and British heritage would be harmed as old books would be
rendered obsolete since "old authors would erelong be laid aside as unintelligible,
and the new could be consigned to oblivion before their time."573 But against this
attitude Hutton sarcastically noted, "As for those books, again, which are not tmly
useful and would not be reprinted, the difficulty of reading them would perhaps
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enhance the value of the operation."574 Furthermore, as Hutton thought that the
advantages of improving the orthography far outweigh the disadvantages and that
books which still held relevance would be rewritten in the improved language, he
wrote that
nothing, upon the whole, would suffer from this step of our
improvement. The value of a particular edition of a work would fall; but
the literary property in general would rise. By how much the value of old
books were diminished, by so much that of new books would be
increased; and, though no former writing would become difficult in any
considerable degree, no future writing would transgress the perfect rule,
in conforming to the principles of our speech.575
Therefore, Hutton's method would be applied to future literary works and past works
ofmerit could be reprinted in the revised orthography. Moreover, Hutton pointed out
to those who resisted change that their objections were an acknowledgement that
they themselves realized that there was "error in our science" but that these
objections were founded upon inconveniency "in correcting the error of our
practice."576 And to those who refuted a "perfect system ofwritten language"577
because it has shortcomings, for example it does not correct the fault of homonyms
such as "hare and hair, hear and here,,57S which are found in the "living language",
Hutton thought that this was not reason enough to adopt "an erroneous system of
579
written language" for ifwe do, "we onlymultiply error."
This was an era during which the ascendancy of the middle class and a
preoccupation with standardization was rife. Those without a 'tenacious memory'
and who spelt incorrectly were subjected to ridicule and it was the "fear of such
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ridicule that the spelling book writers relied on to produce their adult audience."580
Countless authoritarian books of correct usage were published to teach 'proper'
linguistic behaviour based upon memorization and this was exactly in keeping with
the demands of the market since the "insecure do not want theory, speculation,
abstraction, or exceptions; they want hard and fast practical rules that are easy to
understand and memorize."581 Thus spelling was considered in the eighteenth
century to be a measure ofpoliteness and this was evident in a letter that Lord
Chesterfield wrote to his son on 19 November 1750 regarding the conduct of
gentlemen,
I come now to another part of your letter, which is the orthography, if I
may call bad spelling orthography. You spell induce, enduce; and
grandeur, you spell grandure; two faults, ofwhich few ofmy house¬
maids would have been guilty. I must tell you, that orthography, in the
true sense of the word, is so absolutely necessary for a man of letters, or a
gentleman, that one false spelling may fix a ridicule upon him for the rest
ofhis life; and I know a man of quality, who never recovered the ridicule
of having spelled wholesome without the w.582
Hutton, on the other hand, was in no way calling for greater politeness but was
simply wishing to improve scientific accuracy.
The second main advantage of using a perfect written language Hutton
advanced was the "stability of the spoken language, and security from innovation or
corruption."583 He thought that if the orthography conformed to alphabetical
principles then the spoken language would remain stable since ifpronunciation was
corrupted there would always be a written alphabetical standard based upon
elemental sounds that were physiologically fixed with which to return to. So Hutton
580 Scragg, D.G. A history ofEnglish spelling. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974. 88.
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believed that a proper orthography accurately reflecting speech would also lead to
improved pronunciation as a "just orthography necessarily leads the people to a just
pronunciation of their language, or to perfect speech; whereas, an erroneous
orthography necessarily leads to unjust pronunciation, or imperfect speech."584 At
the time the middle class had a preoccupation with a standard pronunciation and
wished to 'correct' their pronunciation so as to sound similar to those they
considered as their betters. But whether this standard was based on an Edinburgh or
a Metropolitan London style it was nevertheless an elite standard. Conversely, not
only did Hutton assert that language should be standardised based on alphabetical
principles which would lead to more accurate scientific knowledge, but as his perfect
alphabet would lead to improved literacy it was the antithesis of an elitist standard
pronunciation.
Speech is constantly changing in various parts of the nation but Hutton
thought that by adhering to alphabetical principles then regional dialects could be
eradicated. He noted that since the "practice of speech" was "acquired by the ear"
this resulted in the dialects of a language.585 His explanation for this was that over a
period of time vowels change due to the "inaccuracy ofpeople's ears" and this "will
naturally bring a disorder, which will change the vocal speech of different
districts."586 And he thought that there is "not perhaps a tongue on earth, which has
departed so much from the general alphabetical pronunciation, as the English."587








believed this was the "most effectual" way to have the language spoken the same
throughout a nation as
Nothing is more certain than the teaching the proper speaking of a
language by the ear; but it is impossible that every ear in a great nation
can be habituated to the same manner of speech; for, whether we
consider the natural improvement or the natural corruption of a language
as changes happening in different degrees in different places, the people
in a nation, who speak the same language, will be found to speak it
variously in the different places of the kingdom. This is the nature of
things, and it is fully confirmed in the actual state ofnations with regard
to speech. Now,
If there be a natural tendency to diversify the speech of the same nation
in its different parts, there ought to be contrived, in the art ofman, a
remedy against this growing inconveniency; that is, some principle
operating with a contrary tendency, as bringing the various modes of
speech to one common standard. But this can only be done by teaching
speech upon principle, that is, analysing speech to its elements, and
ascertaining the sound of these fixed characters in giving a scientific
description of each. This is the science of the alphabet; and, that this is a
practicable thing has been already shown.588
So Hutton thought that the application of the elemental method would also eradicate
dialects so that a nation's speech would become standardized on a restricted range of
sounds fixed in man's constitution as he thought that "the language of a nation
should [and he believed could] be every where spoken in the same manner."589
Those who advocated the preservation of etymology also tended to take the
position that a standard pronunciation should be based upon the style of speech of the
elite of the South East of England. Samuel Johnson supported an elitist
pronunciation as he believed that, "the best general rule is, to consider those as the
most elegant speakers who deviate least from the written words", words which he
thought should be written based on etymology.590 However, having the language
preserved etymologically is itself elitist since it requires greater time to learn than
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language based upon phonetic rules. Furthermore, James Beattie, one of the leading
Scots Anglicizers, wrote in his The Theory ofLanguage (1783) that,
Now it is in the metropolis of a kingdom, and in the most famous
schools of learning, where the greatest resort may be expected ofpersons
adorned with all useful and elegant accomplishments. The language,
therefore, of the most learned and polite persons in London, and the
neighbouring Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, ought to be
accounted the standard of the English tongue, especially in accent and
pronunciation: syntax, spelling, and idiom, having been ascertained by
the practice of good authors, and the consent of former ages.
And there are two reasons for this preference. One is, that we naturally
approve as elegant what is customary among our superiours (sic). And
another, and a better, reason is, because the most enlightened minds must
be supposed to be the best judges of propriety in speech, as well as in
every other thing that does not affect the conscience.591
But Hutton would have thought it preposterous that those in 'London, and the
neighbouring Universities of Oxford and Cambridge' were in any way 'superior' to
the literati in Edinburgh or more 'enlightened' than his friends at the Lunar Society
in Birmingham. Indeed, the raison d'etre of his Science ofthe Alphabet was to
impose a standard pronunciation based upon rule which was antithetical to the elitist
pronunciation of Johnson and Beattie. This was also contrary to the elocutionist
beliefs of the time and so this indicates that Hutton did not consider himself inferior
in the way that many of the literati had done when they attended the 'Select Society
for Promoting the Reading and Speaking of the English Language in Scotland.'
Contrary to the elitists, Hutton thought that a proper written standard for
pronunciation would have "no dependence upon the fashion of a Court, nor the
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customs of a capital" but would instead conform strictly to the alphabetical rule.
Furthermore, he decided,
To illustrate this by a familiar example: Suppose I, who live in
Edinburgh, were to conform my pronunciation to that which is practised
Beattie, 'The Theory of Language', 297-298.
592 PK II, 723.
171
at London or the Court; I have no other method of attempting this, except
in going to Court, or conversing here with people who had learned their
language in the capital. But, were the orthography of the English tongue
compleat (sic), I should only need to learn the proper pronunciation of
each letter in the alphabet; and then, the first good English writer would
teach me the just pronunciation of the English language. Now, having
learned the just pronunciation of the English tongue, or proper spelling of
our language, I could judge every author who should attempt to alter the
orthography; and, at the same time, I should be able to distinguish every
alteration in speech which departed from the common rule. No man then
could learn to read a book, without learning at the same time to speak
with accuracy and propriety; and, no man could write with judgment,
593without giving a standard for the language of his country.
Indeed, the fashionable pronunciation of the Court and polite London society was
just as erroneous as regional dialects since it failed to adhere to scientific principles.
More importantly, Hutton's idea was the antithesis of the elitist's scheme since he
thought that "Every man in the kingdom, who can read the alphabet for a halfpenny,
has in his hand the authority of state, which, though in this particular not above the
rule of reason, is, when in corroboration of it, absolute and omnipotent."594
Therefore, this implies that a standard pronunciation based on Hutton's Principles of
Orthography would decrease regional barriers. Indeed, although Hutton was
directing his work to the intelligentsia with the aim that they would adopt his
theories, consequentially these improvements if practised by teachers would benefit
children and the lower classes with the result of a more just society. Such a reform
would of course have had considerable political implications, but deep-seated
prejudices by those who judge men by accent and who wished to maintain the status-
quo of an erroneous orthography based upon etymology obstructed the advancement
of the lower classes and their struggle towards literacy. While Hutton's intention
was to increase literacy through a phonetic system to make learning to read easier;
593 PK II, 723-724.
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ironically in the current 'erroneous' etymologically-based system it was, and is, the
poorly educated who are more likely to spell 'correctly' on an alphabetically-based
system but are ridiculed as a result. But Hutton wrote that,
Those who have the power to make a reformation, have no inclination to
labour for the common good; and those who are to be benefited by the
innovation, have no power in the empire of letters. The case, indeed,
seems desperate; But why? only because we are not willing to undertake
the remedy.595
So while he thought that a just pronunciation was the second advantage of a perfect
orthography, Hutton realised that his Science ofthe Alphabet was unlikely to be
accepted.
Another objection against changing the orthography made by Samuel Johnson
was due to the impracticality since language is living and over time a mismatch
between speech and writing develops. Indeed, he thought that some reformers have
"endeavoured to accommodate orthography better to the pronunciation without
considering that this is to measure by a shadow, to take that for a model or standard
which is changing while they apply it."596 And James Beattie who thought that
"pronunciation ought to determine orthography" agreed with and quoted Johnson by
stating that it was impossible to maintain a standard written language based upon
spoken language as speech was constantly changing.597 But Hutton was well aware
that as it naturally improves "changes happen to the language by almost
imperceptible degrees" and that speech "in a nation, is a living thing."598 Indeed,
written language is unable to keep pace with the changes in spoken language.
However, Hutton thought that in order to tackle the resulting disparity of speech and
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writing, the orthography would be required to be "founded on the scientific
principle" of one symbol to one sound, and then
nothing would be more easy than to conform the writing to every
improvement admitted into the art of speech; it even could not fail of
being thus practiced, as, the least departure from the accurate principle
would be an evident transgression of the rule.599
Contrary to the etymologists he thought that,
The pronunciation of a language, or the art of speech, ought not surely to
follow the orthography or rule ofwritten language, as this would be
contrary to the natural course of things; for though, in reading, speech
seems to follow the rule ofwriting, yet, in reading, according to the
elemental method, we do nothing but return the sign or figure into its
native sound. Therefore, the rule ofwriting must be founded in the
pronunciation; and, the art ofwriting should follow the improvements of
a people's speech.600
In other words, by adhering to the "natural order of reading and writing" in which the
orthography follows the speech then according to Hutton it was possible by using the
elemental method to return to accuracy.601 And again the necessary remedy was to
learn and adhere to the orthographic principles using the elemental method since,
Every language may be considered as always changing, and, with the
enlargement of science, ought to be improving; but, however guided with
the pleasure of the ear, and the facility of pronunciation, the living speech
may be improved, yet, the science of that language, and consequently the
orthography (which is founded in this alone) can only be preserved by
the employment of the understanding.602
Therefore, without widespread knowledge of the principles of orthography the
written language is unable to keep up with the changes in the spoken language.
Although writing follows speech in the natural order, since the pronunciation and the
orthography do not correspond due to the departure from rule which multiplies over
time, Hutton believed that in order to achieve perfect speech and writing, an
599 PKII, 660.
600 PK II, 659.
601 Ibid.
602 PK II, 725.
174
interdependence exists whereby it is only by performing the "clear distinction of
elementary sounds" that there is an "unequivocal pronunciation of speech", and it is
"only in this perfect execution of speech, that an expression may be wrote, by the art
ofman, without difficulty or error "603 Hence the accuracy ofwritten language was
for Hutton reliant on pronouncing speech unequivocally, especially clear and distinct
vowels, and provided that speech was expressed clearly then it could be written
accurately even though it might not be understood.
While Hutton's Principles ofOrthography was not what has been termed a
'universal language scheme', he did however believe that it was possible to write
from hearing distinct sounds without the need to understand what was being said.
Consequently, despite the fact that Hutton did not think that error would be
completely eradicated by using a perfect alphabet, he did believe that since language
is living it is by continually returning to alphabetical principles that error would be
kept to a minimum and scientific accuracy would prevail. In this point, Hutton was
aware of one of the pitfalls involved in the construction of a universal alphabet as
even if a symbol matches a sound adequately then the symbol will subsequently be
inadequate through changes in the sound, and unless spelling or alphabet reform is
conducted regularly the match between sound and symbol will continually fluctuate.
But of course Hutton's solution to this difficulty was to employ his method of
continually remounting to principles.
Numerous attempts throughout history have been made to construct a
universal alphabet, but it is a difficult task. The most important issue to be
considered in devising a universal alphabet is that a chosen symbol should represent
603 PK II, 665.
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only one sound unambiguously. However, the main difficulty is that there is no
existing alphabet that has an adequate amount of unambiguous symbols. An
example of this difficulty in English is that the letter c can represent both the sounds
of s and k, as in the words city and cat. On the other hand, each sound should be
represented by only one symbol and English orthography again falls short as the
sound s can be represented by either s or c, as in the words sit and city.604 In
Hutton's elementary method the number of distinguishable figures he thought can
never "exceed thirty, which will comprehend all the vowels and consonants, i.e. the
vocal sounds and articulators that can be well used in language."605 So while he was
attempting to construct a perfect alphabet that would contain every possible sound
required for speech without, "making any application to particular national
practices"606 he was well short of all the human sounds of speech. Indeed, the
English language itself has over forty; and while Hutton anticipated much of the
work that was completed in the late nineteenth century, his universal alphabet was
well short of the over one-hundred sounds in the International Phonetic Alphabet.
Nevertheless, Hutton's Principles ofOrthography was considered innovative as The
Analytical Review believed that in it "the reader will find several new and judicious
animadversions on our english (sic) orthography."607
Although Hutton's Principles ofOrthography was a pedagogical, social and
cultural response against the adherents of etymology, it was, as with the rest of his
metaphysics, primarily an epistemology to test science and to show how there is
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design and order in the universe. Indeed, as with his metaphysics as a whole Hutton
provided evidence of design and order in speech as being benevolently only a
"certain number of distinct articulating powers" and "precise vocal sounds" in the
"constitution ofman"608 so that a system of language could be artificially
constructed. It was also directed towards the literati since it was within their control
to make the necessary changes that the language needed. Another aspect of
Principles ofOrthography that was parallel to Hutton's metaphysics as a whole was
that there was evidence ofhis geometric influence as well as his method of
remounting to first principles.
The critical factor in Hutton's elementary method was that the elements were
based in human nature and "nothing should be considered as belonging to the natural
alphabet, or as a principle in speech, but what is properly defined."609 In other
words, only those sounds which are universal in human nature and that have been
defined in the range of vocal sounds as well as the articulations of these sounds are
the principles of speech belonging to the elementary alphabet. But within his
analysis although Hutton thought that speech and writing were devised by the art of
man, the restricted range of sounds in human speech were the "effect of an intelligent
design, by which he [mankind] had been adapted in body and mind for this
discovery."610 Furthermore, while brutes have the means for making sounds, even if
there is no obvious end for these sounds Hutton made the extraordinary remark that
one end which he conjectured upon is that the cries of brutes might have been a
device by an intelligent designer to teach language to man through man's imitation of
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brutes 611 Therefore, humans had been benevolently endowed with a limited number
of vocal sounds so that the alphabet could be constructed artificially to become the
"glory of science" which after speech Hutton considered to be the greatest
accomplishment of humankind.612
As with his work as a whole Hutton was addressing the literati when he
appealed for the orthography to follow the speech, but he would have found it
impossible to persuade the ardent adherents of etymology. Of course Samuel
Johnson had earlier noted that a "great orthographical contest has long subsisted
between etymology and pronunciation"613, but Johnson's attitude was that the
preservation of etymology was to be upheld. And James Beattie, a follower of
Johnson, wrote that reforming the language to a standard based upon pronunciation
"would obliterate etymology, and, with that, the remembrance ofmany old customs
and sentiments, would take away from the significancy ofmany important words,
and involve in confusion both our grammar and our policy."614 Hutton on the other
hand expressed that those who cultivate the art of orthography can simultaneously
transgress the orthographic principles in a gross manner and thought that there is no
compensation for ignoring orthographic principles as we continue to practice an
erroneous orthography only because we have "so widely departed from the truth of
scientific principle."615 Indeed, he reprimanded gentlemen of science by noting that
his appeal was "not addressed to the vulgar, who without thought practice the art of
writing, as they had been taught; it is addressed to men of science, who must know
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the reason why a thing is done; and who ought to seek a better motive for their
acting, than their father had done so before."616 So to both the English and Scots
literati "who have the power to make a reformation"617 Hutton appealed that they
would return the language to the principles upon which it was founded.
Hutton provided an analogy of the principles of the art of speech with the art
ofmeasuring in geometry to show how going back to first principles was the only
way to build a solid foundation of alphabetical principles.618 Indeed, he noted that
the
alphabet being the scientific rule or natural principles of our speech, and
also ofour written language, these principles cannot be employed, in
science, without knowing their truth; no more than in the science of
mathematics, could proposition be employed without preceding
definition, or axioms be admitted which were not clear, intelligible, and
without ambiguity.619
Certainly the alphabetic symbols can only correspond with the elements of spoken
language once these elements are considered to be "naturally fixed and unalterable
(as much as the elements of figure or of geometry)."620 And so the influence of
Hutton's geometric reasoning was also evident in his Principles ofOrthography.
Presuming that the elements of speech are definable, unalterable and fixed in
man's constitution was the pivotal axiom upon which Hutton's Principles of
Orthography was built. He thought that it is "only in this clear distinction of
elementary sounds, that language can be rendered perfect, in the unequivocal
pronunciation of speech; and it is only in this perfect execution of speech, that an
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expression may be wrote, by the art ofman, without difficulty or error."621 Hutton's
partial aim in Principles ofOrthography was "to perfect or improve the practice of
our orthography, in seeing the true principles which is founded that most scientific
art."622 But Principles ofOrthography was first and foremost aimed at protecting the
accuracy of science by counteracting the multiplication of error in language. And
since "one false principle, admitted by us in our science, vitiates all that branch of
reasoning which is founded on it"623, Hutton had to firstly employ his approach of
'remounting to principles' in order to "distinguish the first principles of speech."624
In doing so he arrived at the vowels which he noted were formed by an "operation
which is instinctive; and thus we may be certain, that, in our analysis, we have
arrived at a first principle." Having "found the alphabetical principles of
language" in human physiology, Hutton then thought that it was "in our power to
perfect an alphabet upon that principle"626, and this "task [of constructing a perfect
alphabet] was undertaken" and dependant upon the "presumption of these elements
being definable." Indeed, allowing for his presumption that the first principles of
speech were without tone, he accomplished what he set out to do and illustrated the
advantages that his method would achieve. Therefore, from his Principles of
Orthography it is evident that as with the rest ofhis entire body ofwork, James
Hutton's dictum was that, "It is the nature of science to improve itself, by
remounting to its principles."628
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Chapter Five—The Importance of Hutton's Theory of Language to Science
While Hutton's theory of language was intended to facilitate education and to
stabilize pronunciation it was primarily part of his metaphysics that was applied as an
epistemology to his science. It was clearly evident that Hutton's metaphysics was
applied to his science especially in his method of remounting to first principles, but
as there is a mutual progress between science and language with error in one
equalling error in both then it was also the case that Hutton's theory of language was
part of the metaphysics which he applied to his science. And Hutton thought that if
the English language continued to be based upon etymology, thus memory instead of
principle, then it was in danger of ending up obstructing science like the Chinese
language. Consequently, Hutton's theory of language had implications for his and
others' science since if natural philosophy continued to be written on an erroneous
etymological standard it would eventually fall into scientific ruin.
Clearly Hutton thought that the physical world could not be investigated
unless the metaphysical world was founded on sound principles and this was
emphasized throughout his work and was in fact evident in his physical as well as his
metaphysical inquiries. Certainly, even within his Theory of the Earth it is evident
that an understanding ofMan was ofprimary importance as he wrote that,
The globe of this earth is evidently made for man. He alone, of all the
beings which have life upon this body, enjoys the whole and every part;
he alone is capable of knowing the nature of this world, which he thus
possesses in virtue of his proper right; and he alone can make the
knowledge of this system a source ofpleasure and the means of
happiness.
MAN alone, of all the animated beings which enjoy the benefits of this
earth, employs the knowledge which he there receives, in leading him to
judge of the intention of things, as well as of the means by which they are
brought about; and he alone is thus made to enjoy, in contemplation as
well as sensual pleasure, all the good that may be observed in the
182
constitution of this world; he, therefore, should be made the first subject
of enquiry.629
This part was presented to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1785 and later
published in the first volume of the Transactions ofthe Royal Society ofEdinburgh
in 1788. But in 1795 in Volume I of his extended Theory of the Earth, with Proofs
and Illustrations Hutton also noted that, "It is not given to man to know what things
truly are in themselves, but only what those things are in his thought."630 While both
of these passages echo the sentiments ofHume, they are also clear evidence that
within his science and in this case his geology Hutton was applying metaphysical
inquiry to science. Therefore, this should always be taken into consideration
whenever Hutton's geology is read.
Throughout Hutton's science there is evidence of how the examination of the
principles of knowledge was the key to establishing scientific truth. Indeed, in his
Dissertations on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy (1792) Hutton noted that
without solid metaphysical principles an examination of the physical world was
worthless as,
In order to avoid that error, so reprehensible in our present science, I
have endeavoured (sic) to pursue, what I believe must be esteemed, the
true method of physical investigation; viz. to analise (sic) our ideas of
external things, by separating, with all the accuracy ofmetaphysical
reflection, matter of fact from matter of opinion,—that which has the
testimony of sense, from that which is only imagined by the mind itself,
without having the sanction of external information; and especially, by
distinguishing that which is only supposed from a negative appearance,
and that which is necessarily concluded from the testimony of an
information that is positive.631
629 Hutton, James. "Theory of the Earth; or an investigation of the laws observable in the
composition, dissolution, and restoration of land upon the globe" in Transactions ofthe Royal Society
ofEdinburgh. Volume 1, 1788. 209-304 plus plates. 216-217.
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Of course the way to establish positive information was by employing Hutton's
geometric procedure and this was also evident in his science as he wrote that
"physical principles, which at present are so few and so ill understood, may be
established with all the evidence which is acknowledged in those ofmathematics."632
But Hutton's method of remounting to principles and his conclusion that the universe
was designed and ordered were also evident throughout his science.
Hutton's general system was held together with the conclusion established in
his metaphysics that there was divine design and order in the universe and this was
displayed throughout his science. In the 1788 version of his Theory of the Earth he
wrote that,
Man is not satisfied, like the brute, in seeing things which are; he seeks to
know how things have been, and what they are to be. It is with pleasure
that he observes order and regularity in the works ofnature, instead of
being disgusted with disorder and confusion; and he is made happy from
the appearance ofwisdom and benevolence in the design, instead of
being left to suspect in the Author of nature, any of that imperfection
which he finds in himself.633
The first volume of the 1795 version of Theory of the Earth noted that "having
surveyed the order of this living world, and having investigated the progress of this
active scene of life, death and circulation, we find ample data on which to found a
train of the most conclusive reasoning with regard to a general design."634 In the
second volume he wrote more explicitly that "We live in a world where order every
where prevails."635 Furthermore, in Volume II of Theory of the Earth Hutton thought
that it was evident that nature was ordered by a benevolent power to prevent chaos in
the world as,
632 Ibid., xiii.
633 Hutton, "Theory of the Earth" (1788), 286-287.
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that wise system of nature, in which nothing is done in vain, and in which
every thing tends to accomplish the end with the greatest of economy and
benevolence. Had it been otherwise, and the demolishing powers of the
land increased, in a growing rate with the diminution of the height, the
changes of this earth and renovation of our continent, in which
occasionally animal life must suffer, would necessarily require to be
often repeated; and, in that case, chaos and confusion would seem to be
introduced into that system which at present appears to be established
with such order and economy that man suspects not any change; it
requires the views of scientific men to perceive that things are not at
present such as they were created; it requires all the observation of a
natural philosopher to know that in this earth there has been change,
although it is not every natural philosopher that observes the benevolence
accompanying this constitution of things which must subsist in change.636
But the benevolent power preventing geological chaos had also designed and ordered
the moral system and made happiness the final cause ofhumankind. And in another
ofhis works on science, A Dissertation upon the Philosophy ofLight, Heat and Fire
(1794), this aim was expressed by Hutton since,
Science, no doubt, promotes the arts of life; and it is natural for human
wisdom to improve these arts. But, what are all the arts of life, or all the
enjoyments of the mere animal nature, compared with the art ofhuman
happiness—an art which is only to be obtained by education and which is
only brought to perfection by philosophy! Man must learn to know
himself; he must see his station among created things; he must become a
moral agent; and he must enquire after that system in which he had been
intended either for happiness, or for misery, as an end.637
So examples ofhow Hutton applied his metaphysics to his science can be seen
throughout his scientific work and none more so than his methodology of remounting
to principles.
The correction of first principles and the process of remounting to principles
was another metaphysical aspect that was applied to Hutton's science. In his
Dissertations on Different Subjects in Natural Philosophy (1792) he commented on
636 Ibid., 203-204n.
637 Hutton, James. A Dissertation upon the Philosophy ofLight, Heat and Fire. Edinburgh: Printed
for Messrs Cadell, Junior, and Davies, London, 1794. v-vi.
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metaphysics in response to those philosophers who had not paid enough attention to
first principles as he noted that,
reasoning from false principles is perhaps far more dangerous to science,
than is false reasoning from principles which are true. Because, the
faculty of reasoning justly upon our principles, is found in every person
of a sound mind; whereas there are but few minds that posses the faculty
of correcting unsound principles, by remounting through the various
steps of reasoning to detect the first error of a rash assumption.638
And in the case of remounting through knowledge to find erroneous reasoning, in
Theory of the Earth Hutton thought that "having once departed one step from the
path of just investigation, our physical science is necessarily bewildered in the
labyrinth of error. Let us then, in re-examining our data, point out where lies that
first devious step which had been taken."639 But of course Hutton considered that the
way to examine "our knowledge ofnature or of external things" was by
remounting to the first progress of this growing series, or where the
rudiments of science may be traced in the operations of a conscious
mind. It is in order to have principles established in something, where, if
possible, there may not be a doubt; and from whence, by proceeding with
that strict attention which is due to science, we may in reasoning arrive at
what might then be properly termed the truth of knowledge, in having no
inconsistency, either in its principles or its result, that is, in neither
proceeding from inconsistent principles, nor leading to opposite
conclusions.640
Certainly, Hutton thought that he had corrected first principles in establishing his
theory ofperception and held that he had achieved both physical and metaphysical
truth. However, the emphasis that Hutton placed upon remounting to principles also
meant that natural philosophers could only attain certainty in their reasoning once
they had remounted to first principles or the undoubted information received by
sensation and perception as "the progress of our mind, in natural philosophy,
638 Hutton, Natural Philosophy, ix.
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186
originates all from that knowledge which we have by means of the information of
our senses."641 Indeed, since "all our knowledge properly arises from sensation
(which from its nature is a thing certain)"642, then
every theory, respecting external things, that does not ultimately resolve
itself into sensation, or originate from it, must be false or merely
imaginary, as having no foundation in actual things, and as being only
conceived in the mind forming abstract ideas, without the immediate
conduct of absolute knowledge, which is the same with what is termed
sensation.643
Yet in view of the fact that Hutton understood that the external world can only be
inferred, his Theory ofthe Earth corresponded to his metaphysics in that he believed
that all physical principles were "founded upon matter of fact or experience."644 But
also in his Theory of the Earth Hutton considered that indeed "few among
philosophysing (sic) men remount to the first principles of their theory."645 So no
matter how many steps a natural philosopher took in a complex proposition Hutton
thought that it was vital that all the steps should be retraced back to metaphysical
first principles.
Hutton clearly thought that metaphysical principles should be applied to
science and since his metaphysics included his principles of language these should
equally be applied to science. Indeed, this was so as Hutton considered the
application of language to be of critical importance "especially when the science of
logic [which equaled language for Hutton] is considered as so essential to man; and
when it is acknowledged, that metaphysics is the science in which the principles of
641 PK 1,44.
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all the others are to be examined."646 Therefore, the crucial factor in understanding
Hutton's work on language is that it was not merely a contribution to language
improvement in fact it was part ofHutton's metaphysics which he applied to the
other findings ofhis science. So Hutton's theory of language was essentially part of
an epistemology in which he thought that the search for scientific truth was liable to
corruption without accurate principles of language.
Language was placed early in the faculty of science in the progress of
Hutton's ordered intellectual system. And since he considered "how little progress in
the intellectual acquirements ofmankind could be made without the aid of language"
647 then it was necessary to perfect language on proper principles just as it had been
essential to perfect metaphysical first principles. But while it "cannot be doubted,
that science and language mutually promote each other's progress"648 in the
individual, it is likewise in the human species. In the individual this mutual progress
was illustrated by Hutton in the progress of the mind and how language begins once
'science' (i.e. beyond the instinctive faculties) has been achieved. However, this
mutual progress in the species requires proper principles in both thinking and
language so that accuracy is maintained in the accumulation of 'science' (i.e. as a
large body of knowledge). Indeed, Hutton thought that,
There is not an operation more scientifical (sic) than that of language;
for, science is properly the operation of the species man, and not of the
individual who also does his part: Now, language is the very means by
which the species preserve science, in communicating it successively to
the individuals.649
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So since Hutton thought that the progress of language and science were
"conjoined"650 then error in one could result in error in both thus dire consequences
for natural philosophy.
Hutton believed that the consequences of erroneous language would be
absurdity and confusion and this would also apply to his natural philosophy. An
absurd practice of language would eventually lead to absurd science in which
memorization would replace principles. Of course the most serious corruption of the
English language was how the orthographical practice of an erroneous etymological
standard meant that
we do not find the same sound always connected with the same figure.
Here is, therefore, in a scientific view ofwritten language, a manifest
absurdity, which has slipped into the practice of a nation learned and
wise,—a nation that pretends to write and read on scientific principle.651
And Hutton thought that by continuing to adhere to this "erroneous system ofwritten
language.. .we only multiply error."652 Therefore, in order to preserve natural
philosophy accurately, language must be founded and practiced upon proper
principles of language otherwise the accumulation of science written on a erroneous
system would lead to the multiplication of erroneous science. Furthermore, the
failure to adhere to alphabetical principles was more importantly symptomatic of the
failure ofphilosophers to remount to first principles. Indeed, Hutton wrote that,
It is the nature of science to improve itself, by remounting to its
principles. The science of England has arrived at its present state by
means of an orthography, which however is imperfect; and now it is the
business of science, or philosophy, to perfect those very means by which
knowledge had been attained.653
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So in opposition to the etymologists, Hutton thought that it was imperative to adhere
to the first principles of language and the "natural order of reading and writing" in
which the orthography follows the speech.654 And he concluded that since these
principles were self-evident then to ignore them was preposterous. Therefore,
Hutton's conclusion was that the English langauge was slipping away from the
alphabetical system and degenerating towards a language in which memorization
would replace principles and resemble Chinese.
In support ofhis argument that the English orthography should strictly adhere
to alphabetical principles, Hutton gave China as "a most illustrious example for the
confirmation of our theory, and a powerful argument to induce us to perfect our
orthography, by studying the scientific principles of that art."655 While he recognised
that the Chinese had invented printing, magnets, and gun-powder long before they
were known in Europe and by doing so without the alphabet, Hutton thought that this
was "an enigma, for the solving ofwhich there is nothing, either in human history, or
in the common sense ofmankind."656 Although in this regard the Chinese did not
lack science, it was however the absence of the alphabet that prevented China from
becoming as learned as the Europeans. Indeed, it was by means of the alphabet that
the English had learned from other nations as Hutton noted that, "In England, again,
there is as much science as in any other place upon the globe; and yet it must appear,
that the English nation had not its alphabetical writing from its science, but its
science from its alphabetical writing."657 So the accumulation of science
communicated across nations was made by using alphabetical writing in contrast to
654
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the Chinese nation in which learning to read and write became a lifetime's
occupation. Certainly, Hutton thought that the Chinese
method of reading and writing would require the study of a man's life to
acquire, few people would be general readers or writers; and, nobody
would be universally learned in this respect, as are our European
scholars, however easy it would be for individuals to arrive at partial
accomplishments in this respect, or for every body to attain to that which
might be necessary for some limited transactions. Accordingly, in China,
we find almost every person writing; but most of those that write, write
very little; and no person, perhaps, in that great empire, can write above
one half of the words of their language; at the same time, this difficulty
must still increase with the progress of their science and their learning.658
Of course if the English language degenerated into a system that required a lifetime
to learn it would have dire consequences for science. However, in contrast to the
Chinese system Hutton believed that the alphabet was the "glory of science" and is a
most ingenious invention, which does honour to human wisdom; being,
next after speech, the most useful art ofman; for, the alphabet, as it is the
legitimate child of science, so is it the mother of learning. By an
alphabet, children are taught to read, before they understand the written
language; by an alphabet, men are taught to write every language that
they hear, and speeches which they do not understand; and, by an
alphabet, man is made a writer in a day, and a reader in an hour.659
Nevertheless, the alphabet had been corrupted and learning to read and write was
obstructed by an erroneous etymological standard which Hutton believed could
easily be overcome by returning to alphabetical principles. Consequently, Hutton
was aghast that,
if the invention of an alphabet does honour to human nature, and
procures a most essential benefit to society, what must we think of the
abuse of this valuable art, or the corruption of this useful science? What
shall we say of learned nations, who seem to think that learning has
become too easy, and therefore have contrived to make reading and
writing more operose and less accurate, by giving to different characters
the same expression of sound, and to different sounds the same character
in writing, thus confounding science in ignorance, order in disorder?660
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Although words spelt without connection to pronunciation happen in all European
languages, Hutton of course was mostly concerned with the English language. And
the danger ofEnglish degenerating to a system like Chinese was a reality for Hutton
as he noted that,
every deviation from the strict rule of scientifical (sic) distinction in the
analysis of speech, and from the employment of alphabetical principles
for the commutation of speech and writing, is so far to adopt the method,
already considered, ofwriting by the figuring ofwords or syllables; a
defect which, in the Chinese, we pity, with some degree ofblame; and
which, in ourselves, we are apt to excuse, perhaps not without some
mixture of approbation.661
So Hutton was appalled with those who objected to orthographic improvement and
wished to cling on to an erroneous etymological standard, especially since those
objectors against improvement acknowledged the "error in our science" and were
only able to object on the grounds that the correction of the language would be an
"inconveniency."662 Hutton was not however the first to give China as an example of
how the English language could end up. Benjamin Franklin had proposed a phonetic
alphabet in a letter to Mary Stevenson on July 20, 1768 because
ifAmendments are never attempted and things continue to grow worse
and worse they must come to be in a wretched Condition at last; such
indeed I think our Alphabet and Writing already in; but ifwe go as we
have done a few Centuries longer, our words will gradually cease to
express Sounds, they will only stand for things, as the written words do
in the Chinese Language.663
But in contrast to Franklin's Schemefor a New Alphabet, Hutton's Principles of
Orthography was far more extensive and complex, and it was also part of a
metaphysical inquiry that was to be employed as a scientific method.
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The multiplication of error in language also made an impact upon thinking
and vice versa. So there was no point in correcting the principles upon which we
think if our language continued to be erroneous. Indeed, in his Principles of
Orthography Hutton noted that,
one false principle, admitted by us in our science, vitiates all that branch
of reasoning which is founded on it. Even the admitting of a principle
which is not false, but the evidence ofwhich is not seen, corrupts the
mind, which is thus made to reason with the fallacy ofman, and to
believe without the certainty of science. Thus superstition is taught,
instead of science; and men become learned without being wise.
The subject may seem too trivial for the moral which is here endeavoured
to be founded on it; perhaps it is so; nevertheless, if the reasoning be just,
it is not altogether out ofplace. For, it must be considered, that when the
question is this, How shall we best learn to think by rule, to know from
principle, or to judge in science; nothing is so important to our learning,
as the first rules which we are made to form. Now, when rules are
multiplied without necessity, and exceptions to those rules considered of
equal importance to the rules themselves, the way to science, if not
perverted, is at least obstructed; for, it is not in learning rules of human
institution that science is promoted, but in knowing the reason of such
rules.664
Therefore, the multiplication ofbroken orthographic rules led to corrupt thinking as
well as corrupt language. And if science and indeed metaphysics were to progress
towards perfection then this required a proper method of recording so that our
reasoning was correct. But although language was an art, the limited number of
elements of speech was God-given benevolently and so having made signs for these
sounds in the alphabet man should strictly adhere to principles. This was further
justification according to Hutton for others to adhere to alphabetical principles rather
than an etymological standard since why should orthography be based on an
intentionally erroneous etymological standard especially as it goes against what is
part of the order of the human constitution. Hutton hoped that both the Scots literati
664 PK 11,721-722.
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at the Royal Society ofEdinburgh and the English intelligentsia who read his
Principles ofKnowledge would see the wisdom in his proposals and take a lead by
utilising his theory of language, however as with his physics and his metaphysics he
did not expect that everyone would be able to see this as
It requires philosophy to see the system of things, which in human nature
leads to the principles of speech; and it requires the accuracy of science
to define those principles, so as we may proceed synthetically to reason
upon them, both for the improvement of our natural speech, and the
perfection of our art ofwriting.665
However for those who had progressed in reason to philosophy which Hutton held
was synonymous with natural religion it would be self-evident that language should
be practiced upon God-given principles.
665 PK II, 708.
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Conclusion
While posterity has virtually ignored Principles ofKnowledge, had it been
rewritten as Playfair had done with the Theory of the Earth then it is possible that it
might have received more attention over the years. However, Playfair noted "I have
hardly found this work ofDr Hutton's quoted by any writer of eminence, except by
Dr Par, in his Spital Sermon, a tract, no less remarkable for learning and acuteness,
than for the liberality and candour of the sentiments which it contains."666 And this
neglect probably was more to do with the outmoded deism which featured
throughout Principles ofKnowledge rather than the obscurity of the text as in fact
Playfair noted that when Hutton was writing about natural religion,
It is worthy of remark, that while he is thus employed, his style assumes
a better tone, and a much greater degree ofperspicuity, than it usually
possesses. Many instances might be pointed out, where the warmth ofhis
benevolent and moral feelings bursts through the clouds that so often veil
from us the clearest ideas of his understanding.667
Indeed, it was clearly his natural religion that Hutton held in greatest respect and
although in posterity it has received little attention he would have been delighted
with what The English Review made of this aspect of his Principles ofKnowledge as,
It has been the usual reproach ofmetaphysical writers, that their inquiries
very generally terminate in scepticism; and perhaps the same constitution
ofmind which is fitted for the subtle and minute investigations of
metaphysics, is not equally capable of those great and comprehensive
views which afford the foundation ofphilosophical piety. From this
reproach, however, Dr. Hutton's work is altogether free. There is,
perhaps, no system ofphilosophy, ancient or modem, which presents so
amiable and animating a picture ofman, which exhibits so many sublime
views of the system ofnature, and which has the tendency to excite in the
mind so profound a reliance on the wisdom and benevolence of its
author. Whenever, too, these subjects occur, the Doctor expresses
himself in a style of earnestness and animation which, while it shews the
deep conviction ofhis own mind, is of all others the best fitted to produce
an impression upon the mind of his readers. The value of such a work, in
666 Playfair, 'Biographical Account', 84n.
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the present state of science, it is difficult to appreciate; and we think we
do no exaggerate its importance when we say, that in our opinion it is
impossible for any one to rise from the study of it, without feeling
himself a better and a happier man.668
Nevertheless, his metaphysical talent was unquestioned as The English Review also
noted that,
Ifwe are to estimate the character of an author by the subjects on which
his labours have been employed, Dr. Hutton will stand in the first class of
philosophical writers. The inquiries he has pursued are the most
important that can interest mankind, and comprehend almost every
subject that has occupied the attention ofphilosophers, since the study of
the human mind has been the object of their pursuit. In the conduct of
these investigations too, he has every where given proofs of great vigour
and originality of thought. His opinions, on all these subjects, are his
own: instead of adopting the principles of any of the preceding sects of
philosophy, he has formed his principles from his own reflection and
observation: and even in the structure of his language he seems either to
have forgot, or to have disdained, the usual phraseology of philosophy,
and to have sought only for those terms that might best express his own
peculiar conceptions. Whatever may be the final decision of
philosophers with respect to the truth of his opinions, philosophy itself
will always be indebted to him, not only for the light which he has
thrown on many important subjects, but also for the example he has
given of sincere and manly investigation.669
In spite of the neglect ofPrinciples ofKnowledge, this thesis has established that
Hutton's metaphysics was a rigorously empirical epistemology that he applied to his
science. He undertook an a posteriori Humean approach from which he thought that
he had ascertained God's existence. His method was that observation must precede
theory, and he saw himself as a philosopher rather than a geologist.
Devices that Hutton used to uphold his position included his argument that
anyone could test his position a posteriori to reach happiness through wisdom and
virtue, as well as utilising an original theory of perception to obtain a double physical
and metaphysical proof. This double proof established that matter was an active
668 The English Review, Volume XXVI October 1795., 262-263.
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power thus overturning the Newtonian paradigm that matter was inert, solid,
extended and impenetrable. And so that his readers could test his theory of
perception, Hutton provided an experiment as,
the figures of letters of our alphabet are well known to us, and, upon the
slightest look, they may be distinguished from each other; and, without a
just consideration of the thing, it may be rashly concluded, that in such
cases, when we have instantly named the letter which is presented, or a
word composed ofmany letters, we have truly perceived its figure; this,
however, is not the case, as is to be proved in the following manner:
Instead of presenting those known figures, let a similar glance of the eye
be taken of the letter of an alphabet that is written with a character
perfectly different and unknown, then let the proper alphabet be
immediately presented, in order that the observer may point out the letter
that had been shewn (sic) sufficiently to have been distinguished and
known, if it had been a letter ofhis own alphabet; in this case, his not
being able to point out the letter, is a proof, that when he names the
known letter upon a slight glance of the eye, the figure of the letter is not
all perceived, but only a part, from whence the rest is imagined. This is
also the case with a word of an unknown language written in our own
alphabet.670
Within Hutton's theory of language a number of debates were entered into including
one in his Principles ofSpeech against the belief in natural language by the
philosophes Charles de Brosses and Antoine Court de Gebelin. Therefore, Hutton
did not confine himself to matters solely directed towards members of the Scottish or
English literati—he was also participating in arguments with the European
intelligentsia. However, Hutton's theory of language was both an illustration of the
mind's ordered progress as well as a critique against etymological rules which he
thought could lead to scientific ruin. At a time when the origin of language debate
was fully active, Hutton as to be expected took an empirical approach and so he did
not engage in conjectural history nor did he comment on the social origins of
language. He noticed that there were physiologically fixed limited sounds which he
670 PK I, 171
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concluded were the result of God's benevolence so as to prevent linguistic chaos.
But this was also an empirical examination as he described the vocal powers from
experience.
Throughout Principles ofKnowledge, Hutton noted that only the philosopher
was able to notice systemised order and design in the universe bestowed by a
benevolent power that had the happiness of humans as a final cause. In other words,
the attainment ofphilosophy was equal to the attainment of natural religion. This
was an a posteriori metaphysical exercise; therefore time and time again Hutton was
referring to himself as a philosopher. While Playfair thought that Hutton "possessed,
in an eminent degree, the talents, the acquirements, and the temper, which entitle a
man to the name of a philosopher" , a thorough understanding ofHutton as an
intellectual has been restricted due to him being pigeonholed as the 'Founder of
Modem Geology.' Nevertheless, it would seem that Hutton thought of himself as a
philosopher not merely as he had progressed to that level of intellect, but also
because there is evidence that he wished to be portrayed as a philosopher. Indeed, a
medallion created in 1792 by James Tassie in which Hutton wore "antique rather
than contemporary costume", emphasized that he "thought of himself as a
philosopher rather than as a farmer, geologist or businessman."672 In contrast to the
Tassie portraits of Joseph Black, Adam Smith, John Robison, William Robertson and
Adam Ferguson; Hutton was shown in classical rather than eighteenth century
dress.673 And besides Hutton the only others to be portrayed in classical dress in
Tassie medallions were "Robert Adam, the high priest of neoclassicism, and the
671 Playfair, 'Biographical Account', 88.
672 Jones, Jean. 'James Hutton' in A Hotbed ofGenius: The Scottish Enlightenment, 1730-1790.
Edited by David Daiches, Peter Jones and Jean Jones. Edinburgh: The Saltire Society, 1996. 122.
673 Jones, Jean. 'The Tassie Portrait of James Hutton' in The Edinburgh Geologist. Edinburgh: The
Edinburgh Geological Society, No. 16. Autumn 1984. 2-5. 3.
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philosophers David Hume[674] and Thomas Reid."675 So it would seem that Hutton
chose to be portrayed as a philosopher, not least because "the classical mode of the
portrait is unlikely to have been suggested by Tassie, for he was apparently unaware
ofHutton's reputation referring to him only as 'an Edinburgh gentleman'."676
Therefore, Hutton's self-image was not that of a geologist, but instead he considered
himself a philosopher.
Certainly, it was Hutton's methodology that held the greatest importance for
interpreting how he approached his Theory of the Earth. Most of the historiography
regarding Hutton has been directed towards whether or not his Theory of the Earth
was based upon modern scientific methodology. From what this thesis has
uncovered from his Principles ofKnowledge it is evident that he applied a scientific
methodology in keeping with modern standards.
Current interpretations ofHutton are unsatisfactory because he is incessantly
categorised as simply a geologist in the same manner as Adam Smith has been
pigeon-holed as merely an economist. Certainly, just as "one must rescue Adam
Smith from the economists if one is to see him whole"677, one must rescue Hutton
from the geologists and historians of science if one is to see him whole.
Contemporary interpretations ofHutton are also inadequate since the majority of
them have been fixated with taking sides as to whether Hutton was a purely inductive
674 "Tassie made two medallions of both Hume and Adam. In each case the version in contemporary
dress is by far the better known." Jones, Jean. 'The Tassie Portrait of James Hutton' in The
Edinburgh Geologist. Edinburgh: The Edinburgh Geological Society, No. 16. Autumn 1984. 2-5. 5.
n4.
675
Jones, Jean. 'The Tassie Portrait', 3.
676
Jones, Jean. 'The Tassie Portrait', 4., and 5 n.6. "Tassie to Wilson, Letter 56, 12th April 1792,
Scottish National Portrait Gallery."
677 Forbes, Duncan. 'Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment', in S.C. Brown (ed.), Philosophers ofthe
Enlightenment, Chapter 5, Harvester Press for the Royal Institute of Philosophy (1979) 94-109 as
collected in Hume (Great Political Thinkers: 10) Volume II (eds.) John Dunn and Ian Harris,
Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1997. 78-93. 79.
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or a purely deductive geologist. Of course, this thesis concludes that based upon his
method in Principles ofKnowledge and his intentions for natural philosophy Hutton
used both induction and deduction however induction always took precedence over
deduction. And another major confusion that most interpretations ofHutton have
displayed is that they have failed to comprehend that his works were written at a time
when natural religion and empirical science were compatible. Indeed, as Nicholas
Hudson pointed out,
The direction of ideological change has never been from one universally
held position to another. Certain opinions may gradually achieve pre¬
eminence, pushing previously dominant positions into the periphery of
what the intellectual establishment deems sound or orthodox. But
intellectual history—particularly in areas devoted to human rather than
physical sciences—is seldom characterised by the complete or sudden
eradication of previous outlooks. Proponents of traditional and
innovative ideologies may battle for ascendancy over many decades, and
their encounters inevitably produce hybrid ideologies that seem neither
entirely old or new. Individual authors will display both attachments to
the past and leanings to the future. And their statements always form
part of an ongoing dialogue with other authors past and present, or even
678with the author's own changing and indecisive ruminations.
And in the case ofHutton's innovative Theory ofthe Earth he was using empirical
principles combined with a teleology which was going out of fashion, but
nevertheless one that he thought was ascertained by empirical principles. Therefore,
the Theory of the Earth cannot be completely understood if it is read without
examining Hutton's metaphysics because it is in the Principles ofKnowledge that his
epistemology is revealed. So the consequence of an investigation into the content of
Hutton's metaphysics is that he can be observed not as either modem or old-
fashioned, inductive or deductive, deist or atheist, but as an eighteenth-century Scots
philosopher.
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